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KARMASIDDHIPRAKARANA: *THE TREATISE ON ACTION BY VASUBANDHU*
BY ETIENNE LAMOTTE ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY LEO M. PRUDEN

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PREFACE

When, in 1936, as requested by my teacher, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, I published the Tibetan version and the French translation of the *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa*, I only hoped to bring out of obscurity a small work, long lost to view, of the great *ācārya* Vasubandhu. Great was my suprise to learn that my learned colleague and friend, the Rev. Susumu Yamaguchi, was likewise interested in this treatise and had made a fresh start in studying it. With the utmost consideration engendered by the best traditions of Buddhism, he asked me to write a Preface to his work claiming that I had been the *pravartaka* or the first one to initate the study of this text. I could not but acceed to a request so amiably formulated, although I consider myself very poorly qualified to present this new and entirely original work of Professor Yamaguchi to the educated public. Nevertheless my task will be brief, for Prof. Yamaguchi is universally known for his numerous and learned works on Buddhist philosophy. His publications on the *Ālambanaparikaṣa* of Dignāga, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Mahāyānaviṁśaka* of Vasubandhu, and the *Śūnyatāsaptati* and the *Yuktiṣaṣtikā* of doubtful authorship—are as widely known in the West as in the East, particularly to the French public. These works have drawn the attention of Indian scholars to long-forgotten texts: one of them, the Ven. Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyāna had the good fortune to discover in Tibet, in the Sha-lu Monastery, the Sanskrit original of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, which he immediately published in the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* in 1937; another pandit, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, relied on the work of Professor Yamaguchi in his Sanskrit reconstruction of the stanzas of the *Mahāyānaviṁśaka*. But the major work of Prof. Yamaguchi is without contradiction his edition of the *Madhyāntavibhaṅgaṭikā* of Sthiramati, based on the manuscript of this text discovered in Nepal in 1928. This manuscript, in a very bad state, presented numerous lacunae: this Japanese scholar, with his well tested knowledge and admirable patience, succeeded in using the Tibetan version of this work to thus restore to the academic community the original text of Asanga's *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* as well as the *Ṭīkā* to this work by Sthiramati. This second volume, which contains the Tibetan and Chinese versions of this text, contains, in addition, a detailed index which continues to render the most signal service to scholars in the field.

Without wishing to revive a controversey which has abated today, I shall content myself with mentioning the extremely clear position taken by Prof.

Yamaguchi with respect to the question of the historicity of Maitreya: in contrast to many historians, ancient as well as modern, Prof. Yamaguchi refused to see Maitreya as a historical personage. According to him, the five treatises which are attributed to Maitreya, the *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, etc., are in reality the work of Asaṅga, who wrote them under the real or supposed inspiration of the great Bodhisattva. In order to defend this thesis, Prof. Yamaguchi based himself on the formal declarations of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati in their concluding stanzas (*abhyarcanakārikā*) where they designate Asaṅga as the true narrator (*vaktā*) of the works upon which they are commenting. If the Hīnayānists could legitimately consider their Scriptures as the very word of the Buddha himself transmitted down through the ages by a succession of masters and disciples, the masters of the Māhayāna found themselves in an infinitely more delicate situation since the Māhayāna sūtras, which mark a considerable progress from the original doctrines of the Buddha, appeared only at a relatively late date, perhaps around the beginning of the Christian era. Not being able to place their texts within the authority of an uninterrupted oral tradition, the Māhayānists sought to authenticate their scriptures by means of different strategems. The compilers of the Prajñāpāramitā and the masters of the Madhyamaka traditions claimed that the sūtras which they required had been miraculously discovered within some deep hiding place where they had lain since the beginning: Sadāprarudita, they said, discovered the Prajñāpāramitā in a tower at the village of Gandhavatī in Gandhāra: it was written on golden leaves with a metal stylus and locked up in a precious casket which rested on a litter set with jewels; the Bodhisattva Dharmodgata had sealed it with seven seals.[1] The venerable Mañjuśrī, disguised as a *bhikṣu*, gained entrance into the abode of King Candragupta, in the land of Oḍiviśa (Orissa), presented him with different texts of the Mahāyāna and left with him a work which the Sautrāntikas affirm to be the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*.[2] From his stay in the subterranean palace of the Dragons, Nāgārjuna brought a quantity of profound and obscure sūtras back to Jambudvīpa, which the king of the Nāgas had preciously preserved in his coffers.[3]

But because these sensational discoveries did not obtain great credence among the public, these masters soon returned to a more traditional conception of a "holy book," by presenting their writings as inspired, directly or indirectly, by the future Buddha Maitreya who is presently awaiting, in Tuṣita Heaven, the time for his earthly birth.

It is possible for anyone who possesses the supernormal knowledges (*abhijñā*) to fly up to Tuṣita Heaven in order to consult with the Bodhisattva there and to receive his teachings. After the death of Puṣyamitra, the five hundred Arhats who

had taken refuge in Dakṣiṇagiri ascended to the Heaven of Maitreya and there again took possession of the *Sūtra* and *Vinaya* which the Bodhisattva had saved from being burned.[4] One Arhat, asked a difficult question by Saṁghanandin, divided his person and flew off to Tuṣita Heaven in order to consult with Maitreya; provided with the correct answer, he returned to Jambudvīpa and transmitted the explanation to him.[5] The Chinese monk Chih-yen who had been formally ordained into the Order, asked his master Saṁghanandin if he had truly seen the results of the religious life; Saṁghanandin then undertook a second trip to India and there questioned all of the learned persons that he met concerning this subject; finally, in order to reassure him on this subject, an Arhat consented to go and ask Maitreya; he then entered into meditation and went to Maitreya's Palace in Tuṣita Heaven in order to study there the marvellous characteristics of his divine model.[7] In the land of the Coḷas, the Arhat Uttara, nonplussed by the questions of the Bodhisattva Deva, caused himself to be secretly transported into the presence of Maitreya who then furnished him with the correct answer; but when Uttara transmitted his explanation to Deva, the latter immediately discovered the divine origin of this answer.[8] The Bodhisattva Maitreya does not always show himself so good-natured: struck by the arrogant attitude of Guṇaprabha who had come to ask concerning the conduct of Devasena, he refused to answer him.[9]

These examples show that at a relatively late date the belief in the interventions and in the revelations of Maitreya was general in the Buddhist Saṁgha. Asaṅga and the masters of the Yogācāra Tradition, exploiting this state of mind, affirmed that the sūtras and the śāstras which they had written had actually been composed under the inspiration of Maitreya and thus enjoyed an authority equal to that of the older "Twelve-Part Scripture" (*dvādaśāṅga pravacana*). According to Paramārtha (AD 500–569) Asaṅga utilized his Hīnayānist supernatural powers in order to ascend to Tuṣita Heaven; he asked Maitreya questions and received the Mahāyāna doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) from him. Returning to earth, Asaṅga meditated on this teaching. He continued to go to Maitreya in order to consult with him, with the hope of propagating this doctrine; but humanity refused to be convinced. Asaṅga then begged Maitreya himself to come down to earth. The Bodhisattva descended at night, on rays of light; he called together a great assembly and began to recite the *Yogācārabhūmi*, giving the commentary to this work as his recitation progressed. This continued night after night and was completed in four months. Of the whole assembly present, it was only Asaṅga who approached Maitreya; the others did nothing more than listen. After each session, Asaṅga spent the day in compiling the text

and interpreting it.[10] Hsuan-tsang (602–664) locates in an area five or six *li* southwest of *Ayodhyā* the site where Asaṅga asked Maitreya his questions and where he instructed the multitude; at night he would ascend to the palace of the gods and receive from the Bodhisattva Maitreya the sacred texts, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, etc.; in the daytime, he would develop the correct explanation of this teaching for the multitude.[11] This tradition persisted over the centuries and is found, argumented by supplementary details, among the Tibetan historians Bu-ston (1290–1364) and Tāranātha (1575).[12]

Under these conditions, there is nothing suprising in the ancient sources attributing such and such a work either to Maitreya or to Asaṅga depending on whether they had in view the deity who inspired it (*praṇetā*) or the one who narrated it. As Prof. Yamaguchi has indeed seen, the real author is Asaṅga who, in order to give more weight to his teaching, presents it as inspired by Maitreya. The modern authors who regard Maitreya, or Maitreyanātha as they call him, as an historical person, appear to misundertand the real role played by this great Bodhisattva in the Buddhist religion. Residing in the tenth *bhūmi*, he is an *ekajātipratibaddha,* that is, on the verge of succeeding to Buddhahood. Now, from the eighth *bhūmi* onward, a bodhisattva abandons his flesh body (*māṁsakāya*) born from his father and mother, produced by his karmic actions, and subject to birth and death, in order to be clothed in a body born of the Absolute (*dharmadhātujakāka*). Henceforth, in a perfect state of absorption and concentration, going from Buddha land to Buddha land (*buddhakṣetrād buddhakṣetraṁ saṁkramaṇa*), he can penetrate into the minds of all beings (*sarvasattvacittānupraveśa*), know the degree of their faculties (*indriyaparāparajñāna*) and purify them as befits them by assuming if needed a fictive (*nirmāṇa*) existence which permits him to "ripen" (*paripācana*) the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) which he discovers in them.[13] By this use of his miraculous powers (*abhijñāvikrīḍanā*), the great bodhisattva leaves the rank of common humanity and moves outside history.

***

To return to the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, Yamaguchi did not restrict himself, as I did, to a study of the Tibetan version of this work and to the Chinese translation of Hsuan-tsang.He also used the Chinese translation of this work by Vimokṣaprajñā (the *Ye-ch'eng-chiu lun*, *TD* 31, number 1608), and the commentary on this work composed by Sumatiśila and preserved in the Tibetan

Tanjur.

Vimokṣaprajñā (or Vimokṣasena?, Ch: P'i-mu-chih-hsien), a native of North India, arrived in Lo-yang in 516, and worked with Prajñāruci in Ye in 541. He translated into Chinese various works of Vasubandhu as well as the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna (*TD* 32, number 1631), a version which Yamaguchi used in his study on the Treatise "In order to avoid vain discussion" (le Traite "Pour ecarter les vaines discussions," *Journal Asiatique*, 1929, p. 1–86).

Vimokṣaprajñā is scarcely known, except for a short, but interesting, notice in the *K'ai-yuan Shih-chiao lu*, compiled in 730 by the monk Chih-sheng: "The *śrāmaṇa* Vimokṣaprajñā," this catalogue says, "was a native of the land of Wu-ch'ang (Uḍḍiyāna) in the North of India; he was of the royal family of *kṣatriyas* and a descendant of the Śākyans. In ancient times, King Pi-liu-li (Virūḍhaka, or in Pāli: Viḍūḍabha) destroyed the city of Kapilavastu and massacred the Śākyans At this same time there were four Śākyaputras who, provoked in the face of this oppression, and without dreaming that they were violating the precepts (*śīla*), raised an army in order to resist the invader; Virūḍhaka then fought a retreat. But when the four Śākyaputras wanted to return to their city, the inhabitants would not admit them and said to them: "We are a religious clan and we have pledged ourselves never to engage in combat. You have brought about the retreat of the army of Virūḍhaka; you no longer belong to our clan." Banished from their native land, the four Śākyaputras took refuge in different countries, but as they were of the ancient noble lineage, the countries vied with each other over what positions of responsibility the four would be givien. Each of the four Śākyans ruled over different lands. At the present time the kings of Wu-ch'ang (Uḍḍiyāna) and Fan-yen (Bāmyān) are all their descendents; they have transmitted their power from age to age and their posterity has known no interruption. The Dharmācārya Vimokṣaprajñā belonged to this royal family."[14]

The antiquity of this legend is guaranteed by the Buddhist scriptures, most notably by the *Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins,*[15] the *Ekottarāgama,*[16] and the *Ch'u-yao ching.*[17] According to these sources, when Virūḍhaka, King of Kośala, made war upon the Śākyans, the latter, who had taken upon themselves the vows of *upāsakas*, locked themselves up within the city walls of Kapilavastu, deciding to oppose him with only passive resistence. However one Śākyan named Śamba(ka) or Śāma (She-mo or She-ma), finding himself outside the city walls, ignored the decision taken by his countrymen, and vigorously attacked the troops of Virūḍhaka and put them to flight. When, after his victory, he wanted to return to Kapilavastu, the Śākyans refused him entry claiming that he had violated the Law. Forced to go into exile, Śambaka, taking with him some relics of the Buddha, went

to the land of P'o-chü-ch'a (Bakuḍa); the inhabitants immediately chose him to be their king, and he constructed a stūpa which bore the name Śambakastūpa.

But the oral tradition recorded by Hsüan-tsang in Nepal and in Uḍḍiyāna is even closer to the notice preserved in the *K'ai-yuan Shih-chiao-lu*.According to the *Hsi-yü-chi* in fact, the resistance opposed to Virūḍhaka was done, not by Śambaka acting alone, but by four Śākyan heroes. These four men were banished by their countrymen and they then went north, to the Mountains of the Snows: the first became King of Wu-ch'ang-na (Uḍḍiyāna), the second of Fan-yen-na (Bāmyān), the third of Hsi-mo-chü-lo (Himatala, a district of Kaśmīr), and the fourth of Shang-mi (Śāmbī).[18] Still according to Hsüan-tsang, the first of these four Śākyans travelled over different regions on the back of a wild goose, eventually arriving in Uḍḍiyāna, on Mount Lan-po-lu, close to the celebrated Lake of the Dragons (in the Valley of Aushiri); he married the daughter of the dragon, assassinated the King of Uḍḍiyāna and mounted the throne. His son succeeded him with the name of Uttarasena, a person well known in Buddhist folklore.[19] The Dharma master Vimokṣaprajñā was thus one of his descendents.

Sumatiśīla, the author of the commentary on the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, was a scholar-monk (*ācārya bhikṣu*) of the great monastery of Śrīnālandā, an important intellectual center of Buddhism from the sixth to the twelfth century. We know from Tāranātha[20] that he lived in the time of King Devapāla (ca 815–845), a successful king as well as a fervent Buddhist, whose history is known through abundant epigraphical material.[21] A copper plaque dated in the 39th year of his reign tell us that at the request of the King of Suvarnadvīpa, Bālaputradeva, Devapāla gave some ten villages for the upkeep of the monastery that Bālaputradeva had just had constructed in Nālandā.[22] It is at this time that Śāntarakṣita, the abbot of Nālandā, founded, with Padmasambhava, the Lamaist church of Tibet, strongly colored with Tantrism. The Tantrayāna, a mixture of Buddhism and Śaivism, dominated at Nālandā, whose monks are given, on the aforementioned copper plaque, the name of "tāntrikabodhisattvas."[23] The fact that Sumatiśīla was as interested in a work as serious as the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* proves however that academic studies were not neglected as such and that the monks of Nālandā did not place their faith exclusively in esoteric works, magical diagrams and feminine energies.

One of the great difficulties of the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* lies in the imprecision of its references: the work mentions a large number of theories and systems without designating them other than with the phrase "some say". In my notes I have tried to identify the authors and schools to which this work is alluding, but such attributions remain conjectural and doubtful. Professor Yama-

guchi will no doubt find more positive references in the commentary of Sumatiśīla. In the Tanjur and the Chinese Tripiṭaka the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is included among the works of the Vijñānavāda school, and, in the very title of his translation, Hsuan-tsang insisted on stating that the work is indeed a Mahāyāna treatise. However the work limits itself to presenting and to criticizing, from the Sautrāntika point of view, various Hīnayāna systems, Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika, Vātsīputrīya-Sāṁmitīya, Sauryodayika-Dārṣṭāntika, etc. With the exception of two quotations from the *Saṁdhinirmocana*, the author always refers to Hīnayāna sūtras. The theories developed in this work are closely related to those of the *Abhidharmakośa* and, the problem of the Alayavijñāna, one of the major thesis of the Mahāyāna such as that of Śūnyatā or Vijñaptimatratā, is nowhere mentioned. Under such conditions, one may ask whether the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* truly presents Mahāyāna doctrines rather than those of the Hīnayāna. Would it not be, rather, a bridge between the old and the new Abhidharma? An authoritative response to this question will be found in the work of Professor Yamaguchi. It is very pleasant for me to wish this new work the happy destiny it appears to me it indeed deserves.

Etienne Lamotte

1. *Pañcaviṁśati*, *TD* 8, p. 144c; *TD* 4, p. 420c; *Aṣṭa-*, ed. Wogihara, p. 955; *TD* 8, p. 473a; *TD* 8, p. 505f; *TD* 227, p. 583b; *TD* 8, p. 673a; *Śata-*, *TD* 6, p. 1066a; and the *Ta-chih-tu lun*, *TD* 25, p. 744a.

2. Tāranātha, tr. Schiefner, p. 58.

3. *Lung-shu p'u-sa ch'uan*, *TD* 50, p. 184c; *Fan-i ming-i chi*, *TD* 54, p. 1065c. See also the *Harṣacarita*, ed. Parab,(1946), p. 250; Bu-ston, tr. Obermiller, II, p. 124; Taranatha, p. 71.

4. *She-li-fo wen ching*, *TD* 24, p. 900b.

5. *Fu-fa-tsang yin-yuan ch'uan*, *TD* 50, p. 320a.

6. *Kao-seng ch'uan*, *TD* 50, p. 339c.

7. *Fa-hsien ch'uan*, *TD* 51, p. 859a; *Hsi-yü-chi*, *TD* 51, p. 834b.

8. *Hsi-yü-chi*, *TD* 51, p. 931b.

9. *Hsi-yü-chi*, *TD* 51, p. 891c.
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10. *P'o-shu p'an-to fa-shih ch'uan*, *TD* 50, p. 188c.

11. *Hsi-yü-chi*, *TD* 51, p. 896b.

12. Bu-ston, II, p. 137–138; Tāranātha, p. 109–111.

13. See *Pañcaviṁśati*, ed. Dutt, p. 217, 223–224; *Ta-chih-tu lun*, *TD* 25, p. 146a, p. 264b, p. 283–284, p. 309b, p. 340a, p. 418a, and p. 580a; Hōbōgirin, p. 141.

14. *TD* 55, p. 543b.

15. *TD* 24, p. 240a27; W. Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, p. 117; L. Feer, *Fragments extraits du Kandjour*, p. 72.

16. *TD* 2, p. 691c5.

17. *TD* 4, p. 624cll. The *Ch'u-yao ching* is the Chinese translation of Dharmatrata's *Udānavarga*, together with an anonymous commentary.

18. *Hsi-yü-chi*, *TD* 51, p. 901c13.

19. Ibid, p. 883b–884a.

20. Tāranātha, p. 211.

21. Cf. Hirananda Sastri, "Nālandā and its Epigraphical Material," *MASI*, number 66, Delhi, 1942, p. 87–102.

22. Id., Ibid, p. 92.

23. Id., Ibid, p. 98.

INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORY OF THE TEACHING OF KARMA

1. The Canonical Teaching; 2. The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika School; 3. The Vātsīputrīya-Saṁmītya Scool; 4. The Sautrāntika School; 5. The Vijñānavādin-Yogācāra School; 6. The Madhyamaka School.

The teaching of karma, or action, forms the cornerstone of the whole Buddhist doctrine: action is the ultimate explanation of human existence and of the physical world, and it is in terms of karma that the Buddhist masters have constructed their philosophy.

I. THE CANONICAL TEACHING

The teaching of karma was fixed as early as the first Buddhist documents: it is found in proto-canonical Maghadan (*Vinaya Piṭaka* or "Discipline," *Sūtra Piṭaka* or "Discouıses"), in the Pāḷi Canon begun by the communities of Kauśāmbī-Sañchi-Mālava, and in the Sanskrit Canon of the communities centered around the Yamunā and in the Northeast.

This very simple doctrine can be expressed in a few words:

1. Action is thought, volition. Contrary to what the most primitive thinkers, or even the Jains believed, action is not a material substance; sin is not a fluid, or a sickness which one should "wash away" through ritual baths in sacred rivers or "burn up" through penitence or fasting. Action is essentially thought, voluntary and conscious, and as a consequence morally qualifiable as good or bad. We read in the *Aṅguttaranikāya, iii..* 415: *cetanāhaṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāmi, cetayitvā kammaṁ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā:* "Oh monks, I say that action is volition; after having willed it, one accomplishes action by means of the body, the voice and the mind." We can thus distinguish two or three types of action: 1. two actions: volitional action (*cetanākarman*) and action-after-having-been-willed (*cetayitvā karman*); 2. three actions: mental action (*manaḥkarman*) volitional action; bodily action (*kāyakarman*) and vocal action (*vākkarman*), which are action-after-having-been-willed (see translation, Para. 1,

note 3).

2. Action produces a fruit or result of retribution (*vipāka-phala*) either in this life, or in a future life. The Buddha is categorical about this:

na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api
sāmagrīm prāpya kālaṁ ca phalanti khalu dehinām

"Action does not perish, even after hundreds of millions of cosmic eras. When the complex [of conditions] and [favorable] times come together, they ripen for their author" (Para. 15, note 48).

This means that the retribution of action is certain: there is a necessary relationship (*karmaphalasaṁbandha*) between an action and its result. But this relationship is not always immediate: action does not necessarily ripen in this life; more frequently, it gives forth its result in the course of a future existence. If we thus suppose that action is accomplished, then there will be a transmigration (*saṁsāra*) during which the result of retribution (*vipākaphala*), agreeable or disagreeable, will appear.

3. Actions ripen for their author, or more exactly, where it has been accomplished. In other words, there is a retributed entity.

This doctrine, so simple in appearance, gives rise to three complicated problems which Buddhist scholasticism resolved in different ways.

1. **The nature of action.** There is agreement on the nature of mental action: it is volition pure and simple. But of what exactly do bodily and vocal actions, which constitute the action-after-having-been-willed mentioned by the Buddha, consist? It is admitted that they are preceded by, or issue from, a volition, but their nature is the subject of much discussion. For some, it is matter (*rūpa*) distinct from volition (a Vaibhāṣika position); for others, a simple movement (*gati*): actions of the body and vocal sounds (a Vātsīputrīya position); and finally, for others, a special type of volition: a volition which moves the body and voice (a Sautrāntika position). And the Mādhyamikas, for their part, do not recognize karma as having any self-nature in the absolute level of truth.

2. **The mechanism of retribution.** It is given that a completed action gives forth a result. The Mādhyamikas deny that action is ever really completed and so avoid the problem of its retribution.

But the Buddhist masters for whom action is really completed admit its retribution and attempt to explain it. They ask if action exists even when it ripens. Some say that action is eternal, that it gives forth its result when it is past (a Sarvāstivādin position). Others hold that it perishes immediately upon being completed, but leaves after it a "non-destruction" (*avipraṇāśa*) of itself, an obligation to its retribution (a Vātsīputrīya position), or, rather, that it sets into motion a complicated process of evolution (*pariṇāma*) the end point of which is a state of retribution (a Sautrāntika position).

3. **The nature of the retributed entity.** If action is never completed, there will be no retribution and it is useless to discuss the nature of a retributed entity (a Madhyamaka position). But, if one admits the fact of retribution, one must define the nature of the agent (*kartṛ*) and of the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) who "eats" the fruit of retribution. Some see in this a substantial entity, a soul (a Vātsīputrīya thesis); others, a momentary (*kṣaṇika*) series (*saṁtāna*) of psychophysical aggregates (*skandha*) which continues and renews itself unceasingly. One may ask what this series transmigrates and adapts to retribution. For some, it "eats" the result after having "possessed" (*prāpti*) it after the completion of the action (a Vaibhāṣika thesis). For others, the action, when it is completed, has "perfumed" (*vāsanā*) the series by depositing a seed (*bīja*) in it, by determining in it an internal evolution (*saṁtānapariṇāma*) the culminating (*viśeṣa*) point of which is a state of retribution (a Sautrāntika thesis). Another group of masters sees in this series a subconscious receptacle-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), comparable to a river whose eternal and unceasingly renewing waters carry along the traces of its conscious life which it sustains and reproduces in an uninterrupted cycle (a Sūtrapramāṇika and Vijñānavādin thesis).

II. THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀṢIKA SCHOOL

All of these problems, susceptible of so many different solutions, are raised in the Abhidharma writings which the Sarvāstivādin School of the Northeast added to the Sanskrit Canon. Among its seven Abhidharma books, written near the beginning of the Christian era by historical or semi-historical masters, it is proper here

to mention above all the *Karmaprajñapti,* the third part of the *Prajñaptiśāstra* (see *Kośa,* Introduction, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii), as well as the controversy on Time and on the Pudgala in the *Vijñānakāya* of Deśavarman (*Études asiatiques,* Paris, 1925, I, pp. 343–376).

A commentary on the first of these Abhidharma texts, the *Vibhāṣā,* presents the official doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīr near the end of the 2nd century of the Christian era. The Vibhāṣā masters, or Vaibhāṣikas, continuators of the Sarvāstivādins, elaborated some moral theories, and it is fitting that we bring together here the references scattered in the Introduction and in the Index of the *Kośa* under the entries Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva, Dharmatrāta, the Bhadanta, etc.

In their summaries on the *Vibhāṣā,* the masters Dhramaśrī, Upaśānta and Dharmatrāta are especially interested in the problem of the nature of action (see *Kośa,* Introduction, pp. lxv-lxvii); but all of these summaries have been eclipsed by the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* of Vasubandhu (4th century?), the "Summa" par excellence of Hīnayāna Buddhism.

Chapter IV of the *Kośa* is devoted to a study of action, or karma. We find, in Chapters II and V, precise information on the mechanism of fruition and retribution. Finally, Chapter IX studies the entity which transmigrates. The *Kośa* was abundantly commented upon and, eventually, amended by later scholar-monks (i. e., by Saṁghabhadra).

1. The nature of action. The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas found fault with the threefold division of action posited in the Canon: they attempted to incorporate it into their classification of things into five aggregates (*skandha*) and twelve spheres (*āyatana*).

Mental action (*manaḥkarman*) is solely "volition" (*cetanā*), that is, a mental state (a certain mental entity, *caittadharma*) which accompanies the mind (*citta*) and which makes it (*abhisaṁskṛ-*) or gives it a morally good or bad nature (*Morale bouddhique,* pp. 136–137).

Bodily action (*kāyakarman*) and vocal action (*vākkarman*) arise from a volition, but are not themselves volition. Either one of them can be information (*vijñapti*) or non-information (*avijñapti*), depending on whether it does or does not inform another with respect to the volition from which it proceeds.

a. Bodily *vijñapti*. This is movement of the body (*vispanda, śarīraceṣṭa*), a "shape" (*saṁsthāna*) which has arisen from a volition and which informs another with respect to this volition.

This is a shape: a dimension, long, short, etc., distinct from the color (*varṇa*) with which it forms the "visible" (*rūpāyatana*), which is itself placed in the aggregate of matter (*rūpaskandha*) together with audible things, etc. Arising directly from a volition, this shape is distinguished from all others: the dimensions of inanimate objects, reflexes, etc. Finally, this shape of the body informs concerning the volition from which it proceeds: a killing action informs us with respect to the killing volition which has set it into motion. It will thus be called bodily *vijñapti* (Para. 2, note 8).

b. Vocal *vijñapti*. The distinct pronunciation of syllables (*vyaktavarṇoccarana*), it forms part of the sphere of sound (*śabdāyatana*) which is itself placed in the aggregate of matter (*rūpaskandha*). "Voice" issues from a volition and informs concerning this volition: the order to kill proceeds from a volitional desire to kill and causes us to know of this desire.

c. *Avijñapti*. This is bodily or vocal action which causes no one to be aware of anything. Some examples will not be without value here (see translation, Para. 14, note 36).

In presenting himself before the community, by undertaking the solemn obligation to renounce killing, stealing, etc., the future monk accomplished a bodily and vocal *vijñapti*. At this same moment there arises in him a permanent action called "discipline" (*saṁvara*) or "the renouncing of sin" (*virati*) which makes a monk of him, even when he does not think of his vows. This permanent and invisible action, which causes no one to be aware of anything, is called "non-information," *avijñapti*.

By taking up the occupation of killing or of stealing, and by laying up a store of arms, a man accomplishes a vocal and bodily *vijñapti*. At this very moment there arises within him a permanent action called "indiscipline" (*asaṁvara*) or "consenting to sin" (*avirati*), which makes him a murderer or a thief, even if circumstances hinder him from exercising his trade. This permanent and invisible action which causes no one to be aware of anything, is called *avijñapti*.

By giving Paul the order to kill, Peter commits a vocal *vi-*

jñapti: he has been ordered to kill, but he is not yet a murderer. When he obeys, Paul commits a bodily *vijñapti,* killing. At this very moment, Peter may be asleep or distracted; nevertheless, as soon as his order is carried out by Paul, Peter himself becomes a murderer: a permanent action arises in him, an action which no one sees and which, for this reason, is called *avijñapti.*

Avijñapti, non-information, is called bodily or vocal *avijñapti* depending on whether the *vijñapti* from whence it proceeds is a bodily or a vocal action.

Posited in this way, the Vaibhāṣikas defined *avijñapti* as a permanent action, invisible but material, which causes nothing to be known to another, but which stays with its author, even if the latter is distracted or momentarily deprived of thought.

This action is invisible and, as such, solely "cognized" by the mental consciousness: it is thus included within the sphere of "cognized things" (*dharmāyatana*) together with sensation, ideas and conditioned things. On the other hand, it is matter, and forms part of the aggregate of matter (*rūpaskandha*), because the bodily and vocal *vijñapti* from whence it proceeds is matter, or because the primary elements upon which it is supported are material (Para. 14, note 38).

Whereas the *vijñapti* can be good, bad or morally neutral (*avyākṛta*), *avijñapti* is never neutral, but must be either good or bad (Para. 14, note 43).

There are three types of *avijñapti:* discipline (*saṁvara*) or the renouncing of sin (*virati*), non-discipline (*asaṁvara*) or consenting to sin (*avirati*), and the *avijñapti* which differs from both discipline and from non-discipline (Para. 14, note 37).

The beginning of discipline is not the same in all of the different worlds. Here, in the world of desire (*kāmadhātu*), discipline always results from a bodily or vocal *vijñapti:* by a formal undertaking, man creates in himself a permanent *avijñapti* which makes him a monk, a novice or a pious layman. On the contrary, in the higher world of form (*rūpadhātu*), discipline is subordinated to a mind (*cittanuparivartin*) strong enough to create discipline by itself, without the intervention of a *vijñapti* (Para. 14, note 39).

2. The mechanism of retribution. The Buddha said that action does not perish; so too the Sarvāstivādins, and whence their name "Those who affirm the existence of all things," believing as they

do that all things exist at all times, that past and future things exist. Action in and of itself, considered in its being (*svabhāva or svalakṣaṇa*), exists at all times, but its present, past or future mode of existence (*bhāva,* Chinese *lei-yu* 類有) varies. Hence the stanza of the *Kośa,* V, p. 58: *svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate,* "being always exists, but we do not hold that its mode of existence is eternal" (see *MCB* V, p. 110).

According to the School, the eternal action, during its present existence, at the moment in which it is completed, "projects" (*ākṣipati*) or "grasps" (*pratigṛhṇāti*) its result: it becomes the cause of the result (*hetubhāvenopatiṣṭhate*), it establishes (*vyavasthāpayati*) the result in such a way that it arises later.

This same eternal action, during its past existence, when it is past, "gives forth" (*prayacchati*) its result: at the moment when the future result is directed towards arising, close to arising (*utpādābhimukha*), the former action gives it the force which causes it to enter into the condition of the present (para. 15, note 45).

3. The retributed entity. Conforming to the general tendencies of the Canon, the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas do not believe that the agent destined to "eat" the fruits of action is a substantial soul. "Man is only a succession of physical and mental states. There is no vital principle, no self, but only a series (*saṁtāna*) of thoughts, consciousnesses, sensations, desires, volitions, supported by a body endowed with organs. When the body dissolves, the mental series reproduces itself automatically and continues in a new womb. There is no transmigration (*saṁkrānti*), but there is a new existence" (*Morale bouddhique,* p. 138; cf. *Nirvāṇa,* pp. 39, 45).

The dharmas, real but impermanent entities whose uninterrupted succession constitutes the series, are momentary (*kṣaṇika*), but this instability does not hinder the play of the four characteristics of a dharma. Even though instantaneous, a dharma arises through the action (*saṁskāra*) of arising (*utpāda*), lasts or stabilizes itself through duration (*sthiti*), deteriorates through old age (*jarā*), and disappears through impermanence (*anityatā*) (*MCB* V, p. 139). Let us not forget, however, that this momentariness, conceived here as the very short duration of a dharma, is the fact of its mode of existence, or: a dharma in and of itself *is,* in its own being, eternal.

It remains to explain how the series so conceived is retributed:

the action which "projects" or "grasps" its result when it is present, at the moment A of the series, "gives forth" this same result, when it is past, at the moment N of the same series.

But thoughts in a series follow one another and yet do not resemble one another: each one of them has an object, an aspect, an action of particular consciousness. How can thought N eat the fruit of the action projected by thought A?

In the series, each thought has for its condition the immediately preceeding thought which is its equal and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*). Furthermore, in the series, there exist non-material entities (but not associated with the mind = non-consciousness) which are called *prāpti,* "possessions." Every action creates, in him who accomplishes it, a "possession of this action"; in this same way, every thought, every desire creates a possession of this thought, and of this desire. The "possession," scarcely arisen, perishes; but it engenders a "possession" similar to itself. We continue to possess our actions up to the moment when we "cut off" the possession of these actions or, more exactly, up to the moment when we interrupt the unceasing generation of this possession. This then explains the fact that an action gives forth its result to the benefit of him who has accomplished it and who keeps it in his possession (*Morale bouddhique,* p. 197; cf. Kośa, II, pp. 179–195).

We should note finally that the mental series can be interrupted in certain cases, notable during the "absorption of extinction" which we shall examine later. But, as the thought before the absorption is the antecedent cause of the mind after the absorption, and as the mental series is taken up again after the absorption, one can say with the Buddha that "during the absorption of extinction, the consciousness does not leave the body" (Para. 22, note 72).

III. THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYA-SĀṂMITĪYA SCHOOL

Consult J. Masuda, Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, the treatise of Vasumitra (*Asia Major,* vol. ii, 1925, pp. 53–67); P. Demiéville, L'origine des Sectes bouddhiques d'aprés Paramārtha (*MBB.,* vol. 1, 1931, pp. 57–58); the Nikāyabheda of Bhavya (M. Walleser, *Die Sekten des alten Bud-*

dhismus, Heidelberg, 1927, pp. 77–93); Kathavatthu (in S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy,* PTS., 1915); I-tsing (J. Takakusu, *A Record of Buddhis; Religion, Oxford,* 1896); Tāranātha (A. Schiefner, *Meschichte des Buddhismus,* St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 271–4): Bu-ston (E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism,* vol. ii, Heidelberg, 1932, pp. 96–101); Index to the *Kośa.*, p. 132.

Principal works: the Śāriputrābhidharma, Taishō vol. 28, no. 1548, and the Saṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra, Taishō vol. 26, no. 1539 (see *Kośa,* Introduction, pp. lx-lxii and J. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha,* Paris, 1926, p. 73).

Principal doctrines: duration and movement (Karmasiddhi, Para. 6, n. 21); the Avipraṇāśa (ibidem, Para. 18, n. 57); the Pudgala (footnotes to *Kośa,* ix pp. 227–9; later, St. Schayer, Kamalaśīla's Kritik des Pudgalavāda, in *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny,* vol. viii, 1932, pp. 68–93).

1. The nature of action. Bodily action or information through the body is not a thing in and of itself, a physical matter, as the Vaibhāṣikas would have it: it is a simple movement (*gati*), a displacement of the body, arisen from a volition and which informs with respect to this volition.

But arguments are not lacking. If the bodily *vijñapti* were a separate substance, distinct from movement, it would have, like all substances, a certain characteristic (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*), a cause of extinction (*vināśahetu*) and a cause of arising (*janakahetu*). Now bodily movement does not manifest any specifically defined unique characteristic; it disappears without cause and arises spontaneously. It is thus simple movement.

But movement, measured in time, supposes in the moving object a certain duration (*sthiti*): the school admits that all dharmas are impermanent (*anitya*), but it denies that they are totally momentary (*kṣaṇika*). By virtue of their characteristic of impermanence, certain dharmas – the mind, sound, a flame – perish immediately (*kṣaṇanirodha*) without the cooperation of external causes: these dharmas are momentary and are refractory to movement. Some others – wood, a pot, etc. – perish by virtue of the same characteristic of impermanence, but only with the cooperation of external causes – fire, a hammer, etc. These latter objects are not momentary: they last. Since there is duration, movement is possible. Thus matter, the body, with its specific characteristic,

its cause of arising and its cause of extinction, truly moves. This movement constitutes bodily *vijñapti* (Para. 6, note 21).

2. The retributed entity. They, Vātsīputrīya-Sāṁmitīyas, who are "personalists," believe in the existence of a soul (*ātman*) or a person (*pudgala*). They can bring certain passages of the Canon to the support of their thesis, like the sermon on the burden and the bearer of the burden (La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa,* p. 35; *Dogme et Philosophie,* pp. 99–101). Nevertheless, the Canon, in its totality, does not recognize any reality apart from the impermanent *skandhas,* with the exception of Nirvāṇa. This is why the Vātsīputrīyas, in the period when they elaborated their system, proposed a hybrid definition of the person: the inexpressible (*avācya*) pudgala, neither different from the *skandhas* which it supports nor identical to them. Such as it is, this pudgala moves, eats the fruit of its actions, transmigrates, and arrives at Nirvāṇa.

3. The mechanism of retribution. For the reasons that we mention in Para. 18, note 57, we are warranted in attributing to the Sāṁmitīyas, among other doctrines, the curious theory of avipraṇāśa: a good or bad action perishes as soon as it arises, but it deposits in the series of the agent a certain entity called avipranasa, comparable to a sheet of paper upon which debts and the rightful owners of the fruit are inscribed (Para. 18, note 57).

Avipraṇāśa is a dharma disassociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*)*:* if it were a thought, it would be good or bad and, consequently, the avipraṇāśa of a good action could not be found in a bad person, and, vice versa, the avipraṇāśa of a bad action could not be found in a good person. This is why it is disassociated from the mind, and as it is unconscious, it is morally neutral (*avyākṛta*). Whether it comes from a good or a bad action, it could thus reside within the sinner as well as within the saint.

It is fourfold, for it can bring forth the result of action in one of four worlds: the world of desire, of form, of non-form, or in a pure world.

Constituting a result in its own right, it always subsists but it is no longer active when it has given forth its result (*phalotpādana*)*;* it is not active when one goes beyond its result (*phalavyatikrama*) as when, before having enjoyed the fruit of the action, one raises himself through meditation to a sphere of existence superior to the retribution of the action.

IV. THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

Consult J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines,* pp. 66–69; P. Demiéville, *L'origine des Sectes,* pp. 62–63; The Grub mthaḥ in W. Wassiljew, *Der Buddhismus,* St. Petersburg, 1860, pp. 301–314; Tāranātha, p. 58 and foll.; 78, 271, 274; Hiuan-tsang, Hsi-yü-chi (Julien, 1, p. 154; ii, p. 213; Beal, i. p. 138; ii, p. 302); La Vallée Poussin, the article Sautrāntika in *ERE.:* Introduction to the *Kośa,* pp. lii-lv, Index to the *Kośa,* s. v. Darṣṭāntika, pp. 116–7, Sūryodayavādin, p. 138, Sautrāntika, p. 139, K'ouei ki sur les Sautrāntika in the *Siddhi,* pp. 221–4; Noel Peri, A propos de la date de Vasubandhu, *BEFEO.,* xi, 1911, p. 360; J. Przyluski, Sautrāntika et Darstāntika, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny,* vol. viii, 1932, pp. 14–24; S. Lévi, Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti, *JA.,* t. 201, 1927, p. 25; H. Lüders, Bruchstücke der Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā des Kumāralāta, Kön. Preuss. Turfan-Expeditionen, Klein. Sansk. Texte, ii. Leipzig, 1926.

The Sautrāntikas have had a long history in the course of which they received different names: Saṁkrāntivādin, Sūtrāntavādin, Sauryodayika, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Sūtraprāmāṇika. They reject the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins and recognize only the Sūtras as authoritative.

We can sum up as follows the scattered references that we possess with respect to this school:

1. In the first century after Nirvāṇa, the Sauryodayikas (*ñi-ma 'char-ka pa, jih-ch'u lun* 日出論) Dārṣṭāntikācārya or simply the Dārṣṭāntikas, with Kumārata, (Young Man Head) named as Mūla-ācārya, who composed 900 śāstras, notably the *Chieh-man-lun* 喩鬘論 or the *Yu-man-lun* 結髮論 (*Malyagranthasastra*), and the *Kuang-shou p'i-uy* 廣說比喩 (*Avadana . . .*).

Principle theories: the wind element moves the body which is renewed in a series and which constitutes bodily *vijñapti* (*Karmasiddhi,* Para. 11, note 31); the *rūpa* of the flesh of the heart (*hṛdayamāṁsarūpa*) contains the seeds of the mind after Nirodhasamāpatti (root-opinion: *Karmasiddhi,* Para. 23, note 74).

2. In the fourth century after Nirvāṇa, the Sautrāntikas properly so-called, with Kumārata (Young Man-Acquisition = Kumāralāta). His student was the founder of the School (*Sautrāntikādi*)*:* Śrīlāta (Excellent Acquisition) = the Kaśmīrian Mahābha-

danta Sthavira (according to Tāranātha) = the Sthavira (according to Saṁghabhadra). He composed the *Sautrāntikavibhāsā*.

Principle books: [*lun*] *dpeḥi ḥphren ba* (*dṛṣṭāntamālā*), and the *sde snod ḥdsin paḥi dpe khyud* (*piṭakasamgrahamuṣṭi*).

Principle theories: negation of bodily action and of *avijñapti* (*Karmasiddhi,* Para. 3, note 13; Para. 10; Para. 12; Para. 14, note 36); the subtle transformation of the series (*Karmasiddhi,* Para. 20, note 67); the presence during Nirodhasamāpatti of a subtle mental consciousness (branch-opinion: *Karmasiddhi,* Para. 24, note 77) or of a mind without mental states (variant branch opinion: *Karmasiddhi,* Para. 26, note 82).

3. The "only one termed a Sautrāntika," the Sautrāntika "easy to know" (*K'uei-chi*), the *Ching-chu* 經主 or "Sūtrācārya" whom Saṁghabhadra refutes: Vasubandhu, the author of the *Kośa* and of the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (see below, Section ii). In this last work, he imputes the theory of ālayavijñāna to the Sūtraprāmāṇikas (*Karmasiddhi,* Para. 30, note 100).

1. The nature of action. The Sautrāntikas knew and refuted the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and of the Vātsīputrīyas on bodily *vijñapti*. This, they say, is not a shape distinct from volition, because shape does not exist as such, but only results from a special disposition of colors (Para. 3–5). Nor is it a movement of the body, because the argument of the Vātsīputrīyas does not stand examination (Para. 6–9), and because movement is impossible (Para. 10).

The Sautrāntikas equally reject the definitions of their ancestors, the Sauryodayikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas. The wind which moves the body renewing itself in a series does not constitute bodily *vijñapti,* for one does not see how an irrational element could furnish any information whatsoever and constitute a morally qualifiable action, good or bad (Para. 12–13).

The Sautrāntikas saw indeed that any attempt to separate *vijñapti* from volition would be bound to certain failure. There is no action apart from volition. Consequently the *vijñapti* which the early masters defined as shape, movement or breath, does not exist; the *avijñapti* which derives from it is also totally unreal.

It is important therefore to return to the major principles that the sūtras clearly posit: action as volition and action-after-having-been-willed. There are three types of volition: deliberation (*gati-*

cetanā), decision (*niścayacetanā*), and movement-volition (*kiraṇacetanā*). The first two constitute volition-action (*cetanākarman*); the third, that action-after-having-been-willed (*cetayitvākarman*) of which the Buddha speaks (Para. 46 at the beginning, 47 at the end). The first two volitions, actions of reflection (*manaskāra*) or actions associated with reflection (*manaḥsaṁprayukta*), constitute manaḥkarman, mental action (Para. 49). As for movement-volition, it is twofold: volition which moves the body, called kāyakarman or bodily action (Para. 46), and volition which emits a voice (*vāksamutthāpikā*), called vākkarman or vocal action (Para. 48). An example will help us to better understand this. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, Vātsīputrīyas, and Sauryodayikas, there must be two things in order for there to be murder: a volition to murder (mental action) and a killing action (bodily action) proceeding from the volition to murder, but distinct in itself from this volition, being shape, movement or wind. The Sautrāntikas distinguish two volitions in a killing: the will to murder (mental action) and the volition which moves the hand of the assassin (bodily action). If the deed of killing were not essentially a volition, it would not be a morally qualifiable action, since intention is at the basis of morality,.

Avijñapti is perfectly explained in the Sautrāntika system. The two types of volition bearing on bodily movements and vocal emissions – volitions improperly called bodily action and vocal action – are capable of producing a volition *sui generis* which is the *avijñpti*. The ancient schools singularly triumphed in affirming that *avijñapti* derives from a vijñapti distinct from volition.

2. The mechanism of retribution. The Sautrāntikas easily refuted the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas who posited the thesis of the efficacy of past action and the existence of the *prāptis* (above, Para. ii, 2, 3). When the Buddha affirms the duration of action, he intends solely to affirm the unavoidable character of its retribution. From the terms that he employs, it cannot be concluded that action is eternal, that it "projects" its result when it is present, or that it "gives forth" its result when it is past. In fact, action is present or past according to whether it is active or whether it has ceased to act: if past action gives forth a result, it thus acts and is then present.

In whatever manner one chooses to understand *prāpti*, it

appears not as an entity, a thing in and of itself, but as an imagined being, a purely gratuitous invention of a hard-pressed philosophy (Para. 15–17).

The entity "without extinction," postulated by the Sāṁmitīyas, also rests on nothing. The phenomenon of memory, of ecstacy, or even of farming can be considered in this same way: nothing permits the establishment of an entity which causes the result or the retribution to arise (Para. 19).

The mechanism of the ripening of action is to be sought in the internal evolution of the mental series. The action, which is a thought associated with a special volition (see above, Para. iv, 1), is momentary (*kṣaṇika*): it perishes immediately upon arising. But it "perfumes" (*vāsanā*) the mental series (*cittasaṁtāna*) which is its point of departure; it creates in it a special potentiality (*śaktiviśeṣa*). The mental series thus perfumed undergoes an evolution (*pariṇāma*) occasionally long, the end point (*viśeṣa*) of which is a state of retribution, a result. The process is thus the following: an action (thought), a mental series in evolution, a state of retribution of the action, and ultimate transformation of the mental series. In this same way, the seed is the cause of the fruit, but there is a series with all of its transformations placed between the seed and its fruit: shoot, trunk, branch, leaf, flower, When one paints the seed, the plant gives forth a flower the same color as the paint, but one would search in vain for this color in the shoot, the trunk or in the leaves (Para. 20).

The ingenious theories of the action-seed and of the "subtle transformation of the series" are to the credit of the Sautrāntikas, but, before them, some other schools had already produced some very slightly similar hypotheses: the Kāśyapīya-Kassapikas and the Vibhajyavādins recognized the existence only of the present action and the past action which has not yet given forth its fruit; the Mahāsāṁghikas and the early Mahīśāsakas had an imperfect notion of a theory of seeds (see Para. 15, note 45); and the Pāḷi Scriptures distinguish *kleśa,* "active defilement," from *anusaya,* "sleeping defilement."

3. The retributed series. From the above, we can see that the Sautrāntika series is a mental series perfumable by the mind and in perpetual transformation.

A second characteristic should be mentioned: all of the

dharmas which enter into the composition of this series – mental dharmas and the material dharmas which support them – are instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*): their nature is to perish immediately after having arisen (*utpādānantaravināśisvabhāva*); their extinction is spontaneous and does not depend on a cause. It is thus immediate, and, contrary to what the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sāṁmitīyas have said, things do not last even for an instant.

The Sautrāntika series should not only respond to the exigencies of psychology and of morals, but must also adapt itself to the mystical experience. There are certain ecstasies, certain divine realms in which there is no mind: for example, in the absorption of extinction (see Para. 2, note 71). If the mental series is interrupted for a certain time, won't the potentialities deposited in it by this perfuming disappear? Will the series never arrive at the end point of its evolution which assures retribution? We have seen (above, II, 3) how the Vaibhāṣikas answered this question. The Sautrāntikas took up the problem again and gave different solutions to it.

a. Root-opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas. Two series rest on one another: the mental series (made up of the visual, auditive, olfactive, taste, touch and mental consciousnesses) and the material series (made up of the organs). After having been interrupted during the absorption of extinction, the mental series is reborn from its own seeds which have been preserved in the material series. However, when one passes from a nonmaterial world where the body was lacking into the two lower worlds which suppose the existence of a body, the series of material organs is reborn from its own seeds which have been preserved in the mental series (Para. 23, note 74).

But one is at pains to see how the material organs could contain the seeds of the mind, and vice-versa. On the other hand, if the states "deprived of mind" are lacking any conscious consciousness, they could very well hide a subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*), and it is not without reason that the Buddha said: "During the absorption of extinction, the consciousness (*vijñāna*) does not leave the body." Thanks to this subtle mind, the mental series continues without interruption throughout all of transmigration.

b. Branch-opinion and variant branch-opinion of the Sautrāntikas. Sautrāntika scholars have attempted to define the subtle mind

present in the states deprived of mind. For some masters, this would be a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) lacking the two "mental states" of ideas (*saṁjña*) and of sensation (*vedita*); for others, a mental consciousness without mental states (Para. 25, 26). All are in agreement, however, in saying that the object and the aspect of this consciousness are imperceptible (*asaṁvidita*).

We may ask if this mental series, even thus reexamined and corrected, is capable of undergoing the "perfuming" of the action and of proceeding, through an internal evolution, towards the sate of retribution of action. It is, in fact, a succession of active-consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*): visual consciousness, etc., each having its organ, its object, its particular aspect, and a definite moral value. It is quite difficult to admit that these consciousnesses are able to influence one another. How could a good mind be affected by defilement? And here again the different explanations proposed by the Sautrāntikas reveal their uncertainty. Some say that the active-consciousnesses mutually perfume one another. Others hold that, in the series itself, the former moment (*pūrva-kṣaṇa*) perfumes the following moment (*uttarakṣaṇa*). And finally, for others, the moments of the active-consciousness change their individual reality, but all these moments are similarly consciousness. The species consciousness (*vijñānajāti*) to which they belong does not change, but remains the same. It is perfumable and bears the seeds (see *Saṁgraha* in *MCB* vol. III, pp. 242, 246; *Siddhi,* p. 185).

It is now necessary to find another thing, and we can ask if the mental series susceptible of being perfumed and of bearing the seeds is not a subconsciousness, a "receptacle-consciousness" which supports the active-consciousnesses by preserving the impressions (*vāsanā*) which are the seeds (*bīja*) or the forces (*śakti*) of the new active-consciousnesses.

Earlier, certain schools had already introduced into their psychology certain elements which resembled the receptacle-consciousness; let us mention the "member-of-existence consciousness" (*bhavāṅgavijñānā*) of the Tāmraparṇīyas, the "root-consciousness" (*mūlavijñāna*) of the Mahāsāṁghikas and the "element which lasts until the end of Saṁsāra" (*āsaṁsārikaskandha*) of the Mahīśāsakas (Para. 35, note 116–130). But, if we are to believe Vasubandhu, it is to the Sautrāntikas and not to the Vijñānavādins that

the honor accrues of having first systematized the psychology of retribution-consciousness.

c. The subtle consciousness (*sūkṣmacitta*) of the Sūtrapramāṅikas. In examining the ideas of a "subtle mental consciousness" and of a "perfuming of the series," Sautrāntika masters, after a great many detours and endless self-correction, constructed a psychology of the subconsciousness, the support of experience. The School, it appears, never called the subconsciousness the "receptacle consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*); in the sources at our disposal, it is known by other names: 1. *Ekarasaskandha*, "the aggregate of a single flavor," the cause and the origin of the five adventitious aggregates (*mūlāntikaskandha*); 2. *Paramārthapudgala*, "the true person" which the *Shu-chi* defines as a "real ātman extremely subtle and not able to be grasped" (see J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines*, pp. 68–69); and 3. *Sūkṣmacitta*, "subtle mind" (Para. 30).

Vasubandhu, who adopts this psychology, gives a remarkable presentation of it in Para. 30–32. There are two types of mind: a multiple mind (*nānācitta*), comprised of the six active-consciousnesses, and a store-mind (*ācayacitta*), of subtle mind.

The active-consciousnesses and the dharma which is simultaneous to them, good and bad, perfume (*bhāvayanti*) the subtle mind: they deposit therein the seeds of the different consciousnesses and of the different dharmas. Thus perfumed, the subtle mind forms a store-mind filled with all of the seeds (*sarvabījaka*).

The subtle mind "subdues" the seeds deposited in it (it hinders them from ripening); but its "series" evolves: its power of domination diminishes whereas the force of the seeds grows larger. The result of the evolution is a state of retribution of the series, i.e., wherein finally ripened, the seeds of the consciousnesses and of the good or bad dharmas give forth a result, that is, produce consciousnesses and agreeable or disagreeable dharmas. The subtle mind is thus a result-of-retribution-consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*). From birth until death, it forms a continuous series free from any interruption. From the fact of retribution, it passes (*saṁkrāmate*) from existence to existence, grasping different aspects. Arriving at Nirvāṇa, it is definitively cut off. Among the Sautrāntikas, this psychology of the subconsciousness agreed perfectly with the realistic ontology of the Hīnayāna. It was adopted by the

Vijñānavādins (*Asaṅga*) and by some Mādhyamikas (*Bhāvaviveka*) who adapted it respectively to their idealistic or pseudo-nihilistic metaphysics.

V. THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN-YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL.

This school of meditators became a philosophic school under circumstances still poorly understood, but primarily under the influence of Maitreya-Asaṅga, as is well known. Setting aside its mystical aspect (the career of the Bodhisattva with its spheres and its perfections; the doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha), it presented itself as a Sautrāntika accommodated to an idealistic ontology: the existence of only the mind (*cittamātra*). One should note also that the doctrine of the sole existence of the mind, of the nonexistence of matter, is the logical end of the Abhidharma theories concerning the "predominating force" and the "retributive force" of action.[1]

In their doctrines concerning action, the Vijñānavādins propagated the theories of the Sautrāntikas, even if with some retouches.

1. Action, which is essentially volitional, justifies the doctrine of "mind-only."

With the mind as cause, the hand, which is a development of the mind (whatever the Vaibhāṣikas may say), arises and dies (against the Sāṁmitīyas) in a series which propagates itself in space as if it were moving. This movement appears to "inform," indicating the mind from whence it arises. One can thus metaphorically give it the name of bodily *vijñapti.*

With the mind as cause, a voice or a series of syllables developing from the mind, arises and disappears. As it appears to "inform," one metaphorically gives it the name of vocal *vijñapti.*

The volitions of deliberation and of judgment, actions of the mind, do not allow any development of the mind under an external appearance, and so receive the name of mental action.

Since *vijñapti* is not real, how could *avijñapti,* which deprives from it, exist? Nevertheless, one metaphorically gives the name of *avijñapti,* non-information, to a volition or to a resolution to do good or evil during a long period of time (see *Siddhi,* p. 50).

2. The Vijñānavādins explained the mechanism of retribution

by means of the combined play of the active-consciousnesses and the receptacle-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*): they propagated and developed the psychology of the "subtle mind" of the Sautrāntikas.[1]

VI. THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL.[2]

Madhyamaka philosophers followed the "middle path" between the two positions of philosophical extremes: eternalism and nihilism. This attitude excused them from expressing their opinion on the three great problems of morality: action, retribution, and the retributed entity.

1. From the absolute point of view, one should say that action, a relative entity dependent on an agent, does not "arise" in and of itself, that is, it does not exist in and of itself, it is "empty" (*śūnya*) of any self-nature, of any autonomous nature. One sees consequently that an entity without self-nature arises from causes equally lacking any self-nature, and in reality does not arise. One can conclude from this that action does not arise. To be sure the Buddha said that actions do not perish, but this does not prove that they exist; on the contrary, they do not perish because they do not arise (*Madhyamakavṛtti,* pp. 323–324).

It is impossible to pretend that action arises. If it were to truly arise, one would have to say that it exists in and of itself, and thus that it is eternal. Now to affirm the eternity of action would lead one to absurd conclusions. If action were eternal, it would never be completed, for an eternal entity, existing forever, is not susceptible of being completed. If action were to exist without being completed, one would be the beneficiary of merit or guilty of a sin without having done anything. Being rewarded or punished unjustly for an action that one has not committed, one would always remain exposed to retribution, for, even after a first retribution, the eternal action would continue to exist. If action were to exist without being completed, all work would become useless: pots and cloth would exist before they had been created (pp. 324–326).

All this proves that action does not exist. The cause whence it arises, namely the defilement, is unreal, for it rests on a basic ignorance. Its effect, for example the body created by action in

the present life, is nonexistent, for one cannot recognize any reality in a body created by a nonexistent action arising from a nonexistent defilement. If action does not exist, is it not useless to discuss the agent, the result and the "enjoyer" who partakes of the fruit of the action (pp. 326–329)?

2. From the relative point of view, in practice, one should recognize that action, although lacking a self-nature, nevertheless accomplishes its effect. In fact, it enjoys an efficacy which is sought for in vain in an eternal and immutable entity.

The action lacking the self-nature of action produces a result as if it were an action. Nothing is impossible to such an efficacy. Scripture mentions the case of magical Buddhas and Bodhisattvas illusively creating food for the community, or debating with the monks. In everyday life, mirages and dreams, nonexistent in and of themselves, produce illusive effects which are experienced as real (pp. 329–336).

THE *KARMASIDDHIPRAKARAṆA.*

Sources. For the study of the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, "A Treatise on the Proof of Action," by Vasubandhu, we have at our disposal two Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation.

1. *Yeh ch'eng-chiu lun* (業成就論) = the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, a translation in one volume by Pi-mu-chih-hsien (毘目智仙) of the Eastern Wei Dynasty (541); Nanjio no. 1222, Taisho vol. 31, no. 1608, pp. 77b16–781a21.

2. *Ta-ch'eng ch'eng-yeh lun* (大乘成業論) = the *Mahāyāna Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, a translation in one volume by Hsuan-tsang of the T'ang Dynasty (651); Nanjio no. 1221, Taisho volume 31, no. 1609, pp. 781a23–786b14.

3. *Las grub pa'i rab tu byed pa* = the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, Mdo lviii, no. 8, pp. 156a6–168b6 (Cordier no. 253, 8; p. 386). Author: Vasubandhu; translators: the upādhyāya Viśuddhasiṁha, and the lo-tsā-ba bhikṣu vandya Devendrarakṣita of rTsaṅs; corrector: the zhu-chen-gyi lo-tsā-ba vandya Śrīkūṭa.

There exists a Tibetan commentary on the *Karmasiddhipra-rakaraṇa* entitled the *Las grub pa'ī bcad pa* = the *Karmasiddhi Ṭīkā* or the *Las grub pa'i rab tu byed pa'i 'grel pa* = the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa Vṛtti*, Mdo lxi, no. 2, pp. 69a6–117b1 (Cordier no. 256, 2; p. 389). Author: the ācārya bhikṣu Sumatiśīla residing in the great vihāra of Śrīnālandā; translator: the upādhyāya Viśuddhasiṁha, the lo-tsā-ba bhikṣu Devendrarakṣita of rTsaṅs; corrector: the zhu-chen-gri lo-tsā-ba vandya Śrīkūṭā.

Character of the work. External testimony. Both the Chinese as well as the Tibetan tradition regard the *Karmasiddhi* as a Mahāyāna treatise.

1. In his life of Vasubandhu (*T'oung-pao*, 1904), Paramārtha (499–569) does not mention this work, but Hsüan-tsang (602–664), by the very title of his translation, places it among the treatises of the Mahāyāna.

2. The Tibetan tradition (Bu-ston, I, pp. 53–57; Tāranātha, p. 123, 317–318) has drawn up a list of twenty works "explain-

ing the Scriptures of the last period" and connected with the teachings of Maitreya: the five works of Maitreya, the five volumes of the *Yogācāryabhūmi,* the two summaries of Asaṅga and the eight treatises (*prakaraṇa*) of Vasubandhu.

These eight treatises are five independent works: *Triṁśikākārikāprakaraṇa, Viṁśikākārikāprakaraṇa, Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, Vyākhyāyukti* and *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,* and three commentaries: on the *Sūtrālaṁkāra,* on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra,* and on the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga.*

One can see how defective this list is. As Tāranātha remarked, one cannot give the name of treatise to commentaries and to a lexical work like the *Vyākyāyukti.* Also, one may ask why the three commentaries quoted above have been chosen from among so many others which are equally from the pen of Vasubandhu.

The *Karmasiddhi* is presented as a "presentation of the actions of the three means from the point of view of idealism" (Bu-ston, I, p. 57), probably because it deals with the receptacle-consciousness (Para. 33–40) and because the definition of the three which it proposes (Para. 46–49) bears some resemblance to the presentation of this given in the *Siddhi,* p. 51.

But in the light of internal criticism, this tradition (venerable though it may be) cannot be maintained.

Internal testimony. The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a Hīnayāna treatise presenting the point of view of the Sautrāntikas.

1. With a single exception, the sūtras quoted with or without references in this work all belong to the Hīnayāna Canon.

The author quotes, with the title of sūtra, extracts from the *Daśaparipṛcchāsūtra* on sparśa (Para. 27b), from the *Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra* on the three types of sparśa (Para. 28) and nirodhasamāpatti (Para. 29), and from the *Karmapathasūtra* (see note 147) on the first three karmapathas (Para. 47):

Under the vague reference of "sūtra," the author refers to canonical texts: *Aṅguttara,* iii, 415, on the three types of action (Para. 1, 41, 47); the ancient and celebrated stanza: *na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi* . . .(Para. 15, 41; see note 48); *Saṁyuktāgama,* 11, 2; 13, 4 (*Saṁyutta,* ii, 72; iv, 33 et passim) on the trikasaṁnipāta (Para. 23, 25); *Madhyama* (cf. *Majjhima,* i, 296), on the presence of the vijñāna in Nirodhasamāpatti (Para. 24); *Saṁyuktāgama* 2, 4 (*Saṁyutta,* iii, 96), on avidyāsaṁsparśajā vedanā (Para. 25);

Madhyama, 24, 1 (*Majjhima*, i, 53) on Vijñānopadānaskandha (Para. 37); *Saṁyutta*, iii, 60, on saṁskāraskandha (Para. 37); *Saṁyuktāgama*, 10, 7: sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ (Para. 40); *Aṅguttara*, i, 230: the three śikṣā explained to the Vajjiputtaka (Para. 42); *Karmapathasūtra* compared with the *Saṁcetanīyasūtra* (*Madhyama*, 18, 4; *Aṅguttara*, v, 292; *Majjhima*, iii, 207) on the karmapathas (Para. 47).

The author quotes twice (Para. 32, 37) the *Saṁdhinirmocana*, v. 7, a Mahāyāna sūtra which teaches the receptacle-consciousness. But he quotes this work as an illustration of his thesis and not as a scriptural authority. In fact, in Para. 37b, he states that the sūtras existing in his day do not speak of the receptacle-consciousness. By a stratagem common enough in exegesis, he pretends that some Hīnayāna sūtras which have disappeared would prove the existence of this consciousness.

2. The masters and the schools that the author mentions all belong notably to the Hīnayāna: Vasumitra, the author of the *Paripṛcchāsūtra* and of the *Pañcavastuka* (Para. 24), Sauryodayikas (Para. 11), Tāmraparṇīyas, Mahāsāṁghikas, Mahīśāsakas (Para. 35). He only presents and refutes Hīnayāna positions; the theories of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas on vijñapti-as-shape (Para. 42), on the existence of past action (Para. 15–17), on nirodhasamāpatti (Para. 22); the theories of the Vātsīputrīya-Sāṁmitīyas on vijñapti-as-movement (Para. 6), on avipraṇāśa (Para. 18), on the ātman (Para. 40); and the theories of the early Sautrāntikas, Sauryodayikas and Darṣṭāntikas on the vijñapti-as-wind (Para. 11), on nirodhaṣamāpatti (Para. 23–26). Nowhere does he deal with the *Prajñāpāramitā* system. The author appears to totally ignore the Mādhyamikas and their "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), and the Vijñānavādins and their "true nature" (*tathatā*).

3. The positions taken by the author on the three great problems of morality are Sautrāntika positions.

a. He is Sautrāntika when he denies that shape is distinct from color (Para. 4), when he posits spontaneous extinction (Para. 8), when he denies any duration to the dharmas and the possibility of movement (Para. 10), when he sees in volition the very essence of bodily and vocal action (Para. 46–48), and when he makes *avijñapti* proceed from volition and not from matter (Para. 14).

b. He is Sautrāntika when he denies the existence of past action (Para. 15–17) and when he explains the ripening of action by means of the subtle evolution of the series (Para. 20).

c. Finally, when he sees in the series a retribution-consciousness perfumed by the active-consciousnesses, he adopts, by his own admission (Para. 30), the theory of certain Sautrāntikas (*mdo-sde-pa kha-cig*) or, according to the Chinese version, of a certain category of Sūtraprāmāṅikas (*i-lei ching wei liang chei* 類經爲量者). Now the *Vyākhayā* of the *Kośa* defines the Sautrāntikas: *ye sūtraprāmāṇika na tu śāstraprāmāṇikāḥ:* "those who recognize the authority of the sutras but not that of the śāstras."

4. The discoverers of the ālayavijñana belonged to the Sautrāntikas; the Vijñānavādins borrowed this theory by adapting it to the doctrine of mind-only. The Sautrāntika ālaya described here is to be distinguished from the ālaya presented in the *Saṁgraha* and in the *Siddhi.*

a. Nowhere here does it say that the consciousness, when it arises, develops into two parts (*bhāga, aṁśa*)*:* an image part (*nimittabhāga*), the thing seen, and a vision part (*darśanabhāga*), an act of consciousness (see *Siddhi,* p. 128; *Viṁśikā,* 9). In other words, our author recognizes the reality of the external object (*artha*). Together with the early schools of Buddhism (see *Siddhi,* p. 127), he discovers in all consciousnesses: 1. an object (*ālambana*), an external thing; 2. an aspect (*ākāra*) or internal image of this thing; 3. a particular consciousness (*viśeṣa*), action properly so-called. Para. 37b allows no doubt with respect to this.

b. The ālaya appropriates the body to itself, as defined in Para. 44: an accumulation of atoms of both primary and derived matter. Their reality is not placed in doubt as in the *Viṁśikā,* 12–13, and the *Siddhi,* p. 39.

c. One asks why the Buddha did not teach the ālaya to his first disciples. In the *Saṁgraha* (*MCB,* vol. III, p. 203–207), Asaṅga answers as follows:

The first disciples, the Śrāvakas, had only one purpose: to destroy the hindrance of the defilements (kleśāvaraṇa) which opposed their deliverance. To this end, there is no need to know the receptacle-consciousness, and the Buddha did not mention it in his preachings. Later. the Bodhisattvas, followers of the Mahāyāna, looked not only to the extinction of the defilements, but

also to the attaining of the omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) of a Buddha. This omniscience is confused with the knowledge free from imagination (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) in which there is neither a subject (*grāhaka*) nor an object (*grāhya*). In order to attain this, it is indispenable to comprehend the ālaya; this is why the Buddha taught it to the Bodhisattvas."

The Sautrāntika who believe in the reality of the external object cannot subscribe to such an explanation. And our author also, in Para. 37b, gives a totally different answer. The Buddha, he says, taught only the six consciousnesses; he said nothing about the ālaya in order to avoid any confusion, because the ālaya is very different from the ordinary consciousnesses.

In short, the doctrines of the ālaya presented here constitutes a realistic and not an idealistic psychology. Let us state, however, that, towards the end of this period, Sautrāntika realism is almost dead; the wall that separates it from idealism is tottering. There is nothing to be surprised at in the fact that Vasubandhu, the last Sautrāntika, passed over to the Vijñānavāda: Asaṅga gained a convert through his teachings.

Author and date. The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is the work of Vasubandhu, an enigmatic person who may be placed in the fourth century of the Christian era (bibliography in *Kośa,* Introduction, pp. xxiv-xxviii). His biographers, from the time of Paramārtha up to the authors included in the Lanman collection, demand too much of our credulity: who can believe that Vasubandhu, without mentioning his acquaintance with the Sāṁkhyā, was a Vaibhāṣika in his youth, a Sautrāntika in his mature years, a Vijñānavādin in his old age, and a Pure Land follower of Amitābha at this death? In our opinion, Vasubandhu lived too long, thought too much, and wrote too much; and before giving a verdict with respect to his personality, one should have read, criticized and compared all of his works. And we are now far away from being able to do so.

Limiting our ambitions, let us merely attribute the *Karmasiddhi* to "the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu," the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam.* In fact, both in essence and in form, these two works are very closely related.

1. The first twenty-five paragraphs of the *Karmasiddhi* are directly inspired by the *Kośa;* certain of them are reoroduced almost

literally. Compare Para. 4 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 9; Para. 5 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 11–12; Para. 24–25 = *Kośa,* I, pp. 212–213. We have given all of these borrowings in the Notes to the translation.

2. A clear indication of the interdependence of these texts is the similarity of the comparisons in these works. All those of the *Karmasiddhi* are taken from the *Kośa:* the colored cloth (*citrāstaraṇa* or *pipīlaka*), Para. 4 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 10; the row (*paṅkti*) of trees (*vṛkṣa*) and of ants (*valmīka*), Para. 4 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 12; the items cooked (*pākaja*) due to the action of fire, sun, snow and vinegar, Para. 7, 8c, 8e = *Kośa,* iv, p. 7; the flame of the lamp (*dīpajvāla*) and the sound of the bell (*ghaṇṭā-śabda*), Para. 8a = *Kośa,* iv, p. 6; milk (*kṣīra*) and curdled milk (*dadhi*), Para. 9 = *Kośa,* v, p. 53; ix,. p. 239; wine (*mṛdvīkā*), Para. 9 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 246; the shade (*chāyā*) which moved, Para. 10 = *Kośa,* i. p. 16; the flower of the citron tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*) painted with lacquer (*lākṣārasa*), Para. 19, 20, 32, 40 = *Kośa,*. iv, p. 299; boiling water (*āpaḥ kvāthyamānāḥ*), Para. 32 = *Kośa,* iv, p. 8; the arrow (*isu*) which falls, Para. 32 = *Kośa,* ii, pp. 200, 217; iv, p. 102.

3. The *Karmasiddhi* and the *Kośa* are conceived in the same spirit and pursue the same end: to combat, within the framework of the Hīnayāna and relying on the best of the Sautrāntika teachings, the exaggerated realism of the Vaibhāṣikas and the spiritualism of the Vātsīputrīyas. The author appears to totally ignore the philosophical systems constructed by the Mahāyāna: the nihilism (*śūnyatāvāda*) of the Mādhyamikas, and the idealism (*vijñānavāda*) of the Yogācārins.

Even though the *Karmasiddhi* was translated into Chinese in 541, approximately twenty-five years before the *Kośa,* we are tempted to consider it to have been composed later than the *Kośa.* In fact, it appears to evidence in its authorship a greater width of philosophical conception, less hesitancy, and a better ordered, more systematic presentation.

A Treatise "A Proof of Action"[1]
Homage to the Royal Prince Mañjuśrī[2]

FIRST PART
ERRONEOUS THEORIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF ACTION

A. THE VIJÑAPTI

1. In different Sūtras, the Blessed One said, "There are three actions (*karman*): bodily action (*kāyakarman*), vocal action (*vāk-karman*), and mental action (*manaḥkarman*).[3]"
[781a26]

I. THEORY OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀṢIKAS:[4] (*VIJÑAPTI-AS-SHAPE*).

1. Presentation.

2. Here, some say: *Action done by the body* (*kāyakṛta*) *is called bodily action; the voice* (*vāc*), *being action, is called vocal action. These two are information*[5] (*vijñapti*) *and non-information* (*avijñapti*)[6] *by nature* (*svabhāvatas*). *Action associated with the mind* (*manaḥsaṁprayukta*) *is called mental action. This action has only volition* (*cetanā*)[7] *for its self-nature* (*svabhāva*).

What is the dharma called information? The action of bodily information (*kāyavijñaptikarman*) *has rūpa-shape* (*saṁsthānarūpa*) *for its nature. It issues from a thought . . . which desires this shape* (*tadālambakacittād utpannam*).[8]

Of what is this the shape? It is the shape of the body [shape which affects the body, action, etc].

If it is the shape of the body, why did one say above that action done by the body is called bodily action[9]*? Because this action* [this movement] *is related to one part* (*aṅga*) *of the "body" in general, it is called the shape of the body; since it depends* (*āśrita*) *on the primary elements* (*mahābhūta*) *of the body in order to arise, it is called action done by the body. That which is said of the body in general is equally applied to* [all] *its parts. Thus people* (*loka*) *say, "I live in a village* (*grāma*)," *or "I live in a*

forest (vana)" [when they reside in a house or under a tree].

Why does one say that this information issues from a thought . . . that it desires it? In order to exclude the shape of the lips, etc. (osthādisaṁsthāna): these do not issue from a thought . . . which desires them, but from a thought . . . which desires language (pada). It is aloso in order to exclude shape resulting from a mind . . . from former vows (pūrvapranidhānacitta): this shape does not issue from a mind . . . which desires it, but a totally different mind, a retributive cause (vipākahetu).[10]

Why is it called information (vijñapti)? Because it informs vijñapayati) with respect to the mind to which it leads (tatpravartakacitta) in such a way that another person is conscious of it. In order to explain this, we quote the stanza (gāthā):

"External (bāhya) motion, of the body and the voice, inform with respect to the intentions (āśaya) of the mind. In this same way the fish (matsya) hidden in the sea moves the waves (taraṅga) and reveals its presence."

What is shape (saṁsthāna)? It is the nature of "long," etc. (dīrghādi).[11]

What is "long," etc? It is that to which one applies the idea (saṁjñā) of long, etc.

In which sphere (āyatana) is it included? It is included within the sphere of form (rūpāyatana).[12] [781b18]

2. Refutation:[13]

3. Here we must reflect and choose. Length . . . is either a specific atom (*paramāṇuviśeṣa, an atom of shape*), like rūpa-color, or an aggregate of special atoms (*paramāṇuviśeṣasaṁghāta*), or a unique and distinct substance (*ekam anyad dravyam*) penetrating the mass of rūpa, etc. (*rūpādisaṁghātavyāpi*).

What fault (doṣa) is there in admitting this?

a. If length . . . were a special atom [a rūpa-shape], this definition would also apply to rūpa-color: in each small part (*ekaika avayava*) of the mass of rūpa, length . . . would be present.[14]

b. If length were an aggregate of special atoms, what difference would there be between the aggregate of the atoms of rūpa-color? [There would be none] and, as a consequence, the the different aggregates of rūpa-color should be long, etc.

c. Let us suppose that length is a unique and distinct substance penetrating the mass of rūpa. Being unique and penetrating, it should be found in each of the parts (*avayana*) separately and in all parts at one and the same time. Or rather this substance would not be one, residing separately in all of the parts. Furthermore, [such a hypothesis] destroys the established truth (*siddhānta*) which holds that the ten spheres (*daśāyatana*) are all the aggregates of atoms (*paramāṇusaṁghāta*)[15]; it confirms the theory of the disciples of Kanada for whom composite things (*aṅgin*) are real substances penetrating its parts (*aṅga*). [781b28]

3. Conclusion.

4. When a mass of form appears in one direction (*ekadigmukhe*) in a great quantity (*bhūyas, bahutaram*), it calls forth the idea of long (*dīrgha*); when it appears in one direction in a small quantity, it calls forth the idea of short (*hrasva*). When it appears equally in the four directions, it calls forth the idea of quarter (*vṛtta*); when it appears equally in all directions, it calls forth the idea of round (*parimaṇḍala*). When it appears convex in its center, it calls forth the idea of high (*unnata*); when it appears concave in its center, it calls forth the idea of low (*avanata*). When it appears in a single direction, it calls forth the idea of unequal (*viśāta*); when it appears in all directions, it calls forth the idea of equal (*śāta*).

Even when, on a variegated carpet (*citrāstaraṇa*), one sees various brocades, one produces different ideas of shape (*nānādhasaṁsthānaprajñā*); but it is impossible (*ayukta*) that these different rūpa-shapes are found together in a single spot (*ekadeśa*): this is the same for rūpa-colors. For, if this were the case, one would conceive in any place whatsoever the idea of all types of shapes. Now this is not the case. Thus rūpa-shape is not a substance distinct (*anyad dravyam*) [from rūpa itself]. When rūpa-shape is arranged in squares, it does not call forth at one and the same time the idea of long, etc., as these ideas are called forth for example by a row (*paṅkti*) of trees (*vṛkṣa*), a line of ants (*valmīka*), etc. There is no difficulty to be found in this. [781c8]

4. Answer to an Objection.[16]

5. *If this is the case* [if shape is not distinguished from color],

how is it that, from a distance (dūrāt) and in the darkness (tamasi), one does not discern (avadhṛ) rūpa-color, but one discerns rūpa-shape? How, without discerning the rūpa-shape of the trees (vṛkṣa), etc., does one discern the rūpa-shape of their row (paṅkti)?

There is no distinct row of trees, etc. But, in these distant or obscured masses, color and shape are not discovered at the same time. One grasps (*gṛhṇāti*) something, but this is indistinct (*avyakta*): one asks himself what it is, or what is it that he sees. We know thus that one grasps solely the rūpa-color, but as it is distinct and obscure, one sees only indistinctly. It is thus not proven (*asiddha*) that information (*vijñapti*) is shape (*saṁsthāna*).[17] [781c14]

II: THEORY OF THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS AND SAṀMITYĪAS: (*vijñapti-as-movement*).

1. Presentation.

6. Some[21] say: *Bodily information (kāyavijñapti) is a movement (gati) arisen from a thought . . . which wants this movement (tadviṣayālambakacittāder utpannā).*

Why does one say that it arises from a mind . . . which wants this movement? In order to exclude the movement of the lips (oṣṭhādikampita) . . . arisen, not from a thought which wants it, but from a thought which wants language.

What is movement (gati)? A displacement (deśantarasaṁkrānti).

In which sphere (āyatana) is it included? It is included within the sphere of form (rūpāyatana).[22] [781c19,

2. First argument; Refutation.

7. How do you know that information is a displacement?

Because one does not see (na avadhṛta) that it has a particular characteristic (lakṣaṇaviśeṣa) [apart from displacement].

This argument does not hold. Thus the products of cooking (*pākajadravya*), immediately in contact (*saṁyoga*) with one of the conditions of cooking (*pākapratyaya*) – fire (*agni*), sun (*sūrya*), snow (*hima*), vinegar (*kaṭuka*), etc. – have some particularities (*viśeṣa*) without which one cannot recognize their particular characteristics (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*). However, there is no difference between before and after. The same holds here. Thus again equal piles

(*tulyabhāga*) of herbs to be burned (*dīrghendhanatṛṇa*), which each separately produce their flame (*jvāla*), have some particularities without which one cannot recognize their particular characteristic. Yet, these different piles are not without differences. The same holds here.[23]

If, at the first contact between the product of cooking and its condition, the characteristic of being cooked were not to appear, neither would it appear later (*paścāt*), for the condition of cooking does not vary.

If the similar piles of herbs to be burned did not produce, pile by pile and separately, their flame, tnese flames would not have anything which would serve to distinguish them by means of dimension (*pramā*), of light (*dyuti*) and of heat (*uṣman*). Thus it is not because a particular characteristic [other than displacement] is invisible [in the information] that one can say that information is displacement. One should become conscious of this particular characteristic. [782a1]

3. Second Argument; Refutation.

8. Since information is not a cause of extinction (*vināśahetu*), we know that it is a displacement.

This argument no longer holds. Let us take for example the mind (*citta*), mental states (*caitta*), sound (*śabda*), a flame (*jvāla*), etc. What causes of extinction do they have? [We know that they do not have any] and that they perish immediately (*kṣaṇanirodha*). The same holds for all of the rest: extinction does not depend on a cause (*na hetum apekṣate*).[24]

But the mind, etc., also has a cause of extinction: its own impermanence (*svānityatva*).

If this were the case, then why not reason in this same way for things other [than the mind, etc.]? [From this point of view], other things are not distinguished [from the mind]. Why? You know that for the mind, etc., extinction does not depend on a cause, but this holds for all of the rest as well as for the mind . . .

If the extinction of dharmas other [than the mind, etc.], *were not to depend on a cause, the material cause* (*rūpādisvabhāva*) . . . *of fuel* (*indhana*) *would no longer be perceived* (*gṛhīta*) *before the contact* (*saṁyoga*) *with the fuel . . . with the fire* (*agni*) . . .

as well as after this very contact; or rather, it would be perceived as well after as before.[25]

a. When wind (*vāyu*) does not reach the lamp (*dīpa*), when a hand (*pāni*) does not grasp the bell (*ghaṇṭa*), the flame of the lamp (*dīpajvāla*) and the sound of the bell (*ghaṇṭāśabda*) are clearly perceived; afterward, they are no longer thus. However, [even according to you], the extinction of the flame and of the sound depend neither upon the wind nor on the hand. The same holds for the fuel, etc.; there is no difficulty here.[26]

b. Let us suppose that the fuel . . . perishes in the fire . . . , and that, in this manner, its material nature is no longer perceived. Immediately after its contact with the fire (*saṁyogānantaram*), one should no longer perceive it, for after coming into contact with it, it is modified.[27]

c. The external condition (*bāhyapratyaya*) of cooking remains unchanged (*nirviśiṣṭa*), giving rise [successively] to different cooked products (*pākaja*) with the characteristics of being cooked (*pākajalakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) more and more pronounced (lit: of inferior, medium, or superior category). But how could they arise, later, from the same cause [from the same condition of cooking] which formerly caused them to perish? It is impossible (*ayukta*) that the dharma which brings about arising is confused with the dharma which causes extinction: two dharmas of opposite (*viruddha*) characteristics do not form a single cause: this is known by everyone (*lokaprasiddha*). Thus conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) dharmas do not depend (*nāpekṣante*) on a cause of extinction (*nivāśahetu*): they perish spontaneously (*svarasena nirudhyante*).[28] Whether things are perceived (*gṛhīta*) or are not perceived as formerly (*yathapūrvam*), is, let us remember, the specific characteristic (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) of the continuation (*anupravṛtti*) and of the extinction (*nirodha*) of the series (*saṁtāna*): it enjoys a subtle increase.

d. If extinction (*vināśadharma*) had a cause, it would not be a dharma perishing without a cause; the mind (*citta*), the mental states (*caitta*), etc., which depend on a cause in order to arise, would also depend on a cause in order to perish. Now, [from your very own admission], the mind and the mental states do not have any other cause of extinction than their own impermanence (*svānityatva*), as everyone knows (*lokaprasiddha*).

3. Since the causes [of extinction] would differ [according

to the case], there would be different extinctions (*vināśaviśeṣa*). Fire, sun, snow, vinegar, etc., being different, would produce different cooked foods.[29]

f. Finally, with respect to the dharma which has already perished, one would have to find a cause which would cause it to perish anew, as with rūpa, etc.

This is why extinction absolutely does not have any cause, and as extinction does not have a cause, everything perishes as soon as it arises (*utpattyanantaravināśa*). One can know then that there is no displacement. [782a25]

4. Third Argument; Refutation.

9. *Since information does not have any generating cause (janakahetu), we know that it is a displacement (deśāntarasaṁkrānti).*

This argument no longer holds, for information has a generating cause. The earlier (*pūrva*), with respect to the later (*paścima*), constitutes a generating cause. Thus, for example, the mind of the earlier moment (*pūrvakṣaṇacitta*) with respect to the mind of the later moment (*pascimaksanacitta*); the product of an earlier cooking (*pakaja*) with respect to the product of a later cooking; milk (*ksira*) with respect to curdled milk (*dadhi*); grape juice (*drakṣarasa*) with respect to wine (*mṛdvika*); wine with respect to vinegar (*katuka*), etc.[30] Thus there is no dharma which changes place. Since there is no displacement, how could there be movement? [782a20]

5. The Impossibility of Movement.

10. Furthermore, [from two things the one]. If a dharma is stable (*asasthita*), it is without movement (*agatika*); being without movement, it should always remain in one place. If a dharma is not stable, it is also without movement, for, perishing as soon as it arises (*utpattyanantaravinasin*), it does not include movement.

If this is the case, what is this movement that you speak of?

That which one sees in another place is not the same thing as before (*yad desāntare dṛṣṭaṁ tan mūladravyam na bhavati*).

How does one know that this is no longer the same thing?

Because in such and such a place, there is arising which is always renewing itself: such as the flames of a pile of straw on fire (*tṛṇajvāla*), or the play of the shade (*chāyā*). The shade seen

in such a place is not that of another place; if the umbrella remains unmoving, the light of the sun (*sūryādidyuti*) . . . becomes more distant, comes closer, turns, and then one sees that the shade becomes larger, becomes smaller, or turns. If one hides the light, no shade would appear.

Our opponent (*paravādin*) objects: *Why is there this subtle objection against displacement? How does one know that that which one seens in one place is not the same thing as before?*

But this again touches on our dilemma presented above:

"If a dharma is stable, it is without movement, etc."

Furthermore, the external condition (*bāhyapratyaya*) of cooking, fire (*agni*), etc., does not vary (*abhinna*) and, nevertheless, later (*paścāt*), different cooked products are perceived (*gṛhīta*). By this proof, we know that, in each instant (*kṣaṇe kṣaṇe*), there is a different cooked item [and not the same item more and more cooked].

Under the pretext that there is no cause which makes these items different, you pretend that the item moreover is the same item as before. But as there is no reason why this [new item] should be identical to the former one, why not admit (*kenanistam*) that this is no longer the former item. These two hypotheses cannot both be held, and so movement (*gati*) is not proven (*siddha*). [782b13]

III: THEORY OF THE SAURYODAYIKA-DĀRṢṬĀNTIKAS: (*VIJÑAPTI-AS-WIND*).

1. Presentation.

11. The Sauryodayikas[31] say: *Operations* (*saṁskāra*), *in reality, do not displace themsleves* (*deśāntaram na saṁkrāmanti*), *for, by their nature* (*svabhāvatas*), *they perish instantly* (*kṣaṇe kṣaṇe nirudhyante*). *But, separately, there is a dharma. It has for its cause* (*hetu*) *a certain thought* (*cittaviśeṣa*) *which produces it by relying* (*niśritya*) *on the hand* (*pāni*), *the foot* (*pāda*), *etc. It is the cause which causes the hand, or the foot . . .* [to renew themselves in a series] *arising in another place. It is called movement* (*gati*) *and also bodily information* (*kāyavijñapti*). *In which sphere* (*āyatana*) *is it included? It is included within the sphere of visible*

things (rūpāyatana).

Then why does not the eye (*cakṣus*) see it in the same way in which it sees rūpa-color (*varṇarūpa*)? Since it is not seen, it does not inform another: why call it information? How do you know that this dharma really exists? How does this dharma cause the body to displace itself and "another" to arise?

This is explained by the wind element (vāyudhātu) which has arisen from a certain thought (cittaviśesād utpannah). The wind element, by its nature (svabhāvatas), is mobile (cala). It is the cause which causes the foot to renew itself in another place. Apart from wind, where is there to be found a dharma endowed with mobility? Grasses (tṛṇa), leaves (parṇa), etc., do not have any other mobility than the external wind. How could they move themselves? It is when the wind moves (cal-) them, projects (ākṣip-) them and touches (saṁyui-) them that they move. One should thus admit that the wind can cause the hand, etc., to stir and to arise in another place. Why do you tire yourself out searching for any other thing which, neither by its nature (svabhāva) nor through its activity (kriyā), is able to constitute a dharma capable of movement? [782b26]

2. Refutation.

12. a. According to you, the wind element (vāyudhātu) which has arisen from a certain thought (cittaviśeṣād utpannah) and the cause of the arising of the hand . . . in another place would be bodily information (kāyavijñapti). But how can this wind element, which is not information, be called information? Furthermore, to desire that the sphere of tangible things (sparśāyatana), which includes the wind,[32] be good (kuśala) or evil (akuśala) is not Buddhist (na śākyaputrīyam).[33]

b. According to you, a certain thought (cittaviśeṣa) causes the body to arise in another place, and this arising of the body is bodily information. But such bodily information is imagined (kalpita), non-existent in and of itself (na dravyasat), for the body is by nature a composite of multiple dharmas (saṁbahuladharma-samghāta). Furthermore, how can [the body], which is not information, be called information? Smell (ghandha), etc., do not inform another. Finally, to desire that smell, etc., be good or evil is not Buddhist.[34]

c. According to you, rūpa-color (varṇarūpa) which has arisen from

a certain thought is bodily information. But this rūpa-color does not arise from a certain thought: it arises from its own seeds (svabīja) and from a certain wind (vāyuviśeṣa). Furthermore, to desire that rūpa-color be good or evil is not Buddhist.

13. *If this rūpa-color itself is not bodily information, its arising in another place would constitute bodily information.*

O great fool (*devanañpriya*)![35] Arbitrarily (*jen* 任), you exhaust your forces on this act of information (*vijñaptikarman*) and with much ardor you accumulate various hypotheses (*ch'uan-chi* 轉計); but, when something cannot be acquired through effort, why should one persist in it (*prayatnato'sādhyesu kiṁ prayatnena*)? Who can demonstrate (*vyavasthāp-*) that this arising [of the rūpa] is a reality distinct (*anyad dravyam*) [from the rūpa itself]? If the arising of the rūpa which is perceived is not similar to the rūpa, etc., if the organ which sees it is not similar to the eye, etc., how would the seeing subject recognize its existence? If it is invisible, how can one call it information? We have said above that it does not inform others. Finally, if rūpa-color can be good (*kuśala*) or evil (*akuśala*), one could say that its arising constitutes bodily information. But rupa-color is neither good nor evil: we have said this above. Thus its arising likewise [is neither good nor evil, and does not constitute bodily information]. Consequently, there is no true action of bodily information. [782c15]

B. THE AVIJÑAPTI[36]

14. *If this were the case, bodily action* (*kāyakarman*) *is solely non-information* (*avijñapti*). *What dharma is this non-information? It is a rūpa, discipline* (*saṁvara*),[37] *etc., contained in the sphere of intelligence* (*dharmāyatana*).[38] *But how, in the realm of desire* (*kām-adhātu*), *does non-information arise without* [preliminary] *information*[39]

If there is, in the realm of desire, such non-information, what is the error (doṣa) in this?

Non-information would there be subordinate to the mind (*cittānuparivartin*), *as in the realm of form* (*rūpadhātu*). *But then, in a man who has a different thought* [from that which produces the avijñapti] *or who is without thought* (*acittaka*), *there would neither be any discipline* (*saṁvara*) *nor non-discipline* (*asaṁvara*).[40]

We say that non-information [called discipline] is projected for

a fixed time (*kālasamādānāt*),[41] and thus we avoid this error. (You yourselves, Vaibhāsikas, are forced to admit that, in the realm of desire, a non-information of lying can arise without preliminary vocal information). If not, then when one recites the Prātimokṣa and a monk keeps silent and does not confess, how could he commit the transgression of lying (*mṛsāvādāpatti*)?[42]

[If non-information always results from information], there would not be any morally neutral (*avyākṛta:* indifferent from the moral point of view) bodily action, since the action of non-information has only two moral types [good or bad].[43]

Finally, there would not be at one and the same moment (*ekakṣaṇe*) good and evil bodily actions, since non-information necessarily endures, in the sense that a weak mind (*mṛducetanā*) does not project (*ākṣipati*) non-information, but non-information projected by a strong mind (*tīvracetanā*) necessarily endures.[44]

Even thought, one arbitrarily (*anurucim*) posits the existence of material actions (*rūpakarman*), bodily and vocal, one cannot prove that they are good or evil. Why? Because material action, at the end of one's life, will be entirely abandoned. How then could one produce (*abhinirvṛt*) later an agreeable (*manojña*) or disagreeable (*amanojña*) result (*phala*)? [782c28]

SECOND PART
THE MECHANISM OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTION

I: THE THEORY OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀṢIKAS: THE EXISTENCE OF PAST ACTION

15. Some[45] say: *Why would this be impossible (ayukta)? Past action (atītakarman) in and of itself (svabhāvatas) really exists (asti), and it gives forth (prayacchati) its fruit (phala) realized in the future (anāgatādhvany abhinirvṛttaḥ).*

Pustules (*visphoṭa*) growing on a tumor (*gaṇḍa*)! You now pretend that past action exists in and of itself.[46] But that which no longer exists after having existed (*yad bhūtapūrvaṁ paścān na bhavati*) is called "past."[47] How can you admit that it exists in and of itself (*svabhāvatas*)?

But the Bhagavat said:

"Actions do not perish, ever after millons of cosmic eras. When the complex [of conditions] *and the desired time come together, they ripen* [for the series]."[48] *The Bhagavat said that action does not perish. How do you explain this?*

This means that completed action (*kṛtakarman*) is not without fruit (*niḥphala*), as the second half of the stanza explains. Who does not admit (*kenāniṣṭam*) that good or bad (*kuśalākuśala*) action, even a long time afterwards (*yun riṅ por yaṅ*), gives forth (*prayacchati*) its fruit? It only remains to ask (*vicārayitavyam*) how it gives forth its fruit. Does it give forth its fruit like the rice seed (*śālibīja*), etc., by a special evolution of the series which it modifies (*saṁtānapariṇāmaviśesa*)[49]? Or does it give forth its fruit because its being (*svalakṣaṇa*) subsists for a long time (*dīrghakālam avatiṣṭhate*) and does not perish (*na vinaśyate*)[50]? If it is by a special evolution of the series that it gives forth its fruit, this is fine, but if it gives forth its fruit because its being (*svalakṣaṇa*) subsists for a long time, one must say that the action in and of itself (*t'i* 體 = *svabhāva*) avoids extinction for a long time (*dīrghākalaṁ na vinaśyate*) and that thus it gives forth its fruit. But it is not because action no longer has any being (*svalakṣaṇa*) that it is called "destroyed" (*vinaṣṭa*); it is because the

action no longer exercises any activity (*kriyāṁ na karoti*) that it is called destroyed[51]. Why does the action no longer exercise any activity? Because it no longer projects (*ākṣip-*) any future fruit. Why does it no longer project any future fruit? Because it has already formerly projected this fruit and, after having projected it, it can no longer project it anew; in the same way a dharma, after having arisen, does not arise anew. [783a16]

16. *Why does this action not project any other fruits, fruits of out-flowing (niṣyandaphala), etc.[52]?*

Because the fruits of out-flowing have no limit.[53]

Should not the action existing at the present moment (vartamāna), which has already projected its fruit, no longer project it anew? The action in and of itself (karmasvabhāva) does not perish, but remains eternally (nityam) present. Why does it not eternally project the fruit that it gives forth?

Have we not said above that after having projected its fruit, it can no longer project it anew? In the same way a dharma, after having arisen, does not arise anew.

Why does it lead to this difficulty?

Even though we have mentioned this above, you have not resolved this difficulty. If action in and of itself (*karmasvabhāva*) were constantly present, it should, as at the very center of its present [existence], always be called present and always project its fruit; it should, as at the beginning [of its present existence], always be reborn.

But even though past action in and of itself (atītakarmasvahāva) really exists (asti), it no longer has any activity (kāritra) and consequently is not present. Not being present, it no longer projects any fruit.

This is not at all correct, for if [action] in and of itself (*svabhāva*) were always to exist, it should, as during its present [existence], always exercise its activity. Otherwise, if the past dharmas admitted by you were to have the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of giving forth (*prayam*) a fruit, how would they not be present?

But the expression "present" is applied exclusively to the dharmas which grasp (pratigṛhnanti) – or which project – their fruit.

This is not at all correct, for if the [ripening] activity is the same we would have some dharma present (*vartamāna*) and past (*atīta*) at one and the same time.[54] A dharma which no longer

exercises the activity of grasping (*pratigrah-*) a fruit is called "past"; a dharma exercising the activity of giving forth (*prayam-*) a fruit is called "present." When this activity is exhausted, it is called "destroyed" (*vinaṣṭa*). If the dharmas, after having perished, were to perish anew, it would also have to be the case that, after having arisen, they would arise anew. Thus your theory [that a past action causes a fruit] is not proven (*asiddha*). [783b1]

17. How does a dharma "project" (*ākṣipati*) its fruit?

By setting it up (*vyavasthāp-*) *in such a way that it arises later.*

But then at the very last moment of its existence, [the Arhat] freed from the impurities (*kṣiṇāsrava*) does not project any fruit, since this fruit willl not arise later.[55] Consequently, the mind of the Arhat, not being present, will not be destroyed (*vinaṣṭa*) and will not enter the past. If, in the present, it is without activity (*kāritra*), how, in the future, could one say that it is destroyed?

Even though it is without activity [at the present moment], *it will be thus when it is destroyed* [later].

Then, while being past, it would be able to be destroyed again! If the thing already destroyed could again be destroyed anew, the thing already arisen could arise again. This is in contradiction (*virodhadoṣa*) with that which has been said above.

The mind of the Arhat exists; it has the power of engendering a fruit in the future; nevertheless, if the conditions (*pratyaya*) *are lacking, this fruit will not arise.*[56]

This is not at all correct. If the fruit should not arise, how will one know if the mind [which projects it in vain] exists and is capable of engendering it? One should say that this mind contradicts the law of twofold conditions (*pratyaya*), for [at one and the same time] it is and it is not: even though arisen from a cause (*hetuta utpannam*), it is not capable of engendering its fruit later. This is why the system according to which a [mind] of this type can project a fruit, does not hold. It must absolutely be the case that the seed (*bīja*) causes the fruit to grow (*vṛdh-*) in order that it be called "projector of the fruit."

Furthermore, the School [of the Vaibhāṣikas] holds that the past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) exist in and of themselves (*svabhāvatas*). But then how would the future not be present and a projector of fruit? If all things (*sarvadravya*) were to exist at all

times (*sarvakāla*), at what moment would there be anything not existing in and of itself? However, according to the sutra, [action] ripens only when it encounters the complex of conditions (*pratyayasāmagrī*) and a favorable time (*kāla*).

Finally, the [Vaibhāṣikas] should tell us what this principle is, this state (*avasthā*), this power that "sets it up in such a way that it arises" and is called for this reason "the projector of the fruit"; in fact [according to them] everything exists always.

Thus their theory which holds that past action (*atītakarman*) exists in and of itself (*svabhāvatas*) and gives forth (*prayam*) a fruit realized in the future (*anāgatādhvany abhinirvṛttam*) is not proven (*asiddha*) [783b19]

II: THE THEORY OF THE EARLY SĀMMITĪYAS: AVIPRAṆĀŚA.

1. Presentation.[57]

18. *In this case, one should admit that the two actions, bodily and vocal action, good or bad, deposit* (*ādadhati*[58]) *in the psycho-physical series* (*skandhasaṁtāna*) *a separate dharma, existing in and of itself* (*dravyasat*) *and classed among things not associated with the mind* (*cittaviprayuktasaṁskāra*[59]). *For some, this dharma is called increase* (*upacaya*[60]); *for others "without extinction"* (*avipraṇāśa*[61]) *By reason of this dharma, one realized* (*abhinirvṛt-*[62]), *the future agreeable or disagreeable fruit. In order that this should equally be mental action* (*manaḥkarman*), *one should admit the existence of this dharma. If not* (*anyatra*), *when another mind arises and when the mental action has disappeared* (*nivṛtta*), *if this particular dharma were not deposited in the mental series* (*cittasamtāna*), *how could one realize the future fruit? Thus it is necessary* (*niyatam*) *to admit the existence of such a dharma.* [783b26]

2. Refutation.

19. a. When, first, one has studied (*abhyas-*) a text (*grantha*[63]) and when, a long time afterwards, one recalls it to memory (*smṛti*); when, first, one has seen or heard . . . objects (*viṣaya*) and when, a long time afterwards, one reproduces them in the memory, at what moment (*kṣaṇa*) what dharma is produced (*utpādayati*) which permits later the calling up of these memories?

b. With respect to the mind of entry into the absorption of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatticitta*), what dharma does it produce by virtue of which, later (*paścat*), upon leaving this absorption, there will appear the mind-of-leaving-the-absorption (*vyutthānacitta*)?[64]

c. Finally, when one paints the flower of a citron tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*) with the red essence of paint (*lākṣārasarakta*)[65] – when both of them [the paint and the flower] perish together – what dharma is produced by virtue of which, later, when the fruit arises, the pip (*kesara*) will be of red color (*raktavarṇa*)?[66] [783c3]

III: THEORIES OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS: SAṀTĀNAPARIṆĀMA[67]

1. Presentation.

20. This is why, with the exclusion of this separate imaginary (*parikalpita*) dharma arisen from the two actions, bodily and vocal action, it suffices that a special type of volition (*cetanāviśeṣa*) exercises a perfuming (*bhāvanā*) on the mental series (*cittasaṁtāna*) and creates a potentiality (*śakti*) therein. Through a special evolution (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*) of this potentiality, a certain fruit (*phalaviśeṣa*) will arise later. Thus when one paints the flower of the citron tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*) with the red essence of paint (*lāksārasarakta*), the series of the flower evolves (*pariṇamate*) and, at the moment when the fruit is formed, the pip (*kesara*) is of red color (*raktavarṇa*). We can know that the perfuming (*bhāvanā*) of the internal (*ādhyātmika*) dharmas occurs in the same manner.[68] [783c8]

2. Answer to the Objections.

21. *Why not admit that the two actions, bodily and vocal action, perfume the mental series (cittasaṁtāna)?*

a. Because it is by virtue of a mind (*cittam apeksya*) that bodily or vocal action is good (*kuśala*) or bad (*akuśala*).[69] It is impossible (*ayukta*) that, rendered good or bad by a mind, it would be able [in its own right] to give forth (*prayam-*) a future agreeable or disagreeable fruit to a distinct series. In fact, it is not one thing which does the action and another which gathers the

fruit. (Tibetan version: That by which something is rendered good or bad is capable of giving to the series of this thing an agreeable or disagreeable fruit, but the series cannot do [anything similar]).

b. Let us suppose that the being (*t'i* 體, *svabhāva*) of the completed action is destroyed (*vinasta*), but that, nevertheless, the mental series (*cittasamtana*) perfumed (*bhavita*) by this action could, by a special evolution of its potentialities (*śaktipariṇāmaviśeṣa*), give forth (*prayam-*) an agreeable or disagreeable future fruit. But then, after the absorptions lacking mind (*acittakasamāpatti*) and after existence among the non-conscious gods (*asamjñideva*)[70] wherein the mental series (*cittasamtāna*) is cut off (*chinna*), how could action anterior [to these states] later bear an agreeable or disagreeable fruit? [783c14]

THIRD PART
THE "SERIES" OR THE RIPENING ACTION

I. PRELIMINARY QUESTION: NIRODHASAMĀPATTI.[71]

1. Opinion of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas.

22. Some[72] say: *In the present life* (*iha janmani*), *the mind* (*citta*) *perfumed* (*bhāvita*) *by former actions again takes up its course* (*pratisamdadhāti*) *after absorption; thus, it gives forth agreeable and disagreeable future fruits.*

But since the mind has been interrupted (*samucchinna*) [during the absorption], how can it again take up its course?

It has the "mind of entry into the absorption" (*samāpatticitta*) *for its equal and immediate antecedent* (*samanantarapratyaya*) *and thus it again takes up its course.*

But the mind of entry into the absorption has been destroyed (*vinaṣṭa*) for a long time. How could it constitute an equal and immediate antecedent? We have excluded the hypothesis that past action (*atītakarman*) is able to give forth (*prayam-*) a fruit. This exclusion should equally be applied here.[73] Thus the "mind of leaving the absorption" (*vyutthānacitta*) does not take up again the course of the mind. [783c19]

2. Root-opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas.

23. Some[74] say: *It is through the force of its seeds* (*bījavaśāt*) *supported on the material organs* (*rūpīndriyāśrita*) *that the mind posterior to the absorption comes into existence. In fact, the seeds* (*bīja*) *which give rise to the mind and to mental states* (*cittacaitta*) *rest according to circumstance* (*yathāyogam*) *on* [one] *of the two following series* (*saṁtāna*)*: the mental series* (*cittasāṁtāna*) *or the series of the material organs* (*rūpīndriyasaṁtāna*).

But does not the sūtra[75] say that the manas and the dharmas are the conditions (*pratyaya*) which give rise to the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*)? [If, during the absorption, only the material organs bear the seeds of the future mental consciousness], if there were no manas [to bear these seeds], how would the mental consciousness arise?

Know this: it happens (syāt[76]*) that, by "manas," the sūtra designates the seeds of the manas (manobīja); in order to designate the cause* [namely the seeds of the manas], *it employs through metaphor (upacāra) the name of the effect* [namely the manas itself.] *In this same way, in order to designate the tangible (spraṣṭavya), one employs through metaphor the name* [of the results of the tangible]: *hunger (bubhukṣā) and thirst (pipāsā).*

But how could each mind and each mental state arise from two series of seeds (*bījasaṁtāna*)? We do not see, in the dharmas issued from seeds, any stalk (*aṅkura*), etc., nor that there is anything similar to them. There can be many conditions (*pratyaya*) for the same fruit, but it is false that a single fruit arises from two seeds (*bīja*).

In admitting this, you do not avoid the difficulty mentioned above (Para. 21): "But then, after the absorptions lacking mind (*acittakasamāpatti*) and after existence among the nonconscious gods (*asaṁjñideva*) wherein the mental series (*cittasaṁtāna*) is cut off (*chinna*), how could action anterior [to these states] later bear an agreeable or disagreeable fruit?" [783c29]

3. Branch-opinion of Vasumitra, of the Sautrāntikas, etc.

24. *But, say some, this error (doṣa) is due to the theory (pakṣa).*

To what theory?

To the theory of those who admit that these states (avasthā) of absorption and of non-consciousness are lacking mind (avittaka). Some[77] *say that these states are endowed with a mind (sacittaka) and they thus avoid the error mentioned* [in Para. 23]. *Thus the Bhadanta Vasumitra in the treatise (śāstra) entitled Paripṛcchā says: "Those who consider the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamāpatti) as being deprived of mind (acittaka) run afoul of the difficulty* [of explaining how the mind is taken up again after the absorption]. *But I maintain that this absorption of extinction is endowed with a subtle mind (sūkṣmacitta). The difficulty does not exist for me." Vasumitra again quotes the sutra in order to establish his theory, such as the sutra which says: "The bodily energies (kāyasaṁskāra) of him who resides (viharati) in the absorption of extinction do not let themselves be destroyed (niruddha)," etc., up to: "his organs do not deteriorate (praluj-), his consciousness (vijñāna) does not leave his body."*[78] [784a6]

25. With what consciousness is this state endowed?

Some say: *It is endowed with the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness* (*manovijñāna*).

But[79] does not the sūtra say: "By reason of the manas [mental organ] and the dharmas, there arises the mental consciousness; from the coming together of the three, there is contact; and at the same time as contact, there also arises sensation, ideas, volition" (*manaḥ pratītya dharmāṁś cotpadyate manovijñānam. trayāṇāṁ saṁnipātaḥ sparśaḥ, sahajātā vedanā saṁjñā cetanā ca*).[80] How could this state (the absorption of extinction) be endowed with a mental consciousness without the coming together of the three [manas, dharmas, mental consciousness]? How could there be the coming together of the three without a contact? How could there be contact without sensation and ideas? Now this state is called "absorption extinguishing sensation and ideas" (*saṁjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*).

We are presented with the objection: *Why does the Bhagavat say: "By reason of sensation, there is thirst"* (*vedanāpratyayātṛṣṇā*), *whereas any sensation is not indifferently the cause of thirst? The same holds for contact* (*sparśa*). *No contact of any kind is indifferently the cause of sensation* (*vendanāpratyaya*).

The Bhagavat himself, in another sūtra, distinguished (*viśiṣ, prabhid*) the circumstances. He says that "sensation arisen from contact accompanied by ignorance (*avidyāsaṁsparśajā avedanā*) is the cause of thirst (*tṛṣṇā*),"[81] but nowhere does he distinguish a particular contact which would [alone] be the cause of sensation. Since he does not distinguish any separate one, your objection is not good. [784a14]

4. Variant Branch-opinion of the Sautrāntikas

a. Presentation.

26. Some[82] say: *The phrase: "From the coming together of the three* (*trikasaṁnipāta*), *there is contact* (*sparśa*)*" signifies that, when the three substances* [manas, dharmas and mental consciousness] *are capable of uniting, contact arises. But, in this state* (*avasthā: absorption of extinction*), *they are not capable of produding* (*utpād-*) *contact nor, moreover, sensation* (*vedanā*) *and ideas* (*saṁjñā*) [which result from contact], *for the mind of entry into absorption* (*samapātticitta*) *is lost* (*dūṣita*). *If, in this state of absorption, there*

is no contact, how much more so (kim uta) will sensation and ideas be lacking? Thus, in this state, there is only a mental consciousness (manovijñāna) without mental states (caitta).

In this case, is the mental consciousness of this state good (*kuśala*), is it defiled (*kliṣṭa*), or is it morally neutral (*avyākṛta*)? What errors are there in admitting this? [784a18]

b. Refutation.

27. This manovijñāna can neither be kuśala, nor kliṣṭa, nor avyākṛta.[83]

a. If this mental consciousness were good (kuśala), how could it be good without being associated (*saṁprayukta*) with the roots of good, non-greed, etc. (*alobhādikuśalamūla*)?[84] To suppose that it is associated with these roots of good, non-greed, etc., how could there not be contact?

But, being projected (ākṣipta) by a good "similar and immediate antecedent" (kuśala samanantarapratyaya), this mental consciousness is good.[85]

It is not, for immediately after a good mind, three types of minds [good, bad, neutral] can appear.[86]

Furthermore, a good mind projected by the force of the roots of good is not capable of dispelling (*nivṛt-*) non-greed (*alobha*), etc.

Finally, without the roots of good, it cannot be good. Now the absorption of extinction, like Extinction [Nirvāṇa] itself, is good. [784a25]

b. If this mental consciousness were defiled (*kliṣṭa*), how could it be defiled without being associated (*saṁprayukta*) with defilements, greed, etc. (*lobhādikleśa*)? To suppose that it is associated with the defilements, greed, etc., how could there be a contact [involving the presence of mental states]? Thus, the Bhagavat himself said in the Daśaparipṛcchāsūtra: "No (*anyatama*) sensation-aggregate (*vedanāskandha*), no idea-aggregate (*saṁjñāskandha*), no volition-aggregate (*saṁskāraskandha*) has contact (*sparśa*) for its condition (*pratyaya*)."

Furthermore, if the absorption of non-consciousness (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*) is not considered as defiled, how much more so (*kim uta*) the absorption of extinction. [784a28]

c. But, you say, *this mental consciousness is neutral-non-defiled (avivṛtāvyākṛta).*

Has it arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*) either relative to the attitudes (*airyāpathika*), relative to the fine arts (*śailpasthānika*), or relative to objects of creation (*nairmita, nairmāṇika*)?[88]

What errors are there in admitting this? [784b1]

28. This manovijñāna is not vipākaja.

a. Let us suppose that this mental consciousness has arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*). How, after an absorbed mind in the summit of existence (*bhavāgrasamāpatticittānataram*),[89] and after having itself been discarded (*nivārita*) during eight successive spheres (*bhūmi*),[90] could a mind of the realm of desire produced from retribution (*kāmāvacara vipākaja citta*) arise?

Contrarily, how, afterwards, could the non-agitated (*āniñjyādicitta*) mind [of the two higher worlds[91]] arise? Thus, in the Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra,[92] it is asked: "Upon leaving the absorption of extinction, how many contacts (*sparśa*) will one touch?"

Answer: "Oh Mahākauṣṭhila, one will touch three contacts: contact with non-agitation (*aniñjyasparśa*), contact with nothing (*ākiṁcanyasparśa*), and contact with no-marks (*animitasparśa*)."[93] [784b6]

b. Furthermore, supposing that this mental consciousness is a retribution-mind (*vipākacitta*) projected by former actions (*pūrvakarmākṣipta*), for what reason does it not go beyond the limit,[94] the moment of leaving the contemplation fixed by the resolution to enter it? [784b8]

c. Moreover, how does a mind absorbed in the summit of existence (*bhavāgrasamapātticitta*), having extinction for its object (*nirodhālambaka*), and having arrived at the end (*niṣṭhāgata*), in order that a mind arisen from retribution (*vipākaphalacitta*) projected (*ākṣipta*) by the impregnations of former actions (*pūrvakarmavāsanā*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) happen to manifest itself, whereas it does not manifest itself in earlier states? [784b10]

d. If finally, among beings here, matter arisen from retribution (*vipākajarūpa*), after having been cut off (*samucchinna*), is not taken up again (*na pratisamdadhāti*), why could the mind arisen from retribution, once it is cut off, not be taken up again? [784b 11]

29. This manovijñāna is neither airyāpathika, nor sailpasthānika, nor nairmita.

But this mental consciousness is relative to the attitudes (airyāpathika), relative to the fine arts (śailpasthānika), or relative to objects of creation (nairmita, nairmānika).

a. How could this mind bear (*ālambeta*) on the attitudes, etc.? In the absence of contact (*sparśa*), how could it carry them out (*abhisaṃskṛ-*)?

b. Furthermore, it is admitted (*iṣyate*) that the nine successive absorptions (*navānupūrvavihārasamāpatti*)[95] and the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*)[96] are good (*kuśala*) by nature. Thus it is not possible (*ayuktā*) that these states (avastha) present a defiled (*kliṣṭa*) or morally neutral (*avyākṛta*) mind.

c. Finally, it is by utilizing the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*), by grasping extinction (*nirodha*) as its object (*viṣaya*) and reflection on calm (*śāntamanasikāra*) for its point of support (*āśraya*), that one enters into the absorption of extinction of ideas and of sensation (*saṁjñāveditanirodha-samāpatti*).[97] Thus, in the *Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra*, this question is posed on the absorption of extinction: "How many causes (*hetu*), how many conditions (*pratyaya*), are the base permitting one to enter into the absorption on the element-without-marks (*animittadhātusamāpatti*)?"

Answer: "Oh Mahākauṣṭhila, two causes, two conditions, are the base permitting one to enter into the absorption on the element-without-marks: the absence of reflection on all ideas (*sarvanimittamanasikārābhāva*) and reflection oι the element-without-marks (*animittadhātumanasikārā*)." If, in the absorption of extinction, there were a mental consciousness, what would be its object (*ālambana*), and what would be its aspect (*ākāra*)?

It has extinction (nirodha = nirvāṇa) for its object and calm (śama) for its aspect.

Then, how could it not be good? If one admits that it is good, why does one not admit that it is associated (*saṁprayukta*) with the roots of good, non-greed, etc. (*alobhādikuśalamūla*)? If one admits that it is associated with them, why does one not admit that it arises with contact (*sparśa*) as its condition?

But what if it has another object [than extinction] *and another aspect* [than calm]?

Then how, after the mind of entry into the absorption of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatticitta*), could a distracted mind (*vikṣiptacitta*) arise, without there being a contradiction (*virodha*)? To

arbitrarily posit the existence of another type of *avyākṛta* [distinct from the four known *avyākṛtas*] is not correct (*ayukta*) for these two reasons.

Thus you do not correctly (*yathābhūtam*) understand the meaning of the Āgama [according to which the consciousness does not quit the body during absorption]. With conceit (*āhopuruṣikā*[98]) you figure that the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), is present in the absorption of extinction, etc., and that thus these states are endowed with mind (*sacittaka*).[99] [784b27]

5. Theory of the Sūtraprāmāṇikas and of Vasubandhu.

30. *In this case, according to you, is the absorption of extinction a state* (*avastha*) *lacking mind* (*acittaka*) *or endowed with mind* (*sacittaka*)?

We answer that this state is endowed with a mind: the subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*) admitted by a group of the Sūtrāpramāṇikas.[100] The fruit-of-retribution consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*), endowed with all of the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), from the time of coming into existence (*pratisaṁdhibandhu*) until death (*cyuti*), concontinues in a series (*saṁtānena pravartate*) without being interrupted (*samucchinna*). In such and such an existence (*janman*), from the fact of retribution (*vipāka*), it flows on in a series under different aspects (*ākāraviśesa*) until Nirvāṇa where it is definitively destroyed (*niruddha*). Since this consciousness is not interrupted [during these absorptions], these states which are called lacking mind are also called endowed with mind. As the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) no longer exist in these states, they are called lacking mind.[101] Through the force of the mind preparatory (*prāyogikacitta*)[102] to the absorption of extinction, etc., it happens that the seeds (*bīja*) of the six consciousnesses are temporarily subdued (*vinaṣṭa*), and no longer manifest themselves; thus the absorption is called an absorption lacking mind. But it is not lacking any mind at all. [784c7]

31. There are two types of mind: a store-mind (*ācayacitta*), because it is the place where inumerable seeds (*apramāṇabīja*) are stored; and a multiple mind (*nānācitta*), because it functions (*pravartate*) with different objects (*ālambana*), aspects (*ākāra*) with different objects (*ālambana*), aspects (*ākāra*) and modalities (*viśeṣa*).[103] Since this second mind is lacking in these states of absorp-

tion, etc., they are called free of mind. Thus when a chair (*āsana*) has only one foot and when the other feet are missing, one says that it is without any feet. [784c10]

32. In the states wherein the seeds of the consciousnesses are subdued, the fruit-of-retribution consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*) [undergoes] from instant to instant (*kṣaṇa kṣeṇe*) a special evolution (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*)[104] and the force which subdues [the seeds of the consciousnesses] diminishes gradually until it disappears entirely, like boiling water (*āpaḥ kvāthyamānāḥ*)[105] or the speed of the movement of an arrow (*iṣvāvedhavega*),[106] which also diminish gradually until they entirely. disappear. Then, the seeds of the consciousuesses give forth their fruits: first, by virtue of these seeds, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) comes into existence; then and following in accord with conditions (*anupratyayaṁ*), the other consciousnesses successively (*krameṇa*) arise. The fruit-of-retribution consciousness of which we have spoken above and wherein the seeds of different dharmas lie (*ālīyate*[107]), is perfumed (*bhāvita*) by such and such another consciousness and by their simultaneous (*sahabhū*) dharmas, good or bad. Accrding to circumstances (*yathāyogam*), the force of the seeds (*bījabala*) increases. Through a special evolution of its series (*saṁtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*), considering tne maturity of the seeds and the coming together of its auxiliary cases (*sahakārikāraṇa*), this [retribution-consciousness] realizes (*abhinirvartate*) agreeable (*iṣṭa*) and disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*) future fruits.

On this subject, the stanza (*gāthā*) is quoted:

"The mind (*citta*) endowed with infinite seeds (*anantabījaka*,) flows in a continuous current (*srotasā vahati*). Encountering (*prāpya*) their proper conditions (*svapratyaya*), the seeds of the mind (*cittabīja*) increase.

"The force of the seeds matures gradually (*krameṇa*) and, when the conditions are brought together, it gives forth (*prayacchati*) its fruit. In this same way, when one has painted the flower of the citron tree (*mātulungapuṣpa*), the pip (*kesara*) has a red color (*raktavarṇa*) at the moment of the fruit."

On this subject, the Bhagavat, in the *Saṁdhinirmocananāmamahāyānasūtra*, spoke the stanza:

"The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle, like a violent current, proceeds with all of its seeds. I have not revealed it to the foolish, fearing that they would only imagine that it is a soul."[108] [784c26]

II. THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA.[109]

1. Names.[110]

33. Since this consciousness continues (*pratisamdadhāti*), and since it appropriates to itself (*upādādati*) the body (*kāya*), it is called the appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). Since the seeds (*bīja*) of all the dharmas lie therein (*ālīyate*), it is called the receptacle-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). Since it is the retribution (*vipāka*) of actions laid down in past lives (*pūrvajanman*), it is also called retribution-consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*). [784c29)

2. Proof.[111]

34. a. If one does not admit the existence of this retribution-consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*), what consciousness will appropriate (*upādā-*) the body to itself? The other consciousnesses cannot penetrate-grasp (*pien-ch'ih*) the body without ever abandoning it until the end of life (*āyus*).

b. What is the sphere (*āyatana*) or the aggregate (*skandha*) which, at the moment when the opposition (*pratipakṣa*) of the defilements (*kleśa*) and of their residues (*anuśaya*) arises, will be capable of cutting them off?

This aggregate (*skandha*) resides in the mind which opposes them (*pratipakṣacitta*).

This cannot be (*ayukta*), for, being bound (*baddha*) to the defilements and to their residues, how could it oppose them?[112]

c. Among beings (*sattva*) born in the world of non-form (*ārūpyadhātu*), when a defiled (*kliṣṭa*), good (*kuśala*) or pure (*an-āsrava*) mind is produced, where would the dharmas of retribution (*vipākadharma*) abide which constitute their realms of rebirth (*gati*) [if not in the receptacle-consciousness]? Or rather, [if you do not admit this receptacle-consciousness], you should say that their realm of rebirth contains some dharmas which are not of retribution or which are foreign to saṁsāra (*aparyāpannadharma*). Now this is contrary to your theories.[113] Furthermore, Anāgāmins born in the sphere of the summit of existence (*bhavāgrāyatana*) desire to destroy their last impurities (*āsrava*) and so practice (*bhāvayanti*) the path of opposition (*pratipakṣamārga*);[114] but when the pure

mind (*anāsravacitta*) of the sphere of nothingness (*ākiṁcanyāyatana*) arises among them, what is this separate substance (*anyad dravyam*), proper to the summit of existence by virtue of which their existence (*ātmabhāva*) remains in this place without one saying that they are dead? This is neither the "resemblance" (*nikāyasabhāgatā*) nor the vital principal (*jīvitendriya*)[115] which forms a distinct substance (*anyad dravyam*) apart from the mind (*citta*) and matter (*rūpa*). These two are simply metaphors (*upavāra*) designating the homogeneous progression (*āvedha, pratikṣepa*) of the aggregates of retribution (*vipākaskandha*), and this homogeneous progression is not a real substance distinct [from these aggregates]. In the same way the homogeneous progession of the tare, etc., [is not distinguished from tare]. This is why it is necessary to admit that oustide of the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāya*), there is, as we have described above, a special consciousness which contains the seeds. [785a13]

3. Early Sources.[116]

35. In the sūtras of the Tāmraparṇīyanikāya,[117] this consciousness is called limb-of-existence consciousness (*bhāvaṅgavijñāna*);[118] in the sūtras of the Mahāsāṁghikanikāya, root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*);[119] and the Mahīśāsakanikāya call it the aggregate lasting until the end of saṁsāra (*āsaṁsārikaskandha*).[120] [785a15]

4. *Ālambana* and *Ākāra*,

36. *What is the object* (*ālambana*) *and the aspect* (*ākāra*) *of this consciousness?*

Its object and its aspect are imperceptible (*asaṁvidita*).

How can a consciousness be thus?

You admit indeed that, in the state of the absorption of extinction, etc., there is a special consciousness the object and the aspect of which are difficult to know. The same holds here [for the receptacle-consciousness].[121]

Within which aggregate (*upādānaskandha*) *is this consciousness included?*

In truth (*arthena*), one should say that it is included within the consciousness aggregate (*vijñānopādānaskandha*). [785a20]

5. Answer to Objections.

37. a. *In this case, how do you understand the phrase of the sūtra: What is the consciousness-aggregate? It is the six bodies of consciousness"* (*vijñānopādānaskandhaḥ katamaḥ. ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*)?[122] *And again: "Name-and-form exist by reason of the consciousness and the consciousness is the six bodies of consciousness"* (*vijñānapratyayaṁ nāmarūpam. vijñānaṁ ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*).

We should know that this sūtra has a hidden meaning (*abhiprāya, abhisaṁdhi*), like the sūtra which says: "What is the operative-aggregate? It is the six bodies of volition" (*saṁskāraskandhaḥ katamaḥ. ṣac cetanakāyāḥ*),[123] whereas the operative-aggregate also contains dharmas [other that these six volitions].[124] The same holds here: [the consciousness-aggregate contains items other than the six bodies of consciousnesses, notably the receptacle-consciousness].

b. *But the sūtra speaks solely of the six consciousnesses* [and says nothing about receptacle-consciousness]; *what is its intention?*

The Bhagavat explains in the *Saṁdhinirmocana*: "I have not revealed it to the foolish, fearing that they would only imagine that it [the receptacle-consciousness] is a soul.[125]"

Why would the foolish imagine that it is a soul?

Because this consciousness has no beginning (*anādikālika*) and lasts until the end of saṁsāra: because, very subtle (*atisūkṣma*) in its aspect, it does not change. But the six consciousnesses, in their points of support (*āśraya*), object (*ālambana*), aspect (*ākāra*) and modality (*viśeṣa*), are gross (*sthūla*) and easy to know; as they are associated (*saṁrayukta*) with the defilements (*kleśa*) and with the path which opposes them (*pratipakṣamārga*), as they are included (*vyavasthāpita*) within the categories of defilement (*saṁkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*), their nature is that of a caused consciousness *phalavijñāna*). By this argument (*aunmāna*), one will know that a cause-consciousness (*bījavijñāna*)[126] exists. Nevertheless the sūtras through expediency (*sui so i shuo* 隨所宜說), do not speak of this cause-consciousness (*hetuvijñāna*)[127] because it differs from the aforementioned [six consciousnesses]. Such is the intention of the sutra when it speaks solely of the six consciousnesses. By this, we have explained why the sūtras of the other schools (*nikāya*) speak solely of the six bodies of consciousness as limb-of-existence consciousness (*bhavāṅgavijñāna*),[128] etc; and, considering their circumstances (*yathāyogam*), they are not in error.

Moreover, we should know that today, in each school, in-

numerable sūtras have disappeared (*apramāṇāni sūtrāṇy antarhitāni*),[129] as the Vyākhyāyukti[130] explains in detail. This is why one cannot say that the sūtras have never spoken of the receptacle-consciousness, for there are reasons for it to exist. [785b5]

38. c. *If this is the case, then there will be, in a single person (kāya), two consciousnesses (vijñāna) existing together: the retribution-consciousness (vipākavijñāna) and the other one: the consciousness-in-action (pravṛttivijñāna).*

What errors are there in this?

If two consciousnesses were to exist together in a single person, one would have to see (upacar-) two beings (sattva) at one and the same time, as when two consciousnesses exist together in [two] *different persons.*

This causes no difficulty, for these two consciousnesses, cause (*hetu*) and fruit (*phala*), support themselves one on the other (*anyonuaniśrita*) and are not separated (*bhinna*), for the retribution-consciousness is perfumed (*bhāvita*) by the other, the consciousness-in-action.[131] When two consciousnesses exist together in [two] different persons, there is nothing identical in them. Thus there is no difficulty here. [785b11]

39. d. *But do you not see that the seed (bīja) and the fruit of the seed (bījaphala) are of different series (saṁtāna)?*

We see also that, in an ordinary blue lotus (*nīlotpala*), etc., the root (*mūla*) and the stalk (*aṅkura*), etc., each have a different series: the same holds true for the seed and the fruit also. Moreover, what difference does it make whether you see it or do not see it? If you do not admit the existence of the receptacle-consciousness, you encounter the problems mentioned above (Para. 34). It is thus necessary to admit the existence of a receptacle-consciousness distinct from the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāya*) and existing in and of itself (*svabhāvasat*). [785b15]

6. *Ālayavijñāna and Ātman.*[132]

40. *Why not admit one soul (ātman) existing in and of itself (dravyasat) and the base (āśraya) of the six bodies of consciousness?*[133]

What is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of this soul admitted by you that would permit you to say that it is the base of the six bodies of consciousness? If you admit that this soul, like the receptacle consciousness, is a series of productions and destructions

(*utpādanirodhasaṁtāna*) which transforms itself (*pariṇamate*) in accrd with conditions (*anupatyayam*), what will be the specific difference between it and the receptacle-consciousness which would authorize you to believe that this is a soul?

But this soul is one (*eka*) *and absolutely immutable!*

Then how can you say that it is a base (*āśraya*) susceptible of receiving the impregnation of the consciousnesses (*vijñānavāsanā*)? Impregnation causes the series that it perfumes (*tadbhāvitasaṁtāna*) to transform itself (*parinam-*) and to acquire some special potentialities (*śaktiviśeṣa*), In this same way the paint (*lākṣārasa*), applied on the flower of the citron tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*), permits the flower-series to transform itself [and to give forth a fruit whose pips are red]. Without impegnation, no special transformation is possible. But then [if the soul is immutable] how could the difference in practices (*abhyāsaviśeṣa*), such as the experiences (*anubhava*), the knowledge (*jñāna*) and the desires (*rāga*) of an earlier period, produce, a long time afterwards, difference of memory (*smṛti*), of knowledges and of desires?[134]

Furthermore, in the states lacking mind (*acittakāvasthā*) where [according to you] the soul remains unchanged, there is no consciousness. But then, upon leaving these states, with respect to what could the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), etc., arise?

Finally, what is the power of the soul over the consciousnesses, etc., that makes you consider the soul as the base of the consciousnesses?

The consciousnesses arise from the soul which is their cause.

But since the soul always remains immutable, why do the consciousnesses arise from it successively (*krameṇa*) and not all at one and the same time?

It is because they require (*apekṣante*) *other auxiliary causes* (*sahakārihetupratyaya*) *in order to arise.*

But how do you know that, in addition to these causes, the soul intervenes also in their production?

It is because the consciousnesses arise supporting themselves niśritya) *on the soul.*

All dharmas perish as soon as they have arisen (*utpattyanantaraṁ nirudhyante*). Being unstable, how could these consciousnesses last? It is thus impossible (*ayukta*) to admit a soul existing in and of itself and as the base of the six bodies of consciousness. Fur-

thermore, to admit the existence of the soul is to contradict the Āgama, which says: "The dharmas are not a soul and do not contain anything pertaining to a soul" (*sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ.*)[135] A single soul eternal and existing according to you, is not proven, and is only an invention. Thus it is proven (*siddha*) that only some special volitions (*cetanāviśeṣa*) simultaneously perfume (*bhāvayanti*) the receptacle-consciousness and cause this consciousness, by a special evolution of its series (*saṁtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*), to produce future agreeable and disagreeable fruits (*iṣṭāniṣṭaphala*): these are not bodily and vocal actions as they have been described above. [785c8]

FOURTH PART
THE SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY ON THE NATURE OF ACTION

41. *If you do not admit the existence of two actions, bodily and vocal action, are you not in contradiction with the sūtra which posits three actions?*[136]

We do not contradict (*nirākṛ*) this sūtra, but we interpret it expediently without committing any error (*doṣa*).

How do you interpret it without committing any error?

One should avoid grasping the poison (*viṣa*) of the text. Let us treat of these things in detail: why does the sūtra speak of three actions (Para. 42)? what is the body (*kāya*) and what is action (Para. 43)? in what sense (*kenārthena*) should one speak of the body (Para. 44) and of action (Para. 45)? in what sense should one speak of bodily action (Para. 46–47), of vocal action (Para. 48), of mental action (Para. 49)? Let us ask ourselves finally why does the sūtra speak only of three actions, bodily action, etc., and not of visual action, etc. (Para. 4)? [785c15]

I. THE THREE ACTIONS IN THE SŪTRA

42. *Why does the sūtra speak of three actions?*

In order to show that the three actions embrace (*saṁgṛhṇanti*) the ten pathways of action (*karmapatha*),[137] and to reassure those who fear having too much to do (*bahukāra*). In this same way, [the Buddha] taught in summary fashion (*saṁkṣepatas*) the three learnings (*śikṣātraya*) and gave them to the Vṛjiputraka.[138]

Some believe that action is solely completed by the body, and not by the voice (*vāc*) or the mind (*manas*). In order to show them that it is completed equally by these two, the sūtra speaks of three actions. [785c18]

II. KĀYA AND KARMAN.

43. The body (*kāya*) is a special aggregate (*saṁghātaviśeṣa*) of organic matter (*indriya*), primary (*bhūta*) and derived (*bhautika*)

matter.[139]

Action (*karman*) is a special volition (*cetanāviśeṣa*). [785c19]

III. THE MEANING OF THE WORD KĀYA

44. To the extent that there is accumulation there is a body (*cīyata iti kāyaḥ*):[140] in fact, the body results from an accumulation (*ācaya*) of atoms (*paramāṇu*) of primary (*bhūta*) and derived (*bhautika*) matter. For some, there is a body to the extent that there is an accumulation of excrement (*kuhanācaya*), because the body is a reservoir (*kūpa*) of all types of impure substances (*nānāśucidravya*).[141] But, in this case, the gods would not have any bodies. [785c22]

IV. THE MEANING OF THE WORD KARMAN

45. To the extent that there is activity (*abhisamskāra*) of the mind-agent (*kārakamanas*), there is action (*karman*). [785c23][142]

V. THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION KĀYAKARMAN

1. Literal Meaning.

46. Volition (*cetanā*) which moves the body is called bodily action (*kāyakarman*).[143] There are three types of volitions: (1) deliberation-volition (*gati*); (2) decision-volition (*niścaya*); (3) movement-volition (*kiraṇa*).[144] The volition that moves the body is called bodily action, for this volition produces (*abhinirharati*) the wind element (*vāyudhātu*), the cause of the arising of the bodily series (*kāyasaṁtāna*) in another place (*deśāntara*). In order to be complete (*chü-tsu* 具足), one must say "action which moves the body" [and not "bodily action"], but the word "to move" is omitted, and one says simply "bodily action." In the same way, the oil that increases power is called simply "oil of power" (*balataila*), and the wind that moves dust is called simply "dust wind" (*rajovāyu*).

But one also admits that the first three of the ten pathways of action (*karmapatha*), *namely killing* (*prāṇātipata*), *stealing* (*adattādāna*) *and illicit sexuality* (*kāmamithyācāra*), *are bodily actions.*[145] *How does the action of volition* (*cetanākarman*) *take the same name?*

Because it is the act of volition which moves the body in

order for it to commit murder, stealing and illicit sexuality. But that which is done by the bodily series (*kāyasaṁtāna*) moved by volition is done by the volition. In the same fay, one says that brigands (*caura*) burn a village (*grāma*) and that the grass (*tṛṇa*) cooks the rice (*śāli*) [because one uses fire in order to burn the village and to cook the rice.]

Why is volition also called a pathway of action (karmapatha)?

To the extant that it acts, volition is called "action," but to the extent that it engages in the paths (*patha*) of good and bad realms of rebirth (*sugatidurgati*), it takes the name of "pathways of action."[146] Or again, it is the body in movement which is the pathway of action, but the three actions of volition arisen support themselves (*niśritya*) on the body. [786a6]

2. Figurative Meaning

47. Furthermore, killing, stealing, and illicit sexuality, which arise from acts of volition, arise supporting themselves on the body and, by convention (*saṁvṛtitas*), are also called "bodily actions." However, in and of themselves, they are neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*), and it is also by convention that one metaphorically (*upacar-*) attributes to them these qualifiers, in order that the world (*loka*), by these means (*taddvāreṇa*), nourish good volitions and abstain from bad ones. This is why the qualifiers of "good" or of "bad" are metaphorically attributed to them.

If only the act of volition (cetanākarman) is good or bad, why does the Karmapathasūtra say: "The threefold bodily action accompanied by reflection (kāyasya trividhaṁ saṁcintya karman), completed (kṛta) and accumulated (upacita), is bad (akuśala) and, as a consequence, produces a painful fruit (duḥkhaphala) and a painful retribution (duḥkhavipāka)"?[147]

The sūtra means here: The act of volition (*cetanākarman*) which moves the body, which uses the body as a means (*dvāra*), which employs the body as its support (*āśraya*), which has for its object (*ālambate*) killing, stealing and illicit sexuality – this act of volition is a cause (*hetu*) which realizes a fruit and a painful retribution. This is "the threefold bodily action accompanied by reflection" (*kāyasya trividhaṁ saṁcintya karma*). The other volitions [deliberation and decision], distinct from this [third] volition [or volitions which move the body], are called "mental action"

(*manaḥkarman*), because they are associated (*saṁprayukta*) with the manas and because they move neither the body nor the voice.

If this is the case, why does the sūtra speak of two actions: the act of volition (cetanākarman) and action-after-having-been-willed (cetayitvākarman)?

Among the three types of volitions mentioned above (Para. 46), the first two volitions are acts of volition (*cetanākarman*) and the third volition is action-after-having-been-willed (*cetayitvākarman*). This does not contradict the sūtra. [786a18]

VI. THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION VĀKKARMAN

48. Voice (*vāk*) is the pronunciation of sounds (*ghoṣaccaraṇa*). Because these sounds inform (*vijñāpayanti*) with respect to the idea that one wishes to express, they are called voice.

The volition (*cetanā*) which emits the voice (*vāksamutthāpikā*) is called vocal action (*vākkarman*). Or again, the voice is the support (*āśraya*) of syllables (*vyañjana, akṣara*), and because these syllables also inform with respect to the idea, they are called voice.

In order to be complete, one should say "action which emits the voice" [and not "vocal action"], but the word, "to emit" is omitted, and one says simply "vocal action." See the examples [of abridged phrases] above (Para. 46). [786a22]

VII. THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION MANAḤKARMAN

49. Manas is the consciousness (*vijñāna*). Because it reflects (*manyate, manute*),[148] because it directs itself towards other arisings (*jātyantara*) and towards objects (*viṣaya*), the consciousness is called manas. The volition which is an act of the manas (*manaskāracetanā*) is called mental action (*manaḥkarman*), for it causes the manas to accomplish all sorts of good (*kuśala*) and bad (*akuśala*), etc.

In order to be complete, one should say "manaskārakarman" [and not manaḥkarman], but the word "kara" is omitted and one says simply "manaḥkarman."

Or again, action associated with the manas (*manaḥsamprayukta*) is called mental action: the word "associated" is omitted, and one says simply "metal action." See the examples [of abridged phrases]

above (Para. 46).

Let us admit that the three actions are solely volition; but then, in the state of distracted mind (vikṣipticitta) and in states lacking mind (acittakāvasthā) where the volition is absent, how can there be discipline (saṁvara) and non-discipline (asaṁvara)?

Because the seed [of discipline and of non-discipline] planted and perfumed (*vāsita*) by a special volition (*cetanāviśesa*) is not destroyed [in the above-mentioned states], there can be discipline and non-discipline there: there is no difficulty in this (*nāsty atra doṣaḥ*). One says "special volition," that is, a strong volition creating (*samutthāpaka*) an information (*vijñapti*) of discipline and of non-discipline. This volition plants two types of strong seeds [seed of discipline and seed of non-discipline]. The state of the non-destruction of these two seeds is metaphorically (*upacāra*) called "non-information (*avijñapti*) of good and bad discipline."[149]

What is the destruction of the seed planted and perfumed by this special volition?

It is the fact that [the seed] is no longer the cause of the volition of the renouncing (*virati*) or the non-renouncing of sin (*avirati*) conforming to the engagement undertaken.

What is it that destroys this seed?

It is the volition (*cetanā*) capable of creating the information (*vijñaptisamutthāpaka*) which is the cause of the abandoing of discipline or of indiscipline, or any other cause of this abandoning. [786b7]

VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS.

50. Why does the sūtra not speak of action of the eye (*cakṣuḥkarman*), etc.? Because this sūtra speaks only of the actions of the activity of beings (*sattva-prayoga-karman*) and does not speak of the efficacy of the dharmas (*dharma-kāritra-karman*).[150]

What is the action of the activity of beings?

It is that which is created (*abhisamskṛta*) conforming to the intention of the agent (*kārakamanas*).

What is the action of the efficacy of the dharmas?

This is the power (*śakti, prabhāva*) particular to the eye (*cakṣus*), to the ear (*srotra*), etc.

The Buddha spoke of three actions: the meaning of this is

profound (*gambhīra*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*). Basing myself on reasoning and on doctrine, I have explained it and have demonstrated it. I wish to use my merit (*puṇya*) in order to save beings: may they all obtain the pure mind. [786b13]

MADHYAMAKAVṚTTI: CHAPTER XVII
EXAMINATION OF ACTION AND ITS RESULT

I. THE THEORY OF THE EARLY BUDDHISTS

1. The reality of transmigration.

It has been said: There is most certainly transmigration, because it assures the relationship between action and its result.

Supposing that, through the uninterrupted evolution of the series, through the succession of births and of deaths, and through the functioning of causes and their results, there is a migration (*saṁsaraṇa*) of the component parts [of the pseudo-individual] or of the soul, then there would be a relation between action and its result. Supposing, on the contrary, that the transmigration thus described does not exist, since the mind perishes immediately upon arising, and since, at the moment when the action projects [its result], the retribution has not taken place, then there would be no relationship between action and its result. But if transmigration exists, there would be – perhaps in another life – a relationship between the action accomplished here and its fruit of retribution, and so the relationship between actions and their results will not be impeded. Thus there is most certainly transmigration because it assures the relationship between action and its result. [303, 2]

2. Mind-action, the cause of Dharma

But what are these actions, or what is their result? In order to indicate their type, the author says:

> 1. *The mind* (*cetas*) *disciplining the soul* (*ātmasaṁyamaka*) *and the* [mind] *favoring another* (*parānugrāhaka*)*; the friendly* (*maitra*) [mind]: *this is the Dharma, this is the seed* (*bīja*) *of the result, after death and here also.*

The *soul* (*ātman*) is that to which one applies himself (*ā-hita*) or relative to which there is produced the idea of "me" (*ahaṁ-māna*)*;* the person about whom one speaks by reason of the aggregates is called *soul.* The *mind* (*cetas*) is the action which acqui-

res (*cinoti*) and accumulates (*upacinoti*) the good and the evil, which establishes it in its capacity to assure a retribution. It has for its synonyms: thought, spirit, consciousness. The mind *disciplining the soul* (*ātmasaṁyamaka*) is that which disciplines the soul (*ātmānaṁ saṁyamati*): that which renders it free with respect to the objects of the senses and which hinders it from acting under the action of the defilements, greed, etc. This good mind disciplining the soul and hindering it from being given over to killing, etc., bars (*dhārayati*) the path leading to the bad realms of rebirth: this is also called *dharma*. [304, 2]

This word *dharma,* in language, is employed in three senses: in order to designate that which bears (*dhāraṇa*) a self-characteristic, or that which bars (*vidhāraṇa*) the path leading to the bad realms of rebirth, or that which bars (*vidhāraṇa*) the path of transmigration to the five realms of rebirth. Thus. because they bear a self-characteristic, all things pure or impure are called *dharma.*

Because they bar the path leading to the bad realms of rebirth, the ten good [conducts], etc., are called *dharma:* "Practicing the Dharma, he lives happily in this world and in the other" (Dhammapada, 168–9).

Because it bars the path of transmigration to the five realms of rebirth, Nirvāṇa is called *dharma;* for example: "He takes refuge in the Dharma." But here the word *Dharma* designates exclusively that which bars the path leading to the bad realms of rebirth. [304, 9]

What now! Would only the mind disciplining the soul be Dharma?

No, answers the author, and moreover, "and the mind favoring another with the friendly mind, these also are Dharma." [In Kārikā 1], with the word "friendly," the conjunction "and" is implied.

The mind favoring another (*parānugrāhaka*) is that which *favors another* (*paraṁ anugṛhṇathi*): the mind which exerts itself [in practicing] the four means of converting beings and which exerts itself in liberating them from fear is itself also Dharma.

The *friendly* (*maitra*) *mind* is this mind consisting of a sentiment of friendship (*mitrebhava*) held equally with respect to all beings. This friendly mind is called "friendly mind" (*maitracetas*) or simply "friendship" (*maitra*). And this threefold mind in question

is called *Dharma*. The opposite is the case for Adharma. [305, 4]

This mind, with its different types, *is the seed of the result.* The principle (or cause: *kārana*) specified in the realization of the result is only called seed (*bīja*): such as the rice seed, [the specific principle] of the rice shoot. Contrarily, the common principle, the earth, etc., is not a seed: this is a principle. So thus here, in the realization of the desired retribution, this threefold mind is a seed: contrarily, its virile activity, etc., is solely principle. [305, 8]

But at what moment does the result arise from the seed?

The author answers: *after death and here also. After death:* in the future life; *here:* in the present life. This can be seen at length in the Āgamas. [305, 10]

3. The Two Types of Action

It has thus been established that unique action consists only of the mind. Furthermore, it is twofold, according to the Bhagavat:

2. *Volition* (*cetanā*) *and action-after-having-been-willed* (*cetayitvā karman*), *said the Supreme seer.*

Seer (*ṛṣi*), because he sees (*darśanāt*) the supreme goal. *Supreme seer,* because supreme and seer together. Since he penetrates the supreme goal in all of its aspects, since he surpasses the Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas themselves, he is the supreme seer, the Enlightened One, the Lord. This supreme seer spoke in the sūtras of volitional action and action-after-having-been-willed. [306, 3]

4. The Three Types of Action.

As for this twofold action:

From this action, multiple types have been presented.

How is this?

3. *Now then* (*tatra*), *the action called volition is termed mental* (*mānasa*). *Contrarily,* [action] *"after-having-been-willed" is bodily* (*kāyika*) *or vocal* (*vacika*).

Mental (*Mānasa*)*:* that which is related to the mind (*manas*). Because it is carried out by the mind alone, because it does not depend on the activity of the body and of the voice, volition as-

sociated solely with the mental consciousness is called "mental action." [In Kārikā 3], "now then" serves to emphasize this. Contrarily, the second, called "action-after-having-been-willed" is, for its part, bodily and vocal. The action that one accomplishes after having said in his mind: "I shall act in such and such a manner with the body and the voice," this action is called action-after-having-been-willed. This last, for its part, is twofold: bodily and vocal, because it is related to the body and to the voice, and because it is carried out thanks to them. And thus action is threefold: bodily, vocal and mental. [307, 4]

5. The seven types of action

This same threefold action, always evermore subdivided, becomes sevenfold. It is thus that the Lord described the multiform types of action.

How is this?

4–5. *Voice* (*vāc*), *deeds* (*viṣpanda*), *and consenting to sin* (*avirati*) *are called non-information* (*avijñapti*); *the same also for the other non-informations called renouncing sin* (*virati*), *the merit* (*puṇya*) *resulting from the enjoyment* (*paribhogānvaya*) *and demerit* (*apuṇya*) *of the same nature, and volition* (*cetanā*): *these seven dharmas act as modes of action* (*karmavyañjana*).

Now then, *voice* (*vāc*) is the clear pronunciation of syllables. *Deeds* (*viṣpanda*) are movements of the body. Finally, all good or bad voices, characterized by a renouncing or a consenting to sin and furnishing information, are in general included under the name of *voice*. In the same way, good or bad deeds, characterized by a renouncing or a consenting to sin and furnishing information, are in general included [under the name of deeds]. [308, 3]

In the same way that there are two types of information, there are two types of non-information: "non-information characterized by consenting to sin" and "non-information characterized by the renouncing of sin": 1. First, non-information characterized by the consenting to sin. So, by saying: "From this day onward, I shall make my living by killing beings and by stealing," the man consents (*abhyupagama*) to a bad action; from this moment onward, even though he does not accomplish this bad action, he perpetually (*satatasamitam*) contracts the non-information [of killing and of

stealing] which has as its cause the consenting to bad action. Fishermen, etc., from the moment that they prepare their nets, etc., and even though they do not exercise their [trade], contract these non-informations. These are what are called non-informations characterized by consenting to sin.

2. The others are totally identical: non-informations, good in and of themselves and characterized by the renouncing of sin. So, by saying: "From today onward, I renounce killing, etc.," the man commits (*parasamāpti*) bodily and vocal information; from this moment onward, even if later he is in a state of distraction, etc., he contracts these non-informations consisting of an accumulation of merits. These are what are called non-informations characterized by the renouncing of sin. Although they are matter and action, they do not inform others as does information: they are non-informations. [309, 1]

Finally, the *merit resulting from the enjoyment: the merit* (*puṇya*) is the good; *resulting from the enjoyment* (*paribhogānvaya*), because it draws its origin from the enjoyment (*paribhogena anvayo 'sya*). The *enjoyment* (*paribhoga*) is the utilization, by the community, etc., of a thing given. The *resultant state* (*anvaya*), that is to say the consequence [of this enjoyment], is an accumulation of good in the "series" of the giver. The *demerit of the same nature* is the demerit resulting from the enjoyment; thus, for example, the erection of a temple, etc., wherein creatures will be killed. For, to the degree wherein creatures are killed in the temple, to this degree one enjoys this temple, and thus, in the series of those who have built it, there arises a demerit arising from its enjoyment. There is thus a *demerit of the same nature*. [310, 5]

And the volition (*cetanā ca*): namely a practical operation of the mind (*cittābhisamskāra*), an action of the mind. [311, 1]

In summary, this sevenfold action is: (1) good or bad voice; (2) good or bad deeds; (3) good characterized by non-information; (4) bad characterized by non-information; (5) the merit resulting from its enjoyment; (6) the demerit resulting from its enjoyment; (7) finally, volition. [311, 4]

These seven dharmas are called *modes of action* (*karmavyañjana*), that is to say, actions in and of themselves, manifested as being actions. [311, 5]

II. THE THEORY OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS.

1. Refutation of the Vibhajyavādin theory.

Here some object.

[The Sautrantikas]. Does this so-called multiple action last until the moment of its retribution, or does it not endure because it perishes as soon as it is accomplished? In this case:

6. *If action lasts until the moment of its retribution, it is eternal.*

If, as you suppose, action, once it is accomplished, remains in its being (*svarūpeṇa*) until the moment of its retribution, then all this time it is eternal, for it is free from destruction [to the extent that it is not retributed].

[The Vibhajyavādins.] Since its destruction takes place after [its retribution], it is not eternal.

[The Sautrāntikas.] Wrong! That which is initially free from destruction, as space, will not later be in relation with destruction. That which is free from destruction is by this very fact (*prasaṅgāt*) unconditioned. Unconditioned things, being foreign to retribution, always endure without being retributed. Consequently the thesis (*abhyupagama*) of the eternity of actions is not indispensable (corr. *nopapadyate*). Such is the difficulty inherent in the eternity of actions. It is thus obvious that actions perish as soon as they are accomplished.

[The Vibhajyavādins.] In this case,

If action is destroyed, how, destroyed, will it engender a result?

This means: Once it is destroyed, the action whose self-nature no longer exists will not engender any result. [311, 17]

2. The theory of seed-action.

Here the followers of another school [the Sautrāntikas], set up a refutation. The impermanence of conditioned things due to the fact that they perish immediately upon arising does not cause us any difficulty. We have been told: "if action is destroyed, how, destroyed, will it engender a result?" To this we would answer:

7. *By reason of the seed (bīja), the series "shoot, etc."*

(aṅkuraprabhṛtir saṁtānaḥ), develops (abhipravartate): from it, the fruit; but, without the seed, it does not develop.

The seed, even though instantaneous, perishes immediately after having become the cause of the series "shoot-stalk-stem-leaf, etc." a series which is associated with the special capacity of realizing a special fruit of the same gender as the seed. This series "shoot, etc." *develops by reason of the seed.* This is why, successively, if auxiliary causes are present, there will arise even from a very small cause a mass of large fruits. But, *without the seed,* that is to say in the absence of the seed, *it,* the series "shoot, etc." *does not develop.* Thus since the series exists when the seed exists, and does not exist when the seed does not exist, it is demonstrated that the fruit belonging to the series "shoot, etc." has the seed for its cause. [312, 12]

This being the case:

8. *The series comes from the seed, the fruit arises from the series, the fruit has the seed for its antecedent: thus* [the seed] *is neither annihilated (ucchinna) nor eternal (śāśvata).*

If the seed, without having generated the series "shoot, etc.," were to perish through the presence of a cause of destruction – a flame, hot coals, etc. – then, lacking the functioning of the series which is effect, the nihilist point of view would be justified. Let us suppose on the contrary that the seed does not perish and that the series "shoot, etc.," functions: then, admitting the non-destruction of the seed, the eternalist point of view would be justified! But such is not the case. One thus avoids the conclusion (*prasaṅga*) that the seed is annihilated or eternal. [313, 6]

As we have seen that this holds for the seed, in this same way:

9. *By reason of the mind (cetas) the mental series (cittasaṁtana) develops (abhipravartate): from this comes the fruit; but, without the mind, it does not develop.*

By reason of mind associated with a special good or bad volition, there develops the mental series which has this mind for its cause. From this mental series perfumed by good or bad volition, there will arise – if the auxiliary causes are present – an

aggreeable or disagreeable fruit in the good or bad realms of rebirth. But, *without the mind,* that is to say in the absence of the mind, *it does not develop,* [313, 12]

This being the case,

10. *The series comes from the mind, the fruit arises from the series, the fruit has action for its antecedent: thus* [action] *is neither annihilated nor eternal.*

If a good mind – such as the last mind of the Arhat – were to perish without having become the cause of a future mental series forming an uninterrupted connection of successive fruits arisen from this cause, then this action [namely the good mind] would be annihilated. Contrarily, if [the action], after having become the cause of this future series, does not give up its being (*svarūpa*), then it would be eternal. Now this is not the case. Thus, even by admitting that action is instantaneous, the twofold error – the nihilist or eternalist point of view – is not incurred (*prasaṅga*) here. [314, 6]

3. The ten pathways of action.

Finally, in the presentation of the types of action in question, ten good pathways of action are mentioned. They are:

11. *The ten clear* (*śukla*) *pathways of action* (*karmapatha*) *are the means of realization* (*sādhanopāya*) *of the Dharma. The five objects of enjoyment* (*kāmayuṇa*) *are the fruits of the Dharma, after death* (*pretya*) *and here* (*iha*) *also.*

The ten good pathways of action are the means of realization, that is to say the causes of production of the Dharms. Thus, what is this "Dharma," distinct from the good pathways of action which are present as the means of realization of this Dharma?

This is a certain mind designated by the name of Dharma in Kārikā 1: "The mind disciplining the soul and the [mind] favoring another, the friendly [mind]: this is the Dharma." Or rather, being achieved (*parinisṭhitarūpa*), these ten good pathways of action are called "Dharma," whereas, still in the process of accomplishment (*kriyamāṇarūpa*), they are called "good pathways of action." These ten good pathways of action are present as the cause of the production of this Dharma so characterized. [315, 3]

How are these ten good pathways of action [mentioned] in the division of actions listed just now? The three pathways of bodily action and the four pathways of vocal action are mentioned [in Kārikā 4]: "Voice, deeds, and consenting to sin are called non-information," etc. The three mental [pathways of action], non-greed, non-killing and correct views, are mentioned by the phrase "and volition" [Kārikā 5]. Thus all of the ten good pathways of action are mentioned in this passage. [315, 8]

They are the causes of the production of the Dharma in question. It is of this Dharma that one eats the fruit: *the five objects of enjoyment,* namely form, sound, smell, taste, and tangibles; *after death,* that is, in another world; *and here also,* that is, in the present world. [315, 1]

III. THE THEORY OF THE SĀṀMITĪYAS.

1. Refutation of the Sautrāntika thesis.

It is thus that there has been formulated by certain masters [the Sautrāntikas] the answer to the objection [posed in 6]. Some other masters, raising difficulties against them, formulate another answer to the objection and say:

> 12. *There would be numerous and great difficulties if your explanation* (*kalpanā*) *held; thus this explanation does not hold here.*

If [you allege] the similarity between the mental series and the seed and the shoot in order to deny (*parihāra*) that the errors inherent in the two eternalist and nihilist points of view apply (*prasaṅga*) to the mental series, then *numerous difficulties* result from your thesis, because they are considerable in number, *and great,* because they contradict the visible and the invisible [worlds].

How is this? Let us take for example the seed-series: from the seed "rice" there comes out only the series "rice shoot, etc.," and not a series of a different species; from this series "rice shoot, result "orange" which belongs to a different species. In the same way, here too, from a good mind there would arise only a good mental series, because it is of the same species [as the good mind], and not a bad or morally neutral mental series, because it is not of the same species. In the same way, from a bad or a neutral mind there would arise only a bad or a neutral mental series, not

another which would be of a different species. From minds that belong to the realm of desire, of form, and of non-form, and of pure minds, there would arise only identical minds; minds belonging to the sphere of desire, of form, of non-form and pure minds; not minds of a different species. From the mind of a human there would arise only a mind of a human, not a mind of a god, of one in hell, of an animal, etc. Thus, "a god would only be a god, a human would only be a human, etc." Thus, among gods and humans - even if they were to do evil - there would be differences of rebirth realm, of womb, of caste, of intelligence, of faculty, of strength, of beatuy, of enjoyment, etc., but they would not fall into hell. Now all this [falling into hell, etc.] is admitted. Thus since *numerous and great difficulties* attach themselves to the explanation taken from the similarity between [the mental series] and the series of the seed, *this explanation does not hold.* [316, 15]

2. The theory of avipraṇāśa

13. *But I should propose the explanation which is called for here, an explanation formulated by the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas.*

a. Definition and division of avipraṇāśa.

What is this explanation?

The author answers:

14. *Avipraṇāśa is like a sheet of paper* (*pattra*) *and action is like a debt* (*ṛṇa*). *Fourfold with respect to the realms* (*dhātutas*), *it is essentially neutral.*

Good action, once accomplished, perishes as soon as it has arisen, but it does not result from the fact that it perishes, that its result does not exist. In fact, when action arises, it engenders in the series of the agent an avipraṇāśa of itself, an entity dissassociated from the mind and comparable to a sheet of paper whereon one's debts are inscribed (*ṛṇappattra*). We can thus know that avipraṇāśa *is like a sheet of paper* and that *action* engendering this entity called avipraṇāśa is *like a debt*. And in the same way that a rich man does not lose his money when he lends it to someone, because the money-owning is marked on the sheet of paper; in the same way that he retrieves his money and his

accrued fifty-percent interest at the desired moment; in this same way the action which has perished, being marked on the entity avipraṇāśa, brings back to the agent the suitable result. In the same way that the sheet of paper whereon the debts are inscribed is finished when one has returned the money to the lender and it is no longer capable – whether it exists or no longer exists – of causing the money to be returned again; in this same way, when it has assured the retribution, the avipraṇāśa – whether it exists or no longer exists – cannot, like a debt paid off, exhibit a new retribution. [318, 5].

This avipraṇāsa of which we are speaking and which is taught in certain sūtras, is fourfold with respect to the worlds: depending [on whether it belongs] to the realm of desire, of form, of non-form or to the pure realm. It is essentially neutral: not being defined either by goodness nor by evil, the avipraṇāśa is simply neutral. If the avipraṇāśa of bad actions were bad, it would not exist in those who have cast off desire. Contrarily, if the avipraṇāśa of good actions were good, it would not exist in those who had cut off the roots of good. Thus it is essentially neutral. [318, 10]

b. Cutting-off of the avipraṇāśa.

Furthermore:

15. *It is not cut off* (*praheya*) *by the cutting off* (*prahāṇa*): *it is cut off by meditation* (*bhāvanā*) *or again* [by a second cause].

Avipraṇāśa is not off by the cutting off [that is to say by the path of seeing]. Ordinary actions are cut off only by the path of seeing, for "the Ārya has cast off ordinary actions." But avipraṇāśa is not cut off by the path of seeing, even if its action has been cut off [by this path]. The cutting off of avipraṇāśa is due to the path of meditation. *Or again* it is cut off when one goes beyond the realm [wherein it should ripen]: the word "*or*" indicates an alternative. [320, 2]

Because the avipraṇāśa subsists even when the action is destroyed, because it is not cut off even when the action is cut off,

for this reason, the fruit of actions arises from avipraṇāśa.

Objection. If this avipraṇāśa were cut off by the cutting off, that is to say by the cutting off of action, if it were destroyed

by the disappearance (*saṁkrama*) of the action, that is to say by the destruction of this action and the appearance of another action, what error would there be in that?

Answer:

16. *If it were cut off by the cutting off* (*prahāna*) *or by the disappearance* (*saṁkrama*) *of the action, errors would result: the loss of the action* (*karmavadha*), *etc.*

If avipraṇāśa were cut off by the path of seeing, exactly like ordinary action, then there would be destruction of action, pure and simple. If action is destroyed, then Āryas would no longer have a retribution embracing agreeable or disagreeable fruits, retribution having for its cause previous action; [or rather], there would be a ripening of an action which has not even been accomplished. Now the thesis of the non-existence of the result of action is a false view. Thus *errors would result: the loss of the action, etc.,* if one were to admit that avipraṇāśa is cut off by the cutting off. The same reasoning can be equally applied to the disappearance of the action. [321, 3]

c. The arising of avipraṇāśa.

17. *At the moment of the passage from existence* (*pratisaṁdhi*), *there arises an avipraṇāśa different from all dissimilar* (*visabhāga*) *or similar* (*sabhāga*) *actions of the same realm* (*sadhātu*).

Dissimilar actions: of different species; *similar:* parallel. When all actions are effaced at the moment of the passage from existence in the realm of desire, of form and of non-form, there arises an avipraṇāśa unique from all of these similar and dissimilar actions. There arises one avipraṇāśa [of all the actions] *of the same realm:* to the extent that they belong to the same realm and not to different realms. [321, 9].

18. *In the present life* (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), *there arises one avipraṇāśa from each particular action* (*karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ*), *from each twofold* (*dviprakāra*) *action. Even after retribution, it subsists.*

This entity called avipraṇāśa *from every action* – action which is volition or action-after-having-been-willed, or which presents two

distinct aspects based on the distinction between "impure" and "pure" – arises *in the present life* (during present existence). For *each particular action,* there is a special avipraṇāśa. This avipraṇāśa, even when retribution has taken place, does not necessarily perish: like a paid-up debt, but still existing, it can no longer give forth new fruit. [322, 3]

d. Destruction of avipraṇāśa

19. *It is destroyed when one goes beyond the fruit (phala-vyatikrama) or by death (maraṇa). It presents a distinction: pure or impure.*

It is destroyed when one goes beyond the fruit: see Kārikā 15, where it is said that it is cut off by meditation. *It is destroyed by death:* see Kārikā 17, where it is said that at the moment of passage from existence there arises one avipraṇāśa different from [all actions] belonging to the same realm. The avipraṇāśa of impure actions is impure and the avipraṇāśa of pure actions is pure: there it presents a distinction. [322, 8]

e. Justification of avipraṇāśa.

20. *There is emptiness (śūnyatā) and not annihilation (ucche-da), transmigration (saṁsāra) and not eternity (śāśvata). The entity "avipraṇāśa of action" has been taught by the Buddha.*

Action, once accomplished, perishes and does not subsist in its being: thus, since the action does not subsist in its being, its emptiness becomes necessary. But, from the fact that action does not subsist in its being, it is not for this reason (*prasaṅga*) annihilated: since it is aided (*parigraheṇa*) by [the entity] avipraṇāśa, the retribution of action is assured. If the retribution of action were not to exist, the nihilist point of view would be justified. [But this is not the case here]. Since the entity "avipraṇāśa" exists, since the [Sautrāntika] explanation based on the similarity [of the mental series] with the seed-series does not hold, transmigration with its realms of rebirth, its births, wombs, and different spheres, with its five realms of rebirth and its variety, is proven. And we do not fall into eternalism, for we deny that action subsists in its being. There is non-destruction of action, since there is an [entity called] avipraṇāśa. Since this entity has been taught by the Lord – this Lord who is illumined by the definitive suppression

of the sleep of ignorance – the objection raised above [Kārikā 6] by our opponents does not touch our theory. This objection would say: "If action lasts until the moment of its retribution, it is eternal. [Kārikā 8] If action is destroyed, how, being destroyed, will it engender a result?" Thus the explanation formulated by us is logical. [323, 10]

IV. THE THEORY OF THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

1. The non-existence of action.

What! You are so troubled in mind that the walls of the city of the Gandharvas [that you are erecting] could fall down; in order to maintain them, you expend your pains and efforts, all of you who, although action does not arise, discuss its results and its cause. In fact, if action were to arise in and of itself (*svarūpeṇa*), it would last until its retribution and it would be eternal; or rather, it would perish [immediately] and it would be annihilated. But, since action does not arise because it is empty of self-nature, whence would this persistence or this destruction come which would result from such a position? [323, 15]

One says:

21. *Why does action not arise?*

The master answers:

Because it is without self-nature.

Since action is without self-nature, it does not arise. [323, 19]

Objection. Nevertheless, if action does not arise because it is without self-nature, why did the Lord say: "Actions do not perish, even after hundreds of millions of cosmic eras. When the complex of conditions and favorable times come together, they ripen for the soul"?

Answer:

And because they do not arise, for this reason it is not destroyed.

Such is the idea of the Bhagavat [in the stanza with which you oppose us]. Consequently this passage does not constrain us. One should necessarily recognize here that action is without self-nature. [324, 5]

For if not,

22. *If action were to exist in and of itself (svabhāvatas), it would assuredly be eternal. And action would not be accomplished, for an eternal entity cannot be accomplished.*

If action were to exist in and of itself, without any doubt *it would be eternal,* for a being in and of itself is not susceptible of modification. Thus action would never be accomplished. Action is that which necessarily requires (*yad ipsitataman: of. Pāṇini, I.* 4.49) the activity of a free agent. Now, [if you suppose it to be eternal], it is not explained. Why is this? *Because an eternal entity cannot be accomplished.* That which possesses a real existence is "eternal." That which is real goes beyond accomplishment (*kāraṇa*) and, consequently, does not depend on a cause (*kārṇa*). Without even having accomplished any good or bad action, every person would be retributed. [324, 14]

And thus,

23. *If action were not accomplished, one would fear that a non-accomplished action would be imputed to him (akṛtābhyāgama) and that the state of incontinence (abrahmacaryavāsa) would be then contracted (atra prasajyate).*

If action were not accomplished, then one would fear that a non-accomplished action would be imputed to him. In fact, to him who had not even committed murder, this sin that he had not committed would even be counted to him, and thus even an innocent person, having freed himself from this sin, would fear that an action that he had not accomplished would be imputed to him. And there would be the state of incontinence *then,* that is to say in this hypothesis. Why is this? Even to those who live in perfect continence, the sin of incontinence that they had not accomplished would be counted to them, and thus everyone living in incontinence would be able to attain Nirvāṇa. [325, 7]

Furthermore,

24. *All daily experiences (vyavahāra) would be assuredly controverted. The distinction between someone meritorious and someone quilty would no longer hold.*

Occupations undertaken for profit – agriculture, commerce,

cattle breeding, etc. – would all exist even without being performed, and thus all effort would become useless. And even all of these popular experiences which consist of saying: "making a pot, making a piece of cloth," etc., would be without foundation, for all these [products], pot, etc., would exist [before being made]. And the distinction which consists of saying: "such a person is meritorious, and such a person is guilty" would not hold, for it would be confirmed to exist respectively in a person meritorious and quilty at one and the same time, before the merit or the sin itself. [326, 4]

Furthermore,

25. *The action already retributed would be retributed again, if it were to exist in and of itself and, consequently, would persist.*

There would be retribution anew for an action already retributed, for it would abide in its self-nature exactly as in the state before its retribution. This would take place if you suppose that action exists in and of itself and consequently persists. Assuredly thus such difficulties would arise, if action were to exist in and of itself. Thus action is without self-nature and, since it is without self-nature, the errors resulting from the eternalist or the nihilist point of view do not apply to us who thus explain [the non-existence of action]. [326, 11]

2. The non-existence of defilement.

Objection. Action exists in and of itself, because its cause really exists. In this world, that which does not exist (the hairs of a tortoise, etc.), does not have a cause, Now action does have a cause: the defilements, for it is said: "Actions exist by reason of ignorance; the act of existence (*bhava*) is by reason of attachment." Thus action exists in and of itself.

Answer. This is false. Why? Because

26. *Action which results from the defilements, and these defilements themselves, do not really exist. If the defilements were to really exist, how would action really exist?*

The action which results from the defilements, having the defilement for its cause, and these defilements, do not really exist. In fact it will be said [Kārikā xxiii, 2]: "The defilements which

arise supported on the confusion between good and evil do not exist in and of themselves; thus the defilements do not really exist." Thus since the defilements do not really exist, how could the action which has the defilement for its cause really exist? Thus action does not exist in and of itself. [327, 5].

3. The non-existence of the body.

Objection. No! The defilements and actions exist, because their effect is real. Here, in fact, one perceives the effect of the defilements and of actions: "the body." Now the thing the effect of which one perceives exists, for a non-existent entity, a flower in space, etc., does not have an effect.

Answer: Defilements and actions could exist if their effect, bodies, were to exist. But in order to show that they do not exist, the author says:

> 27. *Action and defilements are present as the cause of bodies. But if actions and defilements are empty, how can one speak of bodies?*

One affirms that actions and defilements are empty. Consequently, since action and defilements do not exist, their effects, bodies, are non-existent, so how can one speak of them? Since their non-existence has been proven *a priori,* there is here nothing to say with respect to it: such is the meaning [of the Kārikā]. [327, 14]

4. The non-existence of the enjoyer.

Objection. Action exists in and of itself, because the enjoyer of its fruit is real. That which does not exist has no enjoyer to eat of its fruits, like the fruit of the mango tree which grows in space. Now there is an enjoyer of the fruit of action.

> 28. *The man weighted down by ignorance, having thirst for a fetter, is the enjoyer. He is not different from the agent, nor identical to him.*

Here *ignorance,* non-knowledge, obscurity, trouble are synonyms. *Weighted down,* that is to say covered by ignorance. The *man* (*jantu*) is he who is reborn (*jāyate*) without ceasing in transmigration in the five realms of rebirth; man, being, person, living

being, are synonyms. *Thirst,* lust, attachment, desire are synonyms. *Fetter,* that is to say bond. *Having thirst for a fetter,* that is to say of whom thirst is the fetter, having thirst for a bond; as the sūtra says: "Being weighted down by ignorance, having thirst for a fetter."

Furthermore, it has been said: "From the bad action that he himself has accomplished, he will himself undergo the retribution." *He is the enjoyer* of the fruit of the action. *He is not different from the agent, nor identical to him:* for one cannot say that this thirst is another reality. Thus, since the enjoyer of the fruit really exists, action exists. [328, 9]

Answer. The agent and the enjoyer of the fruit of the action would exist if the action itself existed. But it does not exist. How is this?

> 29–30. *Since action is neither "produced by reason of condition" nor "not produced by reason of conditions," for this reason the agent, he also, does not exist.* [xvii, 29] *If action does not exist, how could the agent and the fruit born of action exist? If the fruit does not exist, how could the enjoyer exist?*

If any action whatsoever were to exist, then it would be either "produced by reason of conditions," or "not produced by reason of conditions." Would you have it produced by reason of conditions? This is impossible considering the difficulties mentioned in the Examination of Causes (Chap. I). Would it be "not produced by reason of conditions" or without a cause? This hypothesis has also been presented [and refuted] in detail in the Examination of Action and the Agent (Chap. VIII, 4): "Cause not existing, the effect and the cause (*kārana*) do not exist," etc. Whether one considers it as "produced by reason of conditions" or "not produced by reason of conditions," action is not explained; consequently, the agent of this action is no longer explained. Thus, since action and agent do not exist, how could the caused fruit, the fruit born of action, exist? *If the fruit does not exist, how could the enjoyer of the fruit exist?* Thus we know that all of this does not exist in and of itself. [329, 9]

5. Efficacy of a non-substantial action.

Objection. In thus establishing the non-substantiality of es-

sences (*bhāva*), you reject by this argument all the sayings of the Lord who said: "From the action that he himself has accomplished, he will himself undergo the retribution." In denying the fruit of action, you are a total denier.

Answer. We are not deniers (*nāstikas*), but in rejecting the dualist thesis of existence and non-existence (*astitva, nāstitva*), we illumine the path of non-duality which leads to Nirvāṇa. We do not say that action, the agent, the fruit, etc., do not exist; but we affirm that all these are without self-nature. You perhaps think: "As essences without self-nature cannot have any activity, this position also leads to error." But there is nothing, for we do not see any essences endowed with self-nature having any activity, and do see essences without self-nature having activity. In fact, since all things do not have any self-nature, pots, etc, in daily life, evidently accomplish their effect. [329, 18]

Furthermore, from the following example, it is very clear that this [efficacy] will appear once more:

31. *In the same way that the master, through his miraculous power, creates a thing of magic and this thing of magic creates in its turn another thing of magic . . .*

In the same way that the *master* (the Buddha, the Lord), *through his miraculous power* (through his miraculous force) creates a single thing of magic, and then this same thing of magic, created by the Buddha, the Lord, creates *in its turn* (anew) *another* (a second) *thing of magic . . .*

The [first] thing of magic, creator of the second thing of magic, is empty, without self-nature, that is to say lacking the self-nature of a Tathāgata. And this second thing of magic which has been created by the first one, it too is empty, without self-nature, that is to say, lacking the self-nature of a Tathāgata. In this same way here (in this example), some things without self-nature realize some effects without self-nature, and then one can speak of action and of agent; [330, 9]

32. *in this same way the agent has the aspect of a thing of magic and the action accomplished by it is like the second thing of magic created by the first.*

In fact the agent, the author of the action, *has the aspect of*

a thing of magic (is empty of self-nature); and any action, accomplished by this free agent empty of self-nature is, itself, empty of self-nature. We can know that it is like the second thing of magic created by the first one. [331, 3]

It also says in the Āgama: "When a thing of magic speaks, all things of magic speak, and when one remains silent, all remain silent." [331, 6]

How thus do the Mādhyamikas, the followers of non-duality, fall into false views? It is also said in the Āryasamādhirāja:

"When the Sugata, the Protector, teaches, full of compassion for persons on the path, the Victorious One creates magical beings and causes them to manifest the excellent qualities of the Buddha.

"One hundred thousand living beings, having heard him, make the vow to obtain the excellent knowledge of the Buddhas: 'When will we be able to obtain such a knowledge?' Knowing their intention, the Victorious One makes them preach to them.

"The King of the Law emits from the soles of his feet one hundred thousand immense rays of light. All of the hells are cooled and, their sufferings removed, they enjoy happiness.

"Then, when the Law has been taught by the [Buddha] with his ten powers, the eyes of gods and of men become pure.

"He who invites the Victorious One, the King of Men, has no limit to his merits (*dakṣiṇā*) and he obtains supreme and incomprehensible goods: thinking thus, some attach themselves with devotion to him," etc. [333, 5]

And this passage from the Āryavimalakīrtinirdeśa: "Then the magical Bodhisattva prepared the leavings of the meal taken by the Tathāgata Samantabhadra in the world of exquisite perfume: a mixed food of all types of condiments and victuals each [mouthful] of which contained different tastes. In enjoying this Single Food, the people (Śrāvakas, Bodhisattvas, kings, ministers, monks, harem ladies, bearers and camel drivers) obtained the great concentration called Aspect of Enjoyment." [333, 9]

We also read in the Vinaya: "A monk having the appearance of a bad monk was created by the Lord and taught [the rule], on behalf of a moral monk, by living with him who pretends to be pure." [334, 2]

But it is not solely through the example of the thing of magic that the thesis of non-substantiality is explained: the non-

substantiality of essences clearly appears from the following examples. In order to point them out, the author says:

33. *Defilements, actions, bodies, agents and fruits have the aspect of a city of the Gandharvas and resemble a mirage, a dream.*

The *defilements* (*kleśa*): lust, etc., which soil (*kliśnanti*) the mental series of beings. *Actions:* merit, demerit, and non-agitation. *Bodies:* pertaining to the body. *Agents:* the "self." *Fruits:* the fruit of retribution, of predominance, of out-flowing, etc.

We know that these things, defilements, etc., are without self-nature like a city of the Gandharvas, etc. We see thus that the Mādhyamikas who deny the self-nature of essences avoid at one and the same time the eternalist and the nihilist points of view. [335, 3]

Finally, the refutation of the other bad objections concerning the relationship between action and the fruit will be fully completed by the Madhyamakāvatāra.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION.

1 The references in parentheses are to the paragraphs and to the notes of the translation of the *Karmasiddhi* which follows. p. 41. See especially L. La Vallée Poussin, "La négation de l'âme et la doctrine de l'acte, Nouvelles recherches sur la doctrine de l'acte" (*JA*, 1902, pp. 237–306; 1903, pp. 357–450), *Morale bouddhique*, Paris, 1927.

2 "After the period of emptiness or of chaos, the universe is created by the predominating force (*adhipatibala*) of the actions of all of the beings of the cosmos during the course of the former full period, and this with a view to the retribution of the actions of each one of them. In fact, the universe is utilized by the retributive force of the actions of each one in a way that each one enjoys the result which suits it. As – in the extreme rigor of the doctrine of action – we do not experience the sensation which is a consequence of our own actions, we can say that external things are created only in order to be known or experienced by us. To suppose that action creates a good thing to eat, in order that, in retribution for my merit, I eat it and experience an agreeable sensation of taste, is an odious hypothesis. It is simpler to believe that the result of my action is totally internal: that the good action ripens directly into agreeable sensation, without having to create for this a body, a tongue, or a delicious piece of food." "Note sur l'Ālayavijñāna," *MCB*, vol. III, pp. 153–154).

3 See *Triṁśikā*, *Saṁgraha* (*MCB*, vol. III; pp. 169–225), *Siddhi* and two works: J. Masuda, *Der individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra-Schule*, Heidlberg, 1926; "Notes sur l'Ālayavijñāna" (*MCB*, vol. III, pp. 145–168).

4 Bibliography and presentation in "Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka," *MCB*, vol. II, pp. 1–59.

5 Nanjio has restored this as "Vimoksaprajñā Ṛṣi or Vimokṣasena (?)" (App. ii, 118); see Bagchi, *Canon bouddhique*, 267.

NOTES TO THE KARMASIDDHIPRAKARAṆA.

1 The Tibetan translator reads Karmasiddhaprakaraṇa, but the meaning calls for Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, a title attested to by the two Chinese versions. The meaning of *siddhi* appears to be "demonstration" with perhaps the nuacne of "illustration."

Our translation is based on the translation of Hsuan-tsang, Taishō vol. 31, no. 1609.

2 This stanza of homage is lacking in the Chinese version. Mañjuśri, the patron of the doctrine and of letters, is considered as a learner residing in the ninth sphere of the Bodhisattvas, that of "royal princes" (*Muséon*, 1907, p. 251, note 1).

3 On the division into two and three actions, see Introduction, Para. 1;

Aṅguttara, iii, 415; Atthasālinī, p. 88; Kathāvatthu, p. 393; Madhyamakvṛtti, pp. 306–; Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 190 (*Muséon*, 1911, p. 245); Kośa, iv, pp. 1–2, from whence we have borrowed these references.

4 On this school, see Introduction, Para. ii.

5 In fact, the voice is action by its nature, *vāg eva karma*. Contrarily, bodily action is action by reason of the body or action of the body, *kāyena kāyasya vā karma* (see Kośa, iv. p. 2).

6 On vijñapti and avijñapti, see Introduction, Para. ii, 1; Kośa, iv, p. 3; *Morale bouddhique*, p. 131; Madhyamakavṛtti, pp. 307–9.

7 On cetanā, which is imperfectly translated as "volition," see Kośa, i. p. 28; ii, p. 154; iv, p. 2, note 3; *Morale bouddhique*, p. 136.

8 For the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas, bodily vijñapti is a shape, arisen from a volition, but distinct from this volition. See Introduction, Para. II, 1; Kośa, iv. pp. 9–12; Siddhi, p. 48.

9 This should be understood, when one speaks of "bodily" action. Action is bodily because it is an action of the body, a deed relating to the body in general or to one of its parts, hand, foot, etc. or, rather, the action is bodily because its arising depends on the primary elements (*mahābhūta*) of the body – earth, water, fire, wind – which are its generating cause, its predominating cause. See Kośa, i. p. 21.

10 In order to be bodily vijñapti, shapes should be directly willed by the volition: the act of assassination should result immediately from the will to kill. All shapes are not bodily vijñapti: the movement of the lips is the result of the syllables that the speaker wishes to pronounce, and are not willed in and of themselves.

11 Shape is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high (*unnata*), low (*avanata*), same (*śāta*), different (*viśāta*). See Kośa, i. p. 16.

12 Being shape, bodily vijñapti is included within the sphere of form (*rūpāyatana*) which is twofold: color (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṁsthāna*). The sphere of form in its turn is included within the group of physical matter (*rūpaskandha*). See Kośa ,i. p. 16 and i. p. 14.

13 Here the Vaibhāṣikas have the Sautrāntikas for their adversaries (Kośa, iv, p. 12).

14 For the Vaibhāṣikas, color and shape are distinct things (*dravya*). But the Sautrāntikas deny that shape is something different from color (Kośa, i. p. 16) and reason as follows: "There is no atom of length. In fact when a mass of color diminishes, there arrives a moment when we no longer have the idea of long with respect to it, but rather the idea of short; thus this idea does not proceed from a rūpa shape existing in the thing. Thus that which we designate as long is a number of real things (*dravya*), atoms of color, arranged in a certain manner" (Kośa, iv, p. 10).

15 See Kośa, i, p. 25, where it is said that rūpa never exists in the state of an isolated atom, but in the state of agglomeration.

16 On the problem of the whole and of parts (*avayavin, avayava*), of substance and of quality (*guṇin, guṇa*) in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, see the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, I, 1, 15–16; Kośa, iii, pp. 210–211; ix, p. 290; H.

Ui, "Vaisesika philosophy," *OTF.*, xxiv, 1917, p. 122; R. Grousset, *Philosophies indiennes*, paris, 1931, vol. I, pp. 71–2.

17 All of this paragraph is taken from the Kośa, iv, p. 9.

18 This is the second argument of the Kośa, iv, p. 10: 'In a variegated piece of cloth, one sees numerous figures. There would be thus, according to you, many rūpas. of the category of shape, in a single spot (*ekadeśa*): this is impossible, as for color. [If shape is a real thing, that which, in the piece of cloth,, forms part of a long line, cannot at one and the same time form part of a short line]."

19 It is wrong that the Vaibhāṣikas pretend that visible things (rūpa) are of two types, color and shape, for, say the Sautrāntikas, how could a single thing be (*vidyate*) twofold, color and shape together? (See Kośa, i. p. 16).

20 Same objection and same answer in Kośa, iv, pp. 11–12.

21 The thesis of vijñapti as movement is attibuted to the Vātsīputrīyas by the Kośa, iv, p. 4, and to the Sāṁmitīyas by the Siddhi, p. 48. But we know that the Sāṁmitīyas are directly linked to the Vātsīputrīyas (of. J. Masuda, *Origin and doctrines*, p. 57; p. Demiéville, *Origine*, p. 58; Tāranātha, pp. 271–2; Bu-ston, ii, p. 99; Vyakhya to the Kośa, iv, p. 232: the Vātsīputrīyā Āryasāṁmitīyāh).

The thesis of vijñapti as movement is connected with that of the duration (*sthiti*) of the saṁskāras: By virtue of their characteristic of impermanence, certain dharmas (mind, mental states, sound, flames) perish immediately (*kṣaṇanirodha*) without the coming together of external causes; some others (wood, pot) are destroyed, after their arising, with the coming together of external causes (fire, hammer). See Kośa, ii, .. p. 234; iv, pp. 4–5; J. Masuda, *Origin and doctrines*, p. 45 Vātsīputrīya (vii, 2): "Some saṁskāras exist for a time while others perish at each moment." On this subject, the Vātsīputrīyas are in agreement with the Mahāsāṁghikas (i B, 7 .. Masuda, p. 34) and the later Mahīśāsakas (ix B, 8 .. Masuda, p. 63); their adversaries were the Sarvāstivādins (v, 41 .. Masuda, p. 50), the early Mahīśāsakas (ix A, 23 .. Masuda, p. 62), the Kāśyapīyas (xi, 4 .. Masuda, p. 65) and, above all, the Sautrāntikas.

Presentation summarized in the Introduction, Para. iii.

22 Movement (*gati*) is included in the sphere of form (*rūpāyatana*), because it is movement of a body, of visible rūpa.

23 In other words, the nature of the dharmas is subtle (*sūkṣma hi dharmaprakṛtayah*). Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature. Between the clay and brick, there is an infinity of products of difrent color: one sees them without being able to define them, In a jungle fire, each bunch of grass gives forth a different flame because of its dimensions, its light, its radiance; each bunch of grass has its own particlar characteristic, but one cannot exactly define it.

24 This is an argument *ad hominem:* you admit indeed that certain dharmas, the mind, mental states, sound, flames, perish without the intervention of external causes. Admit then that all of the dharmas perish in the same way. (See above, note 21.)

25 The Vātsīputrīyas insist on this point. If wood perishes in and of itself, and by fire, one thing comes from two things: either the wood would already have perished before being placed on the fire, or it would exist even after having passed through the fire. This alternative is contradicted by experience. Thus the wood does not perish in and of itself: it perishes by coming together with fire.

26 Cf. Kośa, iv. p. 6: "Your reasoning is not conclusive. The fact that, after relationship with the fire, we no longer see the wood, is susceptible of two interpretations: either the wood perishes by reason of this relationship, or the wood perishes unceasingly in and of itself, being reborn in and of itself unceasingly under normal conditions, but arrested from renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire. You admit that the extinction of the flame is spontaneous (*ākasmika*). When, after its relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the extinction of the flame; you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship has been arrested from renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: the hand, placed on the bell, hinders the renewing of the sound; it does not destroy the sound which you admit is momentary. Thus it is reasoning (and not experience) which should determine this question."

27 According to the Chinese; the Tibetan renders the same idea in a different way.

28 Cf. Kośa iv, p. 7: "Cooking (*pāka*) or relationship with the fire (*agnisaṁyoga*) gives forth different products (*pākaja*), deeper and deeper in color. The same cause which produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least – if you object that this refers to a new relationship with the fire, since the fire is momentary – the cause which destroys the first color is similar to the cause which produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause produces a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, destroys the said effect."

29 If the dharmas were to perish through external causes, their extinctions would vary when the external cause changes: the extinction of wood by means of fire would differ from the extinction of wood through acid.

30 Some equivalents: *ju* 乳 = *'o-ma* = *kṣīra* (M.V. 5685); *lo* 酪 = *zho* = *dadhi* (M.V. 5686); *p'u-t'ao-chih* 葡萄汁 = *rgun 'bru'i khu ba* = *drakṣārasa* (M.V. 5715); *chiu* 酒 = *rgun chaṅ* = *mṛdvīkā* (M.V. 5718); *tso* 酢 = *tshwa* = *kaṭuka* (M.V 1901).

31 The Jih-ch'u-lin = ñi-ma-'char-ka-pa = Sauryodayika (?), "another name for the root-masters of the Sautrāntika school" (Bukkyō-daijiten, p. 1332), closely related to the Dārṣṭāntikas, are described in a note by K'uei-chi ad *Siddhi*, ii, 1, 36b: "Here the author refutes the Jin-ch'u lun 日出論, that is to say the Sūtra-nikāya-mūla-ācāryas. In the first century after the death of the Buddha, in North India at Takṣaśilā, there was one Kumarata 倶摩羅陀(Bukkyō-daijiten, p. 311), that is to say Young Man-Head who composed 900 śāstras. In this period, in the five Indias, there were five Mahāśāstrācāryas, like a Rising of the Sun (*sūrya udaya*), who illumined-guided the world, whence the name of Sauryodayika, because they resembled the sun; they are also called

Dārṣṭāntika-ācāryas; or because these masters composed the Dṛṣṭānta-mālā-śāstra, bringing together the *adbhutavastus*, they are called Dārṣṭāntikas.

"The seed-[masters] of the Sūtranikāya gradually became the Sūtranikāya, for that which they said becam doctrine. However, at this time there was not yet any Sūtranikāya; this appeared in the fourth century." (*Siddhi*, p. 48).

See also K'uei-chi, commentary on the *Siddhi*, iv, 1, 53b; Noël Peri, "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu," *BEFEO.*, 1911, p. 360, mentions a Sūrya-udaya-śāstra whose title, according to Chi-tsang, is taken from a comparison (Taishō vol. 45, no. 1852, the San-lun hsüan-i).

On the doctrine of the Sauryodayikas, see Introduction, Para. iv, 1. It agrees with the Dārṣṭāntika thesis presented in the *Siddhi*, p. 48: "There exists a certain rupa which is neither color (*varṇa*) nor shape (*saṁsthāna*), which is produced by the mind. This rūpa sets into motion the hand and the other limbs. It is called an act of information by the body (*kāyavijñaptikarman*)."

Compare also Kośa, iv, p. 294: 'What is the principal cause of the beginning of bodily action? Memory (*smṛti*) causes a wish or desire for action (*cahanda* = *kartukamatā*) to arise; from this desire there proceeds imagination (*vitarka*); from imagination there proceeds effort (*prayatna*), which gives rise to a puff of wind (*vāyu*) which releases the bodily action."

32 According to the Kośa, i, p. 18, wind is one of the eleven tangible things. The tangible sphere (*spraṣṭavyāyatana*) forms part of the matter aggregate (*rūpaskandha*).

33 According to the Kosa, i, p. 54, eight dhātus: the five material organs, smell, taste *and the tangible* are morally neutral (*avyākṛta*), being neither good nor bad.

34 According to the Kośa, i, p. 54, rūpadhātu, the visible, is good or bad when it constitutes a bodily action arisen from a good or bad mind; it is neutral in every other case. Now, in your hypothesis, rūpa-color does not arise from a mind, but from its own seeds or from a certain wind. Thus it is not morally qualifiable and cannot constitute any kind of action.

35 On this meaning of the epithet *t'ien-ai* 天愛 .. *lha rnams dga'ba* = *devānāmpriya*, see S. Lévi, *Journal Asiatique*, 1891, 11, p. 549, and *Bull. Ac. Roy. Belg.*, 1933, nos. 1–6, pp. 12–15.

36 On the avijñapti of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas, Introduction, Para. ii, 1; Kośa, i, pp. 20, 26; ii, p. 241; iv, pp. 3, 13–17; threefold, p. 43; tyāga, p. 100; Siddhi, p. 50. Their adversaries were the Sautrāntikas (Vibhāṣā, Taishō vol. 27, p. 383b; Kośa, iv, pp. 13, 18–25) and the Vijñānavādins (Siddhi, pp. 50–51).

37 *Avijñapti* is of three types: *saṁvara*, discipline; *asaṁvara*, non-discipline; and *naivasamvaranāsaṁvara*, neither discipline nor non-discipline (see Kośa, iv, p. 43).

38 *Avijñapti* forms part of the physical matter group (*rūpaskandha*) because it is itself mater (*rūpa*): the *vijñapti* from whence it proceeds is matter and the primary elements which constitute its point of support are matter (see Kosa, i, p. 26). But *avijñapti* is invisible matter: as such, it does not from part of visible things (*rūpāyatana*) but of the sphere (*dharmāyatana*) known by the

mental consciousness (see Kosa, i, p. 30).

39 In order to understand this objection, one should remember that, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the beginning of *avijñapti*, discipline, etc., is not the same in all of the realms of existence. Here, in the realm of desire, discipline is always produced by a bodily or vocal *vijñapti*. Contraily, in the higher realm of form, discipline is subordinated to a mind (*cittānuparivartin*) strong enough to create discipline by itself, without the intervention of a *vijñapti*, Thus, say the Vaibhāṣikas, if the Sautrāntikas deny bodily and vocal *vijñapti*, they shold admit that *avijñapti* does not arise in the realm of desire. Compare Kośa, iv, p. 13: "If the *vijñapti* does not exist, *avijñapti* of the realm of Kāmadhātu will no longer exist, for this *avijñapti* of Kāmadhātu depends on *vijñapti*, bodily and vocal action, *rūpa;* it does accompany the mind like the *avijñapti* of Rūpadhātu."

40 The objection follows: It the *avijñapti* of the realm of desire arises without a preliminary *vijñapti*, one must admit that it is subordinate to the mind (*cittānuparivartin*) like the *avijñapti* of the realm of form. Now it is not, for *avijñapti* of the realm of desire which develops during sleep, distraction, etc., is not subordinate to the mind. Same objection in the Kośa, iv, p. 13.

41 The Tibetan is clearer: *dus yoṅs su gzuṅ bas 'phaṅs pa'i phyir de ltar mi 'gyur la.* The discipline of the realm of desire develops even in the state of sleep or distraction, because one has undertaken this discipline for a time determined in advance: for one's lifetme (*yāvajjīvam*) or for a day-and-a-night (*ahorātram*). See Kosa, iv, p. 62.

42 Every two weeks, the monks within the monastic boundary come together for the "confession ceremony." A monk reads the prātimokṣa to his fellow monks, a formulary in which all of the rules that the monks should observe are enumerated. He asks: "Are you pure [of transgressing the rules]?"

If a guilty monk does not confess his fault, he evidently commits a lie, an *avijñapti* of lying. However, this *avijñapti* is not preceded by a vocal *vijñapti*. Thus the Vaibhāsikas are mistaken whey affirm that all the *avijñaptis* of Kāmadhātu derive from a *vijñapti*. (On the answer of the Vaibhāṣikas, Kośa, iv, p. 163, note 5, and *Morale bouddhique*(p. 133).

43 How can admit that any *avijñapti* of Kāmadhātu proceeds from a *vijñapti*, while *vijñapti* is sometimes neutral from the moral point of view, whereas *avijñapti* is always morally qualifiable, either as good or bad (Kośa, iv, p. 30)?

44 On volition, weak, strong, see Kośa, iv, p. 58.

45 In the Introduction we have given the different theories concerning the retribution of action. We must content ourselves here with some bibliographic and lexicological notes.

a) Action exists in the past, future or present: a thesis of the Sarvāstivādins (v, 1 = Masuda, p. 39; Kośa, pp. 51–65) and of the later Mahīśāsakas (ix B. 1 = Masuda, p. 62).

b) Present action and past action which has not given forth its fruit exists: a thesis of the Kassapikas (Kathāvatthu, i, 8) or Kāśyapiyas (xi, 2 = Masuda, p. 65) and of the Vibhajyavādins (Kośa, v. p. 52 and Introdu on,

p. lv and following).

c) Only present action exists. It creates retribution (*avipraṇāśa*): a thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas, etc. (below, note 57). It modifies the series (*saṁtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*) by depositing a seed in it: a thesis of the Mahāsaṁghikas (i A, 45 and i B, 5 = Masuda, pp. 31 and 33), of the early Mahīśāsakas (ix A, 1 = Masuda, p. 59) and of the Sautrāntikas (Kośa, ii, pp. 185, 272; v, p. 63; ix, p. 296; below, Para. 20).

The Vaibhāṣikas have a precise vocabulary with which the translator should familiarze himself. They speak in a general manner of the realization of the result of fruit of action: Phalābhinirvṛtti = *'bras bu* [*mṅon par*] *'grub pa* = *te kuo* 得果 They say that action is eternal "in and of itself" or "in its being," that is to say in its self-nature, *svabhāva* = [*tzu*] *t'i* 自體, or in its self-characteristic, *svalakṣaṇa* = *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = *tzu hsiang* 自相, but that it varies in its "mode of existence," *bhāva* = *lei yu* 類有. According to them, present action, when it is accomplished, "projects" *ākṣipati* = *'phen pa* = *yin* 引, or "grasps" *pratigṛhṇāti* = *'dsin pa* = *ch'u* 取 its fruit. But it is only when it is past that it "gives forth" *prayacchati* = *'byin pa* = *te* 得 or, better, *yü* 與, its fruit.

46 Understand: "You have already affirmed the existence of bodily and vocal action, distinct from volition, and now you pretend that past action exists! This is a case of saying that pustules are growing on the tumor that is consuming you."

47 Kośa, v, p. 58.

48 *na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api/ sāmagrīṁ prāpya kālaṁ ca phalanti khalu dehinām//*

A stanza frequently quoted, for example nine times in the Divyāvadāna (see *JPTS*, 1886, p. 86), Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika, ix, 71; Abhidharmkośavyākhyā, 221a9, Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 324. There is a variant: *api kalpaśatair api* or *kalpakoṭiśatair api*. The Chinese version does not translate *dehinām*.

49 This is the Sautrāntika thesis presented below, Para. 20.

50 In Tibetan: "Does it give forth its fruit through a condition of its being (*svalakṣaṇāvasthā*)?"

Compare Kośa, v, p. 53: "The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends *avasthānyathātva:* time periods differ through difference of condition (*avasthā*). The dharma, traveling through the time periods, having grasped (*prāpya*) such and such a condition, becomes different through the difference of condition, not through a difference of nature (*dravya*). Example: the tally piece (*vartikā, gulikā*), placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, is called ten; placed on the square of hundreds, a hundred."

51 Kośa, v. p. 55: "It is the operation which is not done, in the process of being done, or already done, which determines the time period of the dharma."

52 An out-flowing result is a result which resembles its cause (*hetusadṛśa*). See Kośa ii, p. 288; iv, pp. 186, 191.

"In fact, it is difficult to attribute to action an outflowing fruit properly so-called: action does not engender action; the action does not bear any fruit which is exactly similar to the action. But lust experienced has for its out

flowing fruit lust, a predisposition to lust, a certain *habitus* favorable to acts of lust" (*Morale Bouddhipue*, pp. 182–183).

53 Understand: "Because there is no limit (*fen-hsien* 分限) to the arising of these fruits the length of transmigration" (see Kośa, text vi, fol. 12a; trans. ii, p. 272, note 1). Whereas the fruit of retribution exhausts the force of retribution of an action, the out-flowing fruit, by its nature, cannot end by itself. (*Morale Bouddhique*, p. 183).

54 Kośa, v, pp. 55–56: "Would you say that the operation is to project and give forth a fruit (*phaladānaparigraha*)? But then, if giving forth the fruit is operation, (*sabhāgahetu*) causes, etc., give forth their fruit when they are past, and one comes to the conclusion that, past, they accomplish their operation and would be consequently present. Or if the operation, in order to be completed, needs the projection and the given fruit, these past causes will be at least semi-present. The time periods will be thus found to be confounded."

55 No mind, no mental state arises after the last mind and the last mental state of the Arhat. The last mind of the Arhat does not engender a fruit of retribution, but a fruit of disconnection (*visaṁyogaphala*): Nirvāṇa (Kośa, ii, p. 305).

56 For the Vaibhāṣikas, the last mind of the Arhat is a *manas*, that is to say a support mind which would be capable of supporting a subsequent mind should this latter arise. But as, in fact, this subsequent mind does not arise, lacking any other causes necessary for its arising, the *manas* of the Arhat differs from other minds, not being *samantarapratyaya*, a condition in the quality of equal and immediate antecedent, with respect to a subsequent mind (Kośa, ii, p. 305).

57 The theory of *avipraṇāśa* is presented: a. in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, pp. 317–323 (translation below) b. in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 126, 1. 12 (*Muséon*, 1910, p. 318): "He who maintains that action perishes, in order to answer this question: How can the fruit of this action which has perished arise?, imagines . . . an entity, the *avipraṇāśa*, similar to a tally-book of debts"; c. perhaps in the Kośa, ii, p. 304: "According to other masters (*Vibhāṣā*, 179. 4; Saṁghabhadra, *Taishō* vol. 29, p. 444b23), there is in the series of beings a certain dharma which is the mark (*cihna* = *liṅga*) of the fruits which will arise in the future, namely cersain *saṁskāras* disassociated from the mind."

Since K'uei-chi, in the list of the *vipayuktas* of the Siddhi, p. 71, mentions the *avipaṇāśa* of the early Sāṁmitīyas, we are able to attribute this theory to the Vatsiputriya-Sāṁmitīyas. But other schools also admit the *avipraṇāśa:* the *Karmasiddhi* tells us that this dharma is called accumulation (*upacaya*) by some, *avipraṇāśa* by others; we read in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 318: *yaś cāyam avipraṇāśo'smabhir uktah sūtrāntaroktaḥ* . . . [The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr also employ the example of the debts; see Kośa, iv, p. 95].

This theory calls to mind the words of the Epistle to the Colossians 2:14: "Blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us . . . "; cf. Origen, *In Genesim*, hom. 13 (p.G., 12, 235): "Unusquisque . . . nostrum, in hic quae delinquit, efficitur debitor et peccati

sui litteras scribit."

58 *yin* 引 . . . *ch'i* 起 = *skyed* = *ādadhāti*.

59 On the dharmas disassociated from the mind, see Kośa, ii, p. 178 and following.

60 *tseng-ch'ang* 增長 = *brtsegs* = *upacaya*. [Compare *Kathāvatthu*, xv, ii, where the Andhakas and the Sāṁmitīyas distinguish *kamma* from *kammaupacaya*.]

61 *pu-shih-huai* 不失壞 = *chud mi za ba* = *avipraṇāśa*.

62 *te* 得 = *mṅon par 'grub pa* = *adhinirvṛt-*.

63 *wen-i* 文義 = *gzuṅ* = *grantha*.

64 During the absorption of extinction [of ideas and of sensation], the mind is interrupted for a long time. How upon leaving the absorption, can a new mind arise from a mind destroyed for a long time? There is no difficulty for the Vaibhāṣikas who admit the existence of past dharmas (see Kośa, i,i p. 211). But for the Sāṁmitīyas, the question is insoluble; since the mental series is interrupted during the absorption, their *avipraṇāśa* will not repose on anything.

65 *tzu-k'uang-chih* 紫礦汁 = *rgya skyegs kyi khu ba dmar po* = *lākṣārasarakta*.

66 If one paints the flower of a citron tree, the pip of the new fruit will be red. But if the pip is seeded, a new red pip fruit will not arise. Some comparison below, Para. 20, 32, 40, *Kosa*, iv, p. 299.

67 On the Sautrāntika *saṁtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa* of the series, see Introduction, Para. lv, 2, and *Morale bouddhique*, p. 198.

Detailed presentation in Kośa, ii, pp. 185, 272; v. p. 63; ix, p. 296; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, pp. 312–314.

68 "In the same way that when one paints the seed, the plant will give forth a flower the color of the paint, without this color being visible in the stalk or the sap; in this same way the mental series undergoes a subtle transformation by reason of the action, and flourishes after the action, assuming a certain body, experiencing a certain suffering, experiencing a certain." ecstacy. (*Morale bouddhique*, p. 198.)

69 For the Vaibhāṣikas, bodily action is *rūpa*. Now *rūpa* cannot be either good or bad (see above, Para. 12c). The mind alone gives actions their moral value.

70 The two absorptions lacking mind are the absorption of non-consciousnessś (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*) and the absorption of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatti*), *Kośa*, ii, pp. 200–214. The nonconsiousness gods are beings conscious at birth and at death. In the interval, consciousness is suspended among them. When, after this long time, they produce consciousnesses anew, they die.

See Kośa, ii, pp. 199–200.

71 In order to exactly define the nature of the series (*saṁtāna*) wherein action ripens, one should determine with precision the nature of the absorption of extinction (*nirodhasamāpatti*). On the one hand, the Buddha declared that during this absorption, the consciousness (*vijñāna*) does not leave the body; on the other hand, and by definition, ideas and sensations are lacking in this

absorption which is the arresting of ideas and of sensations (*saṁjñaveditanirodha*). The discussion which follows will be clearer if one remembers the beginning of a conscious consciousness. In order and in dependence: 1. the mental organ (*manas*); 2, the object to be known (*dharma*); 3. the mental consciousness (*manaovijñana*); 4. contact between the first three (*sparśa*); 5. sensation and ideas (*vedanā*, *saṁjñā*) which are lacking in the absorption of extinction; 6. thirst (*tṛṣṇā*). The whole question is to know whether the coming together of the first three elements necessarily involves contact, and if all contact necessaily involves sensation. In the affirmative, the absorption of extinction does not contain consciousness, for this last necessarily involves sensation and ideas which should be lacking in the absorption.

Certain schools pretend that the absorption of extinction is lacking mind (*acittaka*). If the Buddha affirms that, in this state, the consciousness does not leave the body, this is because the mind is produced anew after the absorption, whether the mind after the absorption has for its equal and immediate antecedent the mind previous to the absorption (a Vaibhāṣika thesis), or whether it arise from the material organs that the absorption leaves intact (root-opinion of the Sautrantika-Dārṣṭāntikas).

Other schools pretend that the absorption of extinction is endowed with a mind (*sacittaka*), namely with a subtle consciousness (*sūkṣmāvijñāna*) which does not leave the body, according to the word of the Buddha. But they are not in agreement with respect to the nature of this consciousness: mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) with all of the mental states (*caitta*) which are necessarily associated with it, exception being made for ideas and sensation (a thesis of Vasumitra, of the Vibhajyavādins, branch-opinion of the Sautrānikas); or mental consciousness without mental states (variant branch-opinion of the Sautrāntikas); or a retribution-consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) better known under the name of receptacle-consciousness (opinion of the Sūtraprāmāṇikas). The references to these echools will be given below.

72 The Vaibhāṣika theory is given: a, in Kośa, ii, p. 211: "The past dharmas exist. Consequently, the mind previous to the absorption, the mind of absorption (*samapātticitta*) or the mind of entry into the absorption, is the equal and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*) of the mind after the absorption, or mind of leaving (*vyutthānacitta*)"; b. in the Saṁgraha (Ch. pp. 334c8–9; Tib. 12a6–7), Bhāṣya (Ch. pp. 334d10–13; Tib. 164a1–3), Upanibandhana) Ch. pp. 395c6–9; Tib. 263b3–4); c. in the Siddhi, p. 205.

73 The mind of entry into absorption, which is past, cannot "give forth" the mind of leaving the absorption.

74 The root-opinion of the early Darṣṭāntika masters is presented: a. in the Kośa, ii, p. 212: "When a person is born in Ārūpyadhātu, *rūpa*, or matter, is found to be cut off for a long period of time: if this person is subsequently reborn in Kāmadhātu or in Rūpadhātu, his new *rūpa* does not proceed from the series of *rūpa* previously interrupted for a long period of time, but rather from the mind before the absorption: it arises from the body endowed with the organs (*sendriyakakāya*). This is why the early masters say: Two dharmas are the seed one of the other (*anyonyabījaka*): These two dharmas are the

mind and the body endowed with the organs"; b. in the Saṁgraha (Ch. pp. 336a9–12; Tib. 12b4–6), Bhāṣya (Ch. pp. 336a13–21; Tib. 167b5–168a2), Upanibandhana (Ch. pp. 396b23–396c11; Tib. 265b1–8); c. in the Siddhi, p. 207.

75 See Para. 25.

76 *huo-shih* 或時 = *syāt.*

77 The theory of the subtle *citta* is attributed: a. to the Bhadanta Vasumitra by the Kośa, ii, p. 212. This Vasumitra, called the Bhadanta or the Sthavira, is different from the Vasumitra of the Vibhāṣā. He is the author of a *Paripṛcchasatra* and of a Pañcavastuka commented upon by Dharmatrāta (Taishō vol. 28, no. 1555). See Kośa Introduction, pp. xliv-xiv; b. to a variant opinion of the root-system of the Sūtra-nikāya (*tsung-ch'uan-chi* 宗轉計) and to the Sthavirācāryas, by K'uei-chi and Siddhi, iv, 2, 18a; c. to the Dārṣṭāntikas and to the Vibhavyavādyācārya by th› Vibhāsā (Taishō vol. 17, pp. 772c, 774a).

This theory is presented and refuted: a. the Kośa, ii, p. 212; b. in the Saṁgraha (Ch. pp. 334c14–21; Tib. 12a7–12b4), Bhāṣya (Ch. pp. 343c22–335c2; Tib. 164a3–166a2), Upanibandhana (Ch. pp. 395c16–396a16; Tib. 263b4–264b1); c. in the Siddhi, pp. 208–210.

78 The Siddhi, p. 204, quotes the entire passage: "The *saṁskāras* of the body, of the voice, and of the mind of he who resides (*viharati*) in the absorption of extinction do not let themselves be destroyed (*nirodha*); but his life (*āyus*) is not destroyed, his heat (*uṣman*) does not leave him, his organs do not deteriorate (*praluj-*), his *vijñāna* does not quit (*hā*) the body." (Compare Majjhima, i. 296.)

The kāyasaṁskāras or bodily energies are the inspiration and the expiration of the breath (*ānāpāna*); the vāksaṁskāras or vocal energies are enquiry (*vitārka*) and judgment (*vicara*); the manaḥsaṁskāras or mental energies are volition (*cetanā*), ideas (*saṁjñā*), (see Saṁgrahabhāṣya, Taishō vol. 31, p. 335b20).

79 Same objection and same answer in the Kośa, ii, pp. 212–3:

80 Similar passages in Saṁyukta, 11,2; 13.4. Compare Saṁyutta, ii. 72; iv. 33 *et passim: cakkhuṁ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajatti cakkhuviññāṇam; tiṇṇaṁ saṁgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā taṇhā: ayaṁ kho dukkhassa samudayo.*

81 Saṁyukta, 2,4. Compare Saṁyutta, iii. 96: *avijjāsamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena phuṭṭassa assutavato puthujjanassa uppannā taṇhā.*

82 This refers to the variant branch-theory of the Sautrāntikas preeented and refuted in the Saṁgraha and its commentaries (see references in note 77) and in the Siddhi, pp. 211–214.

83 This special point is treated: a. in the Saṁgraha (Ch. pp. 335c3–4; Tib. 12b4); Bhāṣya (Ch. pp. 335c5–336a8; Tib. 166a2–167b5), Upanibandhana (Ch. pp. 396a18–936b19; Tib. 264b1–265b1); b. in the Siddhi, p. 213.

84 A mind is good through association (*saṁprayogatas*) when it is associated to the root of good which forms part of the good mental states (see Siddhi, pp. 319–320).

85 This is the thesis of the Kośa, ii, p. 203; iv. p. 33, in which the dharmas can be good or bad through their originating cause (*samutthānatas*).

86 See Siddhi, p. 213, and the long analysis in the Kośa ii, p.p 316–331.

87 In fact nothing is defiled nor neutral in a good samāptti (see Siddhi, p. 213; Kośa, viii, p. 145).

88 Like every non-defiled-neutral (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) dharma, the non-defiled-neutral mental consciousness can be: 1. arisen from retribtuion (*vipākaja*); 2. relative to the attitude of laying down, sitting, etc. (*airyāpathika*); 3. relative to one's professional work (*śailpasthānika*); 4. a created mind (*nirmānacitta*). See Kośa, ii, p. 265. But the absorption of extinction, good by nature, cannot contain any mental consciousness of this type.

89 One enters into absorption of extinction upon leaving the absorption of non-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness (*naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana*), also called the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*), *Kośa*, ii, p. 203.

90 Namely the four ecstacies (*dhyāna*) and the four non-material (*ārūpya*) absorptions, *Kośa*, viii, pp. 132–4.

91 Good action belonging to the realm of desire (*kāmādhatu*) is called meritorious; good action belonging to the two higher realms (*rūpa* and *ārūpya-dhātu*) is called "non-agitated," *āniñjya* (*Kośa*, iv, p. 107).

92 An unknown sūtra from a celebrated person; see M. Akanuma, *Dictionnaire des noms propres de bouddhisme indien*, Nagoya, 1931, p. 373. [In *Saṁyutta*, iv, 295, the three contacts are *suññatā*, *animitta*, *appaṇihita*.]

93 One should compare these three contacts with the three absorptions called *śūnyatāsamādhi*, *ānimittasamādhi*, *apraṇihitasamādhi*, meditations on emptiness, on no-characteristics, and of not taking into consideration (*Kośa*, viii, p. 184).

94 "What proof does one have that the fruit of retribution which it constitutes is not aleady exhauted?"

95 Namely the four *dhyānas*, the four *ārūpyas* and *nirodhasamāpatti*.

On these nine absorptions acquired one after the other, see *Dīrgha*, 17, 11; Dīgha, iii, 266; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 1498.

96 On the eight *vimokṣas*, of which the last is *nirodhasamapatti*, see Kośa, viii, pp. 204–211.

97 *Nirodhasamāpatti* has for its sphere the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*), for its preparation (*prayoga*) the idea of stilling, and for its object the extinction (*nirodha*) of the mind and mental states (Kośa, ii, p. 210).

98 The Chinese *tsung-ch'ing* 縱情 signifies indulgence in one's own sentimets"; this expression corresponds to the Tibetan *gzu lums*, "not listening to any instruction or order, selfish" (Chandra Das, p. 1105). But the Tibetan-Sanskrit Index to the *Nyāyabindu* by Obermiller (*bibl. Buddh*. xxv, p. 116) mentions *gzu lums* = *āhopuruṣikā* f. 128. 15, "great self-conceit or pride: military vaunting, boasting; vaunting of one's own prowess' (Apte, p. 92).

99 In other words: "The *Āgama* says that the consciousness does not leave the body during the absorption of extinction. You affirm that this consciousness is the mental consciousness. Now this refers to the receptacle-consciousness."

100 In Tibetan: "As some Sautrāntikas (*mdo-sde-pa kha-cig*) admit." The Sūtraprāmāṇikas are those for whom [only] the sūtras are an authorty. The

Sautrāntikas are defined by the Kośavyākhyā, p. 11, 30: *sūtraprāmāṇikā na śāstraprāmanikāḥ.*

On the Sautrāntika origin of Vijñānavada psychology, see the *Introduction,* II.

101 Compare the Saṁgrahopanibandhana (Taishō vol. 31, p. 395b26): "The sūtra says: The consciousness does not leave the body. Why is this? The absorption of extinction does not oppose (*pratipakṣa*) the receptacle-consciousness and this latter does not hinder the absorption from producing itself, because the object (*ālambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of the receptacle-consciousness are difficult to know [or imperceptible, (*asaṁvidita*) . . . Not being opposed, the receptacle-consciousness does not disappear [during the absorption]. But the absorption opposes the active-consciousnesses (*pravṛttivi jñāna*) . . . because their objects and aspects are not calmed, and are easy to know. Thus the absorption of extinction solely destroys the active-consciousnesses, but does not destroy the receptacle-consciousness.'

102 As we have seen (note 97), the antecedent or preparation (*prayoga*) for the absorption of extinction is the idea of stilling, which is incompatible with the presence of the six active-consciousnesses.

103 The "store-mind" is the receptacle-consciousness; the "multiple mind" is the six aciive-consciousnesses.

104 See above, Para. 20.

105 See Kośa, iv. p. 8 (Vyākhyā, 348): "By reason of its relationship with the fire . . . the ignited element which is present in the water increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in a more and more reduced quantity (*ksāmakṣamā*) until, being completely reduced (*atikṣāmatā*), the water stops renewing itself (*na punaḥ saṁtānaṁ saṁtanuta iti*).

Sūtrālaṁkāra, xviii, 83, p. 150; *apām api kvāthyamānānām agnisaṁbandhād alpataratamotpattito'timandyād ante punar anutpattir gṛhyate.*

106 The arrow falls when its impetus is exhausted: Vibhāṣā, Taishō 27, no. 1545, p.103c; p.105a; Kośa, ii, pp.200, 217;iv,p.102 MCB vol. iii, 1934–5, p. 248.

107 *she-tsang* 攝藏 = *sbyor ba* = *ālīyate* (*MCB.*, ibidem, p. 174).

108 Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra, v, 7, a stanza frequently quoted: Saṁgraha (Ch. p. 324b24; Tib. 3b8); Triṁśikābhāṣya of Sthiramati, p. 34; Siddhi, p. 173; Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 196.

ādanavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo
ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo/
bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi
mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ//

109 Manuals of Buddhist psychology have some more or less exact presentations of the psychology of the Yogācāra, but the publication of the Siddhi has informed us more exactly with respect to the ālayavijñāna. Later, "Note sur l'Ālayavijñāna," in *MCB.*, vol. iii, 1934–5, pp. 145–168.

110 On the names of the ālaya, see Saṁdhinirmocana, v, 3; Saṁgraha (in *MCB.*, vol. iii, pp. 171–186); Siddhi, p. 166; "La Notation de Tréfonds," in S. Lévi, *Matériaux,* p. 125.

111 For the proof of the ālaya, see Saṁgraha and Bhāṣya (Ch. pp.

330b19–336b26); Upanibandhana (Ch. pp. 391a2–397a19); Siddhi, pp. 182–220.

112 The Chinese is unclear here. According to the Tibetan we have: "Where are the residues of the defilements to be found when they have been cut off by their opposition? In the same mind which opposes them, you would say. No; for, being bound by the said residues, how can you admit that it opposes them?"

113 When a being arises in a sphere of rebirth (*gati*) of the realm of non-form (*ārūpyadhātu*), it is not only a mind, but a neutral (*avyākṛta*) mind from the moral point of view, for the "sphere of rebirth" is essentially a *vipākaphala*, a fruit of retribution (Kośa, iii, p. 12). If this sphere of rebirth-mind were to constitute a particular recompense distinct from the receptacle-consciousness, one would have to say that the being born in ārūpyadhātu loses his sphere of rebirth from the time that he produces a good or bad mind: or one must admit that the sphere of rebirth is not solely a fruit of retribution, but also contains elements foreign to retribution. Now this is not admitted by anyone (Siddhi, p. 192).

114 A being born in the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*), or "the place of non-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness" (*naivasamjñānāsaṁjñāyatana*), is too much asleep to cultivate the pure (*anāsrava*) path which destroys the defilements relative to the summit of existence. In order to cultivate it, he should realize the absorption of the immediately lower sphere called "place of nothingness" (*ākiṁcanyāyatana*) (Kośa, viii, p. 175). However, by producing a mind in the sphere of nothingness, he keeps his sphere of rebirth in the summit of existence: there his receptacle-consciousness has been projected by his actions.

115 For the Vaibhāṣikas there exists, apart from the material elements and the mental states, a separate entity, a *sattvasabhāgatā* (the quality of a person, etc., "a *samskara* disassociated from the mind"). The Sautrāntikas and Vasubandhu see in *sattvasabhāgatā* only a similarity in the manner of being persons, etc., a similarity which is a mistake for the aggregates, and does not constitute a distinct substance Kośa, ii, pp. 196–8).

116 A subject developed in the Saṁgraha (*MCB.*, vol. iii, p. 207–211) and in the Siddhi, pp. 178–182.

The text, corrupted, is easily amended. Line 14, *ch'ih-t'ung ye* 赤銅鍱: replace *ye* which signifies "a metal sheet" (Couvreur, p. 960, col. 1) by its homophone *ye* 葉 signifying "leaf," which then gives Tāmraparṇīya. Line 15, *hua-t'a* 化他: replace *t'a* with *ti* 地, and this gives Mahīśāsaka. The Tibetan version differs: "The venerable Tāmraśāṭīyas (*btsun pa gos dmar sde pa rnams*) called it *bhavāṅgavijñāna;* some, *mūlavijñāna.*'

117 The Tāmraparṇīyas, the masters of Taprobane, are mentioned in the Vyākhyā, p. 39, 1. 26, p. 705, 1. 6 (*ad* Kośa, i, p. 32; ix, p. 252).

118 On the *bhavāṅgavijñāna*, notes and references in *MCB.*, vol. iii, pp. 212–215. Its invention is attributed by the Saṁgraha and the Siddhi to the Ārya Sthavira.

119 The *mūlavijñāna* of the Mahāsāṁghikas appears to be closely related to the *ekarasaskandha,* the aggregate of a single taste, which the Sautrāntikas,

in their thesis xii, 3, oppose to the *mūlāntikaskandha*, derived aggregates (see J. J. Masuda, *Origin, p.* 68).

120 The Upanibandhana (*MCB.*, vol. iii, p. 211) teaches us that the Mahīśāsakas admit three types of aggregates: instantaneous aggregates (*kṣanikaskandha*), the aggregates which last the duration of an existence (*ekajanmāvadhiskandha*), and the aggregate which lasts until the end of transmigration (*āsamsārikaskandha*). It is perhaps to this last type that the thesis ix B, 9, of the later Mahīśāsakas make -allusion (=Masuda, p. 63): "The *skandhas, āyatanas* and *dhātus* are also always present."

121 Same objection and same answer in *Siddhi*, p. 142.

122 Madhyama, 24, 1; Majjhima, 1, 53; Pratītyasamutpādasūtra quoted in Kośa, iii, p. 85 (*Vyakhya*, Index of proper names, p. 12).

123 Compare Kośa i, p. 28; Saṁyutta, iii, 60; Vibhaṅga, p. 144; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, p. 64.

124 All conditioned things which do not form part of any of the four other *skandhas* are included within the *saṁskāraskandha* (see Kośa, i, pp. 28–29).

125 See above, Para. 32.

126 See the Para. Receptacle-consciousness and action-consciousnesses, in Saṁgraha (*MCB.*, vol. iii, pp. 251–5) and the chapter on the six vijñānas in the Siddhi, p. 289.

127 Compare the Saṁgraha (in *MBC.*, vol. iii, pp. 203–207); the reason why the Buddha kept silent with respect to the receptacle-consciousness.

128 Above, note 118.

129 On the sūtras that have disappeared, see, Kośa Index, p. 138, and above all Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism*, Part II, pp. 169–171: On the Lost Parts of the Canon.

130 *Shih-kuei lun* 釋軌論 = *Rnam par bśad pa'i rigs pa*=*Vyākhyāyukti*, a work by Vasubandhu (Tangyur, Mdo., lviii, Kośavyākhyā, p. 6, 1. 20). Obermiller rejects the edition from the monastery of Aga, 97b6.

131 On the reciprocal casualty between the receptacle-consciousness and the active-consciousnesses, see Saṁgraha in *MCB.*, vol. iii, pp. 252–254, with the quotations from Abhidharmamahāyānasūtra (in Madhyāntavibhāga, V. Bhattacharya-Tucci edition, p. 28; Yamaguchi edition, p. 34) and from the Yogācāryābhūmiśāstra (Taishō vol. 30, p. 580b10).

132 See Siddhi, pp. 12–22.

133 The Vaibhāṣikas say that the minds arise from the soul (Kośa, ix, p. 284.)

134 The problem of memory is studied in the Kośa, ix, p. 274 and Siddhi, p. 21.

135 Saṁyukta, 10, 7. Cf. Vyākhyā and *Kośa*, ix, p. 252; *na caita ātmasvabhāvāḥ na caitesv ātmā vidyata ity anātmānaḥ; Sūtrālaṁkāra*, xviii, 101 (p. 158): *dharmoddāneṣu sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitam;* Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 65: *anātmānaḥ sarvadharmā ity āgamāt.*

136 Cf. Para. 1, note 3. Same objection in Siddhi, p. 51.

137 On the ten pathways of action, Kośa, iv, pp. 21, 137, 168, 181–188,

227; below, Para. 46–47.

138 See Aṅguttara, i, 230, where the Buddha explains in a summary fashion to aññatara Vijjiputtaka the three *sikṣās: adhisīla, adhicitta, adhipaññasikkhā*. The Chinese *Fo-li-chih* [*tzu*] 佛栗氏子 and the Tibetan *'bri rdsi* [*'i bu*] are a phonetic transcription of Vṛji [putraka].

139 According to the Tibetan: *byuṅ ba dan 'byun ba las gyur pa;* the Chinese *ta-tsao* 大造 suppose an original *mahābhūtāny upādāya rūpāni.*

140 Cf. Amarakośa, Nirnaya-sāgar edition, p. 226, col. 2: *cīyate' nnādibhiḥ/ ciñ cayane.*

141 We have the expression *śarīrāśucitā* in the Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 57.

142 In other words, action is essentially and exclusively volition (*cetanā*). It is volition which "constructs," which "models' (*abhisaṁskar-*) action in its moral quality, good or bad (*Morale bouddhique*, pp. 136–7).

143 This is the thesis of the Sautrāntikas (Kośa, iv, p. 12) and the Vijñānavādins (Siddhi, p. 51).

144 Compare Siddhi, p. 52. We have *shen-lü* 審慮 = *'gro* ba = *gati; ch'üeh-ting* 決定 = *ṅes pa* = *niścaya; and tung-fa* 動發 = *gyo bar byed pa* = *kiraṇa*. But La Vallée-Poussin (Siddhi, p. 52, note 1) proposes *upanidhyāna, saṁtīraṇa, ceṣṭa* or *viṣpanda*.

145 Among the ten pathways of action, the first three are pathways of action and bodily actions, the following four are pathways of action and vocal action, and the last three are solely pathways of action (see Kośa, iv, pp. 168–9).

146 Siddhi, p. 52: "The third *cetanā* which moves the body and creates the voice, being *abhisaṁskṛta*, modeled in good or bad, is called action (*karman*), and also pathway of action (*karmapatha*): 1. because it is tread upon, like a path, by the cetanās of deliberation and of judgment; 2. because it is the pathway of agreeable or disagreeable retribution."

147 The Tibetan differs. Compare the Saṁcetanīyasūtra (Madhyama, 18, 14; *Aṅguttara*, v, 292; *Majjhima*, iii, 207) quoted in the Kośa, iv, p. 136: *kathaṁ ca bhikṣavaḥ saṁcetanīyaṁ karma kṛtaṁ bhavaty upacitam / iha bhikṣava ekatyaḥ samcintya trividham kāyena karma karoty upacinoti caturvidhaṁ vācā trividhaṁ manasā.*

Samcintya is rendered here in Chinese by *ku-ssu* 故思 in Tibetan by *ched-du bsams-pa.*

148 On the etymology of the word manas, see *Laṅkāvatāra*, x, 400: *manasā manyate punaḥ;* 461, *mano manyati vai sadā;* Kośa, ii, p. 177; Saṁgraha (in *MCB.*, iii, p. 192).

149 These are very simple ideas expressed in scholastic jargon. It is volition positively expressed which creates in its author the state of discipline or indiscipline. This state lasts, even if the person is distracted or sunk in unconsciousness. It ceases from the time a person positively retracts it (cf. Kośa, iv, pp. 93–94).

150 In other words, the sūtra here studies only properly human actions; conscious actions, voluntary and morally retributable; it does not occupy itself with the purely mechanical activity of the senses.

NOTES TO THE MADHYAMAKAVṚTTI

1: The Vibhajyavādins affirm the existence of the present and of a part of the past, namely the action which has not given forth its fruit; and the non-existence of the future and of a part of the past, namely the action which has given forth its fruit (see Kośa, v, p. 52).

2: There then follows a story taken from out of the *Ratnakūṭa* translated by Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Conception of the Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 129.

Étienne Lamotte
(1903-1983)

Étienne Paul Marie Lamotte was born in Dinant, Belgium, on the 21st of November, 1903, the son of Georges Lamotte (1861–1952) and Louise Delvaux (1864–1939). His father was the president of the Dinant Regional Magistrates Court and published an *Étude historique sur le Comté de Rochefort* (Namur, 1893).

Étienne Lamotte did his initial studies in Greek and Latin at the Collège Notre Dame de Belle-Vue in Dinant (1915–20). Enrolling as a student at the University of Louvain, he obtained the rank of *Candidat en Philosophie et Lettres* in Classical Philology in 1922, and, in 1923, the Bachelor's Degree in Thomist Philosophy.

After studying two years of Theology in Malines and serving a year of military service (1923–26), Étienne Lamotte went to Rome where he attended courses at the Università della Sapienza and worked under the direction of the Italian Orientalist Carlo Formichi (1927).

During the years 1928–30, Lamotte was a teacher at the Collège Saint-Pierre in Louvain. While teaching, he also attended courses at the University of Louvain where he obtained the degrees of Doctor of Oriental Languages (1929), Doctor of Philosophy and Letters (Classical Philology, 1930), and he was also awarded the Premier Lauréat en Philologie Orientale in the Concours Universitaire for the period 1928–30.

Soon thereafter, Étienne Lamotte went to Paris on a travelling scholarship (*boursier de voyage*) and studied various Oriental subjects at the Institute de Civilisation Indienne of the Sorbonne, the École des Langues Orientales Vivantes, the École des Hautes-Études and the Collège de France. He studied Sanskrit under the aegis of Professors Sylvain Lévi and Alfred Foucher, Chinese with Paul Demiéville, Tibetan under Mlle. Lelou, and Pāḷi under Jean Przyluski.

Returning to Belgium in 1932, he worked until 1938 with the eminent Belgian Indologist, Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1869–1938), the French translator of both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam,* and the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi;* La Vallée Poussin directed Lamotte's interest to Buddhist studies, and in particular to the transla-

tion of Chinese and Tibetan versions of Indian texts which were no longer extant in their Indian original.

At the end of 1932, Lamotte was named *Maître de Conference* at Louvain University; at the same time he taught various courses at the Institute Saint-Louis in Brussels.

In 1934 Étienne Lamotte became exclusively attached to the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at Louvain University and here he taught, as *Chargé de cours,* elementary and advanced courses in Sanskrit, Buddhist Chinese and Tibetan, Introduction to Indology, History of Indian Philosophy, sight translation of Greek, and the interpretation of a Greek author. He also directed various exercises in Greek language.

His promotion in 1937 to the rank of *Professeur ordinaire* in no way interfered with these functions, but, following a reshuffling of the structure of the curriculum at Louvain University, he dropped his courses in Philosophy and Letters (1959) in order to undertake new courses at the Institut Orientaliste, notably a Course in Pāḷi and a course in the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European Languages.

Additional duties were added to his task as Professor. From 1947 to 1970, Étienne Lamotte sat on the XXIst Commission, the Commission of Philology of the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. From 1950 to 1959, he was President of the Institut Orientaliste of the University of Louvain. In 1962, he was elected Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, and in 1966, Director of the Classe des Letters et des Sciences morales et politiques of the Académie Royale de Belgique. In 1964, he assumed the duties of Editor-in-chief of the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhigues,* published by the Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises in Brussels.

Among the courses and lectures that Étienne Lamotte gave abroad, are the following:

1. The Conferences de la Foundation Michonis at the Collège de France (1951). His subjects which concentrated on the first centuries of Buddhism were: a) Can the Arhat fall from the state of Arhatship?, b) the popularization of Buddhism, and c) the birth of the critical mind.

2. The lectures presented under the aegis of the Fondazione Giorgio Cini, in Venice (1959), dealt with the Spirit of Early

Buddhism, and covered such topics as a) the Message of the Buddha Śākyamuni, b) the Ideal of the Monk and the Buddhist Laity, and c) Aśoka, the Buddhist Emperor.

3. He spoke at the Conferenze dell' Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente of Rome (1959) on the subject "Aśoka in History and Legend."

4. At the Special University Lectures at the University of London (1963), Lamotte gave three addresses which dealt with the origins of the Mahāyāna.

5. At the Vorträge des Indologischen Seminars der Universität Göttingen (1971), he spoke on the topic "The Author of the *Upadeśa* and His Sources."

6. In October of 1977 Prof. Lamotte was invited by the Japan Foundation (*Kokusai-kōryū-kikin*) to Japan and here he addressed groups at Tokyo University, the Shūkyō-gakkai of Aichi-gakuin University, Kyoto Univeristy, and Otani University.

In 1964, Étienne Lamotte began to take part, first as *Consultateur,* and four years later as *Correspondant,* in the work of the Secretariet for Non-Christian Religions, in Vatican City.

Under the influence of his teacher, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Étienne Lamotte began a series of publications which were primarily editions, translations and commentaries on Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist texts. His first work was *L'Explication des Mystères* (*Saṁdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*), Louvain, 1935, in 238 pages. This work was praised by Le Vallée Poussin in these words:

> This is a contribution which I would willingly term of fundamental importance to the history of the literature and the philosophical speculation of the Mahāyāna . . . a model of the first order" (in the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* vol. 5 (1937), p. 271).

His other works in this same vein were:

Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu (*Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa*), published in *Mélanges chinois et buddhiques,* vol. 4, Bruges, 1936;

La Somme du Grand Vehicule (*Māhāyana-saṁgraha*) *d'Asaṅga,* Louvain, Muséon, vol. 7, 1938–1939, in two volumes;

L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*), translated and annotated, Louvain, Muséon, vol. 51, 1962, in 488 pages; the English translation of this work by Mrs. Sara Webb has

appeared under the title of *The Teachings of Vimalakīrti*, Pali Text Society (in their series *The Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, no. 32), London, 1976. The English translation contains a new Foreword to the English translation by Prof. Lamotte.

La Concentration de la Marche héroïque (*Sūraṁgama-samādhi-sūtra*), a translated and annotated text (*Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, vol. XIII), Brussels, 1965, in 308 pages; and

Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse (*Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*) *de Nāgārjuna:* vol. 1, Louvain, Muséon, 1944 (620 pages); vol. 2, *ibidem*, 1949 (pages 621 to 1118); vol. 3, Louvain, P.I.O.L., 1970 (pages 1119 to 1733); vol. 4, 1976, (pages 1735 to 2162); and vol. 5, 1980 (pages 2163 to 2451).

We can perhaps do no better in summarizing Étienne Lamotte's contribution to the study of Buddhism than to quote the words of Professor Paul Demiéville, who, in a review article published in 1971 – in which he reviewed the third volume of the *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse* – said,

> In order to reach such completely new conclusions, M. Lamotte was obliged to identify all the scriptural sources which inspired the composition of the *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*. These identifications represent a *tour de force*, the author needing to be completely familiar with the whole of Buddhist literature in many languages, Sanskrit, Pāḷi, Chinese, and Tibetan. The sources thus located occupy a large part of the notes to his translation, where they are duly quoted, translated, and explained with a profusion of references and other materials which make this work a veritable manual of Mahāyāna scholasticism, equivalent to the contribution made to the study of Hīnayāna by Lamotte's master, the illustrious Louis de La Vallée Poussin with his monumental translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, published over half a century ago, and who was also a Corresponding Member of our Academy. We are thus indebted to Belgium for two of the French language masterpieces of Oriental Studies. (*Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, proceedings for the year 1971, Jan.–March, pp. 49–50).

Another of Lamotte's major works is a summa of Indian Buddhist thought: his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien, des origines*

à l'ère Śaka, Louvain, Muséon, 1958, in 862 pages. This is an exhaustive work whose value lies in his collating all relevant sources from the various Indian languages, as well as from Chinese and from Tibetan. As John Brough states, "This book suplies the need and will be indispensable for all students of early Buddhism, whatever may be the specific problems with which they are con-concerned . . . " (*B.S.O.A.S.*, vol. 25, ɹ1962]).

Étienne Lamotte also compiled *Lo Spirito del Buddhismo Antico* ("*The Spirit of Early Buddhism*"), Venezia-Roma 1959, in 63 pages; and *Introducation à l'étude du bouddhism indien,* (vol. 1 of the series *À la rencontre du bouddhisme*), Rome 1970 (translated into English as *Towards the meeting with Buddhism,* vol. 1, Rome, 1970).

Étienne Lamotte wrote some fifty-eight articles and twenty-nine reviews. His articles are:

1. "Bouddhisme et Upaniṣad," by J. Przyluski with the collaboration of É. Lamotte, in the *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extreme-Orient,* 32 (1932), p. 142–170;

2. "Louis de La Vallée Poussin," in *Revue du Cercle des Alumni de la Fondation Universitaire,* IV. 3 (1933), p. 1–17;

3. "Les trois caractéres et les trois absences de nature propre dans le *Saṁdhinirocana-sūtra,* chap IV and VII," in *Bulletin de la Casse des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 1935, p. 289–303;

4. "L'Ālaya-vijñāna (le Réceptacle) dans le *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha,* chap. II.," in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques,* 3 (1934–35), p. 169–255;

5. "Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Notice necrologique)," in *Le Flambeau,* 21, no. 3 (1938), p. 275–286;

6. "Chronique bouddhique," in *Le Muséon,* 54 (1941), p. 199–213;

7. "La conduite religieuse du Faisan dans les textes bouddhiques," in *Le Muséon,* 59 (1946), p. 641–653;

8. "La critique d'authenticité dans le bouddhisme," in *India Antiqua,* Leyden, 1947, p. 213–222;

9. "La légende du Buddha," in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* 134 (1947–48), p. 37–71;

10. "Une nouvelle Vie du Buddha," in *Le Muséon,* 62 (1949), p. 251–260;

11. "La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme," in *Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves,* 9 (1949), p. 341-361;

12. "Alexandre et le bouddhisme," in *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient,* 44 (1951), p. 147-162;

13. Preface to the work by S. Yamaguchi, *Seshin no Jōgō-ron* (*Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa* of Vasubandhu), Kyoto, 1951, p. 1-10;

14. "Le troisiéme Bhāvanā-krama de Kamalaśīla, traduction de la version tibétaine," in the work by Paul Demiéville, *Le Concile de Lhasa,* Paris, 1952, p. 336-353;

15. "La bienveillance bouddhique," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royal de Belgique,* 38 (1952), p. 381-403;

16. "Les premières missions bouddhiques en Chine," *ibidem,* 39 (1953), p. 220-231;

17. "Notice sur le Chevalier Charles de Harlez de Beulin," in *Annuaire de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 119th year (1953), p. 414-440;

18. "Les premières relations entre l'Inde et l'Occident," in *Nouvelle Clio,* 5 (1953), p. 83-119;

19. "Sur le formation du Mahāyāna," in *Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller,* Leipzig, 1954, p. 377-396;

20. "L'Oeuvre indianiste de Roger Goossens," in *Nouvelle Clio,* 6 (1954), p. 193-198;

21. "La personnalité et l'esprit de Śākyamuni," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Science . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 41 (1955), p. 198-218;

22. "Le bouddhisme des laïcs," in *Studies in Indology and Buddhology* presented in honor of Professor S. Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1955, p. 73-89 (this article was translated into Japanese and published in the magazine *Zaike Bukkyo* (*"Lay Buddhism"*), 31, (1956), p. 12-17;

23. "De quelques influences grecques et scythes sur le bouddhisme," in *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres,* 1956, p. 485-504;

24. "Linguistique indienne," in *Publications d'enquêtes linguistiques,* Louvain, 1956, p. 269-274;

25. "Buddhist Controversy over the Five Propositions," in *Indian Historical Quartely,* 32 (1956), p. 148-162;

26. "Problemes concernant les textes canoniques 'Mineurs'," in *Journal Asiatique,* 1956, p. 249–264;

27. *"Khuddakanikāya* and *Kṣudrakapiṭaka,"* in *East and West,* 7 (1957), p. 341–348;

28. "Paul Demiéville," in *Orbis,* 6 (1957), p. 230–235;

29. "Prophéties relatives à la disparition de la Bonne Loi," in *Presénce du bouddhisme, France-Asie,* 153–157 (1959), p. 657–668;

30. "Mgr Théophile Lefort," in *Le Muséon,* 72 (1959), p. 251–255;

31. "Gérard Garitte," in *Orbis,* 9 (1960), p. 232–247;

32. "Mañjuśrī," in *T'oung Pao,* 48 (1960), p. 1–96;

33. "Yamaka-vyatyasta-āhara," in *Artibus Asiae, Melanges Coedès,* 24 (1961), p. 307–310;

34. "La notion d'être dans le vocabulaire bouddhique," in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie,* 23 (1961), p. 310–317;

35. "Aśoka et les missionnaires bouddhiques," in *Studia Missionalia,* 12 (1962), p. 35–48;

36. "Un festin d'immortalité dans le bouddhisme," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 49 (1963). p. 173–182;

37. "L'oeuvure bouddhique de Sylvain Lévi," in *Hommage à Sylvain Lévi pour le centenaire de sa naissance,* Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris, 1964, p. 35–51;

38. "Le suicide religieux dans le bouddhisme," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 51 (1965), p. 156–168;

39. "Louis de La Vallée Poussin," in *Annuaire de l'Académie Royale de Belgique pur* 1965 (vol. 131), p. 145–168;

40. "Avec le Bouddhisme," in *Bulletin du Secretariatus por non christianis,* 3 (1966), p. 123–133;

41. "Vajrapāṇi en Inde," in *Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à M. Paul Demiéville* (Biblothèque de l'École des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, vol. 20), Paris, 1966, p. 113–159;

42. "Une Sūtra composite de l'*Ekottarāgama,"* in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 30 (1967), p. 105–116;

43. "Les yakṣa Ajakalāpaka and Bakkula dans les Écritures canoniques du bouddhisme," in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire*

de Louis Renou (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, vol. 28), Paris, 1968, p. 445–466;

44. "Le Triple Joyau du bouddhisme d'après Nāgārjuna," in *Bulletin du Secretariatus pro non christianis,* 7 (1968), p. 19–33;

45. "Le Buddha insulta-t-il Devadatta?" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 33 (1970), p. 107–115;

46. "Note bibliographique sur la *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse* de Nāgārjuna," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 56 (1970), p. 534–542;

47. Preface to the re-edition of the *Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* by Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Brussels, 1971), vol. I, p. 5–9;

48. "Perspectives chrétiennes et bouddhiques sur l'acte humain," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences . . . de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 58 (1972), p. 355–369;

49. "Der Verfasser des *Upadeśa* und seine Quellen," in *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschafter in Göttingen,* Phil.–Hist. Klasse, 1973, Nr 2, p. 3–22;

50. "Trois Sūtra du *Saṁyukta* sur la Vacuité," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* 36 (1973), p. 313–323;

51. "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner,* ed. by L. Cousins, A. Kunst and K. R. Norman, Dordrecht, Boston, 1974, p. 91–104;

52. "Les visions dans l'histoire et la légends du bouddhisme indien," in *Les Nouvelles* 1976–1977 of l'Institut Catholique de Paris, no. 1, Feb. 1977, p. 156–160;

53. "Le concept de vacuité dans le bouddhisme," in *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques de l'Académie Royale de Belgique,* 5 series, vol. LXIII, 1977 p. 66–78;

54. "Die bedingte Enstehung und die höchste Erleuchtung," in *Beiträge zur Indienforschung* (*Ernst Waldschmidt zum* 80 *Geburtstag gewidnet*), Veröffentlichungen des Museums für Indische Kunst, Berlin, band 4, 1977, p. 279–298;

55. "Conditioned Co-production and Supreme Enlightenment," *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula,* London, 1980, p. 118–132;

56. "The Gāravasutta of the Saṁyuttanikāya and its Mahāyānist Developments," *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, vol. ix, London, 1981, p. 127–144;

57. "Lotus et Buddha supremondain," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, Tome lxix, *à la mèmoire* de Paul Demiéville (1981), p. 31–44; and

58. "Le Bouddhisme de Śākyamuni," *Nachr. Ak. Wiss. Göttingen, Phil. -Hist. Kl.*, Jahrgang 1983, No. 4, p. 83–120.

A nearly complete list of Mgr. Étienne Lamotte's review articles (*comptes rendus*) is given on pages xiv-xvi of the article "L'oeuvre de Mgr Étienne Lamotte" by M. Daniel Donnet, U. C. L., Louvain-le-Neuve, included in the volume *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*, Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1980 (Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, vol. 23)

The above survey of the life of Mgr. Lamotte owes much to this article by M. Donnet, and the "Notice sur Mgr. É. Lamotte, Professeur à l'Université de Louvain," Louvain, 1972, and the translation of this latter article by Mrs. Sara Webb. I am also indebted to Mrs. Webb for updating much of the material contained in these Belgian articles.

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